














The Dissertation Committee for Daniel Parker Hanchey 




Cicero the Dialogician: 
The Construction of Community at the End of the Republic 
 
 
       
 
        Committee:  
  
              
__________________________________  
              Andrew M. Riggsby, Supervisor  
  
           
__________________________________  
              Stephen A. White 
  
              
__________________________________  
              Jennifer V. Ebbeler 
  
              
__________________________________  
              Lawrence Y. Kim  
  
              
__________________________________  








Cicero the Dialogician: 




Daniel Parker Hanchey, B.A.; M.A. 
 
Dissertation 
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of 
The University of Texas at Austin 
in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements 
for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 






I would like to thank Andrew Riggsby for his sustained instruction and input over the 
entire course of my graduate school career, including the direction of both my Master’s 
report and my dissertation. I am also grateful to the members of my committee, Steve 
White, Jen Ebbeler, and Larry Kim, each of whom helped me to complete this project 
under unusual circumstances. And I owe a particular debt of gratitude to Joy Connolly, 
who gave me comments and help as if I were her own student and colleague, rather than a 
student half of a continent away. 
 I would also like to thank my parents and in-laws for their constant support. Most 
of all I wish to say thank you to my wife, Ginger, who has been so selflessly supportive, 
even as she has worked and attended graduate school, and my son, Oliver, who has 




Cicero the Dialogician: 
The Construction of Community at the End of the Republic 
 
Daniel Parker Hanchey, Ph.D. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2009 
 
Supervisor: Andrew M. Riggsby 
 
 In the opening lines of the preface to De Divinatione 2, Cicero describes his 
motivation in composing of the complures libros of his post-exilic years.  Most of all, he 
says, he wished to prevent any interruption in his service to the state.  Though he does not 
say so explicitly, he clearly refers to an interruption occasioned by his exile and Caesar’s 
ascension.  Elsewhere Cicero describes this period of his life as enforced otium, an otium 
threatened by the absence of the dignitas which Cicero identifies with the otium of L. 
Crassus in the opening words of De Oratore.  As he claims in Div. 2, Cicero achieved a 
level of usefulness to the state (and so maintained a certain amount of dignitas) by 
writing his theoretical books, books which he says communicate the optimarum artium 
vias to the Roman reading public. 
 What Cicero does not explicitly explain is why the great majority of those works 
assume the form of the dialogue.  In this dissertation I seek to explore the formal 
capabilities of the dialogue which would make it attractive to a Cicero seeking to 
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maintain dignitas and to render significant service to a state faced with a rapid shift of 
political and social structure.  In general I argue that the dialogue form itself represents an 
antidote to the decommunalizing and populizing nature of Caesarian hegemony. 
 As I contend, the dialogue achieves its communal nature through an emphasis on 
three major ethics, each of which is demonstrated in the theories expressed within the 
dialogues, in the actions of the interlocutors, and in the activity of Cicero himself as 
author.  These three ethics (imitatio, memoria, gratia) each depend on community for 
their actualization and themselves generate the bonds that lead to community.  By placing 
significant, multi-layered emphasis on each of these ethics, Cicero aims to communicate 
their validity to a generation of boni faced with the non-traditional, non-communal power 
of Julius Caesar. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 Upon his return from the imposed silence of his exile in 57, Cicero quickly and 
regularly made his voice heard in Rome, delivering speeches in thanks for his recall, de 
domo sua, de haruspicum responsis, pro Sestio, in Vatinium, pro Caelio, pro Balbo, and 
in Pisonem all between 57 and 55.  Over the remaining twelve years of his life, however, 
Cicero’s opportunities for public speaking became rarer and rarer, limited by civil unrest 
and the transfer of power into new hands.  He delivered only a handful of speeches 
between 55 and 43, the majority of which at times feel like little more than Caesarian 
flattery.  Faced with the realities of Rome’s new political climate, Cicero had to turn 
gradually to a new medium for self-expression and public communication.  For Cicero 
this medium was the literary dialogue.  In this dissertation I examine Cicero’s use of the 
dialogue form in an effort to determine why Cicero considered it the best choice to 
replace his oratory and to communicate his ideas on the republic.   
 On a certain level, Cicero the orator turned to dialogue partly because of the 
influence of predecessors like Plato and partly because of a general affinity for the 
methods of Academic skepticism. 1  But the form also has a fundamental connection to 
his theoretical project of the same period.  This theoretical project, reiterated over the 
course of all of his dialogues, through a wide variety of topics and characters states in its 
essence that: Rome needs a republic; a republic needs an aristocracy of good men; and 
                                                
1 The philosophical influences on Cicero should not be underestimated. In the following chapter on imitatio 
I will specifically examine the suitability of Plato as a model for Cicero. On Cicero’s philosophical 
affiliations, see the work of Glucker and Görler, including their respective chapters in J.G.F. Powell, ed., 
Cicero the Philosopher. Glucker has argued that, at first, Cicero’s loyalties lay with Philo of Larissa and 
the “New Academy,” that he later became an adherent to the “Old Academy” of Antiochus of Ascalon, and 
finally returned to the “New Academy” and its methodology of skepticism. Görler argues that Cicero was 
always a disciple of Philo and never changed his affiliation. 
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the aristocracy must be a unified group.2  This syllogism locates the survival of Rome in 
community, however restricted it may be.  And it is the dialogue form’s emphasis on 
community that made it the most suitable mode of political expression for Cicero; in 
contrast to the monologic perspective of a literary treatise or even a speech given to a 
limited audience, such as Cicero’s speeches of 46, the dialogue form is a polyphonic 
medium for the expression and exhibition of right community. 
 Cicero had conceived early in his career of the unity of form and content in the 
written word.  In his first theoretical work, De Inventione, Cicero opens with an 
Isocratean argument on the importance of the unity of philosophy and oratory for the 
leader of the state.  This argument, as it had for Isocrates, arises from the general 
principles that eloquence gives a wise man influence and wisdom tempers an eloquent 
man’s temptation toward manipulation.  Such had been the case ever since the dawn of 
society.  Before eloquence men had wandered about as animals, unable to employ their 
ratio for any positive purpose.  There was no system of governance and physical might 
carried the day.  Only when an unnamed vir joined oratio to ratio did men decide to 
arrange themselves in societies governed by laws.3  Community was the offspring of 
speech. 
                                                
2 Robert Hariman describes this project as ‘republican style.’  As he says, the “republican style begins with 
a relish for the pleasures of composing and delivering persuasive public discourse, it includes other modes 
of exchange and becomes a more focused mode of action by defining consensus as the foundational means 
and end of governance, and it culminates in a model of leadership that features personal embodiment of the 
civic culture” (102). After his exile, Cicero uses the dialogue as his “other mode of exchange” precisely 
because the forum for “delivering persuasive public discourse” through oratory had become so limited. 
3 DInv 1.2: Quo tempore quidam magnus videlicet vir et sapiens cognovit, quae materia esset et quanta ad 
maximas res opportunitas in animis inesset hominum, si quis eam posset elicere et praecipiendo meliorem 
reddere; qui dispersos homines in agros et in tectis silvestribus abditos ratione quadam conpulit unum in 
locum et congregavit et eos in unam quamque rem inducens utilem atque honestam primo propter 
insolentiam reclamantes, deinde propter rationem atque orationem studiosius audientes ex feris et 
inmanibus mites reddidit et mansuetos. 
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In this proem, the first words of Cicero’s career as a theorist, he adumbrates two 
general ethical ideas, neither specific to oratory, which remain true for him until his death 
in 43.  In the first place, Cicero justifies his project (in this case, the explanation of the 
principles of oratory) with an appeal to its role in the construction of community.  While 
Cicero would go on to show himself a divisive figure in many instances leading up to his 
exile, two of his clearest political ideals were the concordia ordinum and its partner, the 
consensus omnium bonorum.  His objections to figures from Verres to Catiline to Clodius 
to Antony centered on their rejections or manipulations of traditional principles of Roman 
society.   
In the second place, even at this early stage, Cicero demonstrates an appreciation 
of the unity of form and content in the written word.  So he synthesizes the beginning of 
this treatise with the origins of society in general, and implies a further synthesis of ratio 
and oratio in the treatise to follow.   
 De Inventione itself does not fully bear out the general principles with which it 
begins.  It eulogizes community and details ideas on how community can and should 
function, but in its form it tends towards specific and individualizing principles in a 
monologic presentation.  It aspires to a unity of form and content, but a treatise which 
itself originates with the origin of society devolves into a conventional techne.  It gives a 
static taxonomy of rhetoric and replaces the pairing of oratio and ratio with one of oratio 
and ars.  In short, its form is insufficient for the project it outlines.  When he returned to 
the same subject matter thirty years later in his first dialogue, De Oratore, Cicero hoped 
to correct his mistake by making use of another form, a form steeped in philosophical 
tradition, which demonstrated a ratio while detailing an ars, and simultaneously 
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constructed and exploited the advantages of polyphony and community.   
 Cicero returned to the dialogue form of De Oratore fourteen more times before his 
death in 43, with: 4 
 
* (56 BC) De Oratore (De Orat.) 
* (54-51 BC) De Re Publica (Rep.)  
* (50 BC) De Legibus (Leg.) 
* (46 BC) Brutus  
* (45 BC) Consolatio^ 
* (45 BC) Hortensius^  
* (45 BC) Academica Priora (Acad 2) 
* (45 BC) Academica Posteriora (Acad 1) 
* (45 BC) De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum (Fin.) 
* (45 BC) Tusculanae Disputationes (Tusc.) 
* (45 BC) De Natura Deorum (Nat. Deor.) 
* (44 BC) De Divinatione (Div.) 
* (44 BC) Cato Maior de Senectute (Cato) 
* (44 BC) De Gloria^ 
* (45 BC) De Fato  
* (44 BC) Laelius de Amicitia (Laelius) 
 
 Cicero’s dialogues, though relatively neglected, have been the subject of much 
good scholarly discussion over the past twenty years, and Cicero’s political aims have 
played a major role in many instances.  Scholarship has tended to fall into one of two 
major categories: philosophical studies and rhetorical studies.  By philosophical studies, 
including the excellent collections Philosophia Togata I and II, as well as Powell’s 
Cicero the Philosopher, I do not mean that the scholarship in question does not take 
account of the political aims and topics of the dialogues; very often it does.  I do not 
mean that the work is performed by philosophers instead of classicists, nor do I mean that 
these works privilege the history of philosophy over the history of ideas.  I mean rather 
                                                
4 Works marked by a “^” survive either not at all or only in the smallest fragments. Parts of two versions of 
the Acad. survive. Acad 1 is the revised version, also called Acad Post. Acad 2 is one half of the original 
version, alternately called Acad Priora and the Lucullus. 
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that these works tend to engage with Cicero as a thinker and theorist first, as a politician 
second, and, a very distant third, as a writer. 
 The other type of scholarship, the rhetorical studies, tend more often to emphasize 
Cicero’s rhetorical works (most often De Inventione, De Orat., and Brutus), especially 
according to Cicero’s political aims as expressed and communicated therein.  Among 
these are the very good works of Narducci, Connolly, Dugan, and Fantham.5  This 
scholarship very often calls attention to the self- and state-fashioning projects that are 
relevant to this dissertation.  These studies are more interested than the philosophical 
studies in exploring Cicero’s use of some of his dialogues to communicate ideological 
positions beyond the stated goals of the texts.  This method has proved very enlightening 
and provocative on several occasions, especially as used by the four scholars listed 
above.  But as a general rule these works identify oratory, or at least rhetoric, as the 
medium by which the self- and state-building projects are achieved.  
 In this dissertation I wish to consider many of the same questions addressed by the 
second kind of scholarship, the rhetorical studies: what does Cicero consider to be the 
best way to ensure the survival of the republic? How does Cicero personally relate to the 
historical figures represented in the dialogues? What role does Cicero envision for 
himself in relation to his contemporaries at Rome? How dogmatic are Cicero’s positions?  
                                                
5 I am thinking here especially of Narducci’s Cicerone e l'eloquenza romana: Rhetorica e progetto 
culturale (1997), Connolly’s The State of Speech (2008), Dugan’s Making a New Man (2005), and 
Fantham’s The Roman World of Cicero’s De Oratore (2004). Both Narducci and Dugan also use Cicero’s 
speech Pro Archia to introduce their positions. Narducci initiates the approach of reading the rhetorical 
works in terms of a “progetto culturale.” He observes repeatedly the ways in which the Roman aristocracy 
seeks to deploy rhetoric as a means of maintaining their advantaged social position. In general, and 
especially in his chapter on Brutus, Dugan tends to be more concerned with Cicero specifically, interpreting 
Cicero’s rhetorical theory as an elaborate attempt at self-fashioning. Connolly, who points out in a BMCR 
review that Dugan perhaps over-emphasizes the self-orientation of Cicero’s theory, explores rhetoric as a 
tool for the construction and organization not of the self, but of the state, focusing on Cicero as “an 
exemplum of communal republican engagement.” 
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As Narducci, Connolly, and others have shown, Cicero’s rhetorical theory holds the 
answers to many of these questions.  At the same time, as the concentration of these same 
scholars on De Oratore and Brutus has proved, these answers are regularly best 
communicated through literary dialogue.  I aim to show that, while Cicero’s rhetorical 
theory can answer these questions well, it is in part aided by the form in which it is 
expressed, and that this form can communicate some of the same ideas even when 
divorced from the rhetorical content. 
 To this end I will consider all of Cicero’s surviving dialogues in the chapters that 
follow.  Though they are regularly distinguished according to several criteria 
(philosophical vs. rhetorical vs. ethical; 50s vs. 40s; before Tullia’s death vs. after 
Tullia’s death; regular conversational exchange vs. extended speech-making), Cicero 
himself, in his final dialogue, hints strongly that the dialogues as a whole share a certain 
bond.  Written in 43, Laelius is the most self-conscious of its form of all of the dialogues 
with its dialogical mise-en-abyme.  The opening scene of the dialogue follows the typical 
schema of a dialogue, with a young man (Cicero) sitting at the proverbial feet of an older 
one (Scaevola).  But the setting quickly shifts as Scaevola himself recalls another 
“dialogue” in which he himself was sitting at the feet of his father-in-law Laelius.  Then, 
in the course of this second, interior dialogue, Laelius himself recalls sitting at the feet of 
Cato, a direct reference to Cicero’s own Cato Maior de Senectute (Laelius 11).  A short 
while later Laelius also refers to a discussion led by Scipio on the topic of the republic, a 
reference to another Ciceronian dialogue, Rep. (Laelius 14).  This series of dialogues 
within dialogues, and the one dialogue’s consciousness of other dialogues, especially in 
this last of Cicero’s dialogues, serve as reminders to the reader that the dialogues ought 
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not be treated as discrete entities.  It is in this spirit that I consider all of Cicero’s 
dialogues with a view to determining the advantages of the form in the communication 
and actualization of his post reditum political project.6 
  
 The dialogues cover a wide variety of topics – philosophical, rhetorical, and ethical 
– and span many important and influential events in both the life of Rome and of Cicero 
himself.  Such diversity not withstanding, there are three social ethics that repeatedly 
appear in and structure the theoretical and dramatic content of the dialogues: imitatio, 
memoria, and gratia. 
 I treat each one of these ethics individually in the major chapters that follow.  My 
basic approach is to begin each chapter with a survey of the general principles or 
positions the dialogues give on the ethic in question (i.e., what do the interlocutors say?).  
I then observe the dramatic actions and interactions of the interlocutors to determine to 
what extent they agree with the theories that these same interlocutors have expressed (i.e., 
what do the interlocutors do?).  Finally I compare Cicero’s own practice of the ethic, as 
represented through his use of his own voice in the prefaces of dialogues and their 
individual books, to ascertain how fully he employed (or affected to employ) the theories 
outlined in the dialogues (i.e., what does Cicero do?).  
 I begin in chapter 2 with imitatio.  As it is described and represented in the 
dialogues, imitation is a potentially dangerous act.  It contains elements of performance 
                                                
6 My consideration of all of the dialogues instead of, e.g., the rhetorical ones only, is fundamentally 
contingent on the belief that they all, like every other form of Ciceronian communication, constitute a type 
of political involvement. Since oratio is the impetus for joining in communities, or, to phrase it as Hariman 
has, “the republic is constituted in discourse,” the republic is “endangered by silence, for without the 
continuing discussion of public duties, virtue could wane, citizens become distracted, forces of change 




and pretense that hint of effeminacy and deception, and therefore stand at odds with 
traditional Roman aristocratic ethics and nature in general.  But Cicero seeks to 
rehabilitate imitation by identifying it as a process that allows individuals to live in 
accordance with nature and so attain to virtue.  In the dialogues and Off., nature and 
individual character are external ideas which must be accessed with varying levels of 
success through the processes of following nature or imitating other individuals.  One 
will ideally follow nature, but, if he is unable to do so, he must imitate another individual 
who himself follows nature.  It is the latter process that Cicero himself employs.  As I 
attempt to show, he is in the first instance an imitator of Plato in his use of the dialogue 
form.  Plato himself is an acceptable model because he has imitated nature through his 
use of the dialogue form, which approximates the reasoned process of dialectic more 
closely than any other literary form. 
 Like imitatio, memoria gives individuals access to a community with figures from 
the past.  In chapter 3, drawing on the work of Hannah Arendt, I contend that Cicero 
conceives of memoria not only as a recollection of the past, but as a reanimation of it.  
Cicero himself is a rememberer in the dialogues, wherein his memories bring back to life 
the figures of the past and allow him and other contemporaries to interact with them 
directly, much as mourners in a funeral procession interact with the deceased through the 
medium of the imago.  Cicero thus uses memory to transtemporize the generations of the 
republic.  By also setting most of his dialogues during periods of otium, Cicero further 
removes his ancient interlocutors from their historical contexts and transports them into a 
counter-reality to which individuals of all times have access.  By these means Cicero 
develops a “Ciceronian circle” which is meant not simply as a literary device, but as an 
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accurate picture of the communication of authority that traces back to Rome’s founding. 
 Finally, in the fourth chapter, I consider the social ethic of gratia, and its role in 
replicating the bonds to the past (imitatio and memoria) in the present.  In the dialogues 
Cicero regularly represents two kinds of gratia, one practical and concerned chiefly with 
maintaining a system of equal exchange, and one which is virtuous in its own right and 
responds to the virtue of others.  Cicero regularly discusses the first type of gratia with 
the language of commodities and associates it with the Epicureans, in both cases marking 
it as undesirable.  The latter kind of gratia he associates with the language of virtue and 
ratio, which are the principles that govern the interactions of the worthiest interlocutors, 
like Crassus, Scipio, and Cato.  Cicero also, in his dedications of the dialogues, 
participates in the giving of gratia.  His methods as dedicator closely adhere to the 
positive type of gratia which his interlocutors have themselves discussed and performed. 
 
The Dialogue 
 Before moving on to my analysis of Cicero’s dialogues, a few words on the form 
itself are in order.  J.G.F. Powell, in the introduction to his commentary on Cato, has 
given a brief, but very useful discussion of the progression of the form from Plato to 
Cicero.7  Powell calls attention to a pair of Cicero’s own statements in his letters 
regarding his use of the dialogue, in which he names both Aristotle and Heraclides 
Ponticus as influential predecessors.  Like Aristotle, Cicero affixed prose prefaces to 
many of his dialogues, and like Heraclides, he set many of his dialogues in the past.  
Cicero would certainly have been influenced by Xenophanes as well, and, of course, his 
                                                
7 Powell (1996) 5-9. The definitive study of the form in antiquity remains Rudolf Hirzel’s massive two-
volume Der Dialog, which treats the writers of dialogue individually, in chronological order. 
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debt to Plato leads Quintilian to name him Platonis aemulus.  But Cicero had only one 
Roman predecessor in the use of dialogue (M. Junius Brutus); it was accordingly his 
efforts (to some extent in cooperation with Varro’s) that defined what Roman dialogue 
was. 
 On the most basic level, a Ciceronian dialogue involves two or more speakers in 
some kind of conversational exchange within an expressed setting.  The presence of a 
second speaker creates several opportunities for the writer of dialogue: it furnishes a 
forum for the discussion of serious political, philosophical, rhetorical, or religious ideas; 
it permits (though does not require) a certain light-hearted charm in the banter and 
interaction of the interlocutors;8 it allows the author to multiply his voice, perhaps to 
include contemporary or historical figures or ideas as a tribute, perhaps to appropriate, 
manipulate, and violate a contemporary or historical figure or idea, perhaps in an effort to 
be inclusive or conciliatory, a force of compromise, perhaps to put his own ideas in 
biased relief against those of others, or perhaps simply to conceal his own voice.  
 There are, however, two specific characteristics of the dialogue which are not 
simply enabled by the form, but actually inhere in the form’s nature.  First of all, through 
their presentation of multiple speakers, dialogues naturally demonstrate and depend on 
communal interaction.  Such interaction can be complimentary or critical of the 
community in question, but by nature introduces an element of personal or political 
relations into the discussion.  Secondly, as a tool for the expression and comparison of 
ideas, dialogue closely approximates a skeptical philosophical method.  That is to say, 
though dialogue may be a vehicle for the dogmatic expression of a position, any type of 
                                                
8 Jon Hall (1996) identifies this characteristic as humanitas in the context of De Orat. 
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expression in dialogue is always made relative to other ideas, so that truth may be 
accessed or at least approximated (as the probabile) through comparative evaluation of 
specific positions.  And the multiplication of the author’s voice resembles a withholding 
of assent (epoche) for a specific position until the choices have been similarly vetted.  
Some dialogues execute these two functions of communal interaction and the application 
of the skeptical method more ably than others, and not by chance the greater execution of 
these functions tends to coincide with an increase in the number and variety of 
interlocutors.  The more speakers there are, and the more they speak, the more a dialogue 
tends to be communal and skeptical. 
 Using these two criteria as a general basis, the dialogues may be evaluated 
according to those which are the most dialogic and those which are the least.  While all of 
the dialogues have two speakers, some use their variety of interlocutors to more 
advantage than others.  The dialogues thus range from Tusc. which features only two, 
anonymous speakers, and features one much more prominently as he gives a largely 
dogmatic expression of his views; all the way to Rep., which features a full nine speakers 
(though some clearly play larger roles than others).  At the same time, dialogues like Fin., 
Cato, or Nat. Deor. feature long, uninterrupted speeches, while De Orat. regularly depicts 
conversational interchange.9  And some of the dialogues (e.g., Div., Tusc.) are entirely 
dogmatic, while many (e.g., Acad., Nat. Deor., Fin. 5) end in aporia or, as Griffin has it, 
“at most a decision on the probabile.”10  Because of these differences, some dialogues 
take great advantage of the form through the comparison of various ideas by various 
                                                
9 Of course not even De Orat. reaches the same level of interchange as some of the “early” dialogues of 
Plato, but it comes much closer than, e.g., DD. 
10 Griffin (2003) 5. 
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persons, while others seem to have assumed their form by default and eventually devolve 
into something resembling monologue.   
 By using these criteria, we can observe not two or three distinct groups of dialogues 
(e.g., philosophical/rhetorical/ethical), but a spectrum of works that most closely wed 
form and content, with Tusc. on one end and De Orat. on the other.  Tusc., with its 
anonymity, duality, and dogma, least expresses the communal and skeptical aspects of 
dialogue.  De Orat., which involves a synthesis of ideas and artfully exhibits multifaceted 
communal interactions, derives greatest benefit from dialogue.  Dialogues like Fin., 
Acad., or Nat. Deor., which balance long speeches in favor of specific philosophical 
positions, skillfully use the dialogue form as a forum for the application of the skeptical 
method.  But because of their tendency to be reduced to dyadic exchanges, with 
characters serving as placeholders for their philosophies, they less ideally represent 
community and fall closer to the middle of the spectrum than De Orat.  This type of 
classification on a spectrum has the advantage of providing a synoptic view of all the 
dialogues, as the mise-en-abyme of Laelius recommends.  It also helps explain in non-
rhetorical terms why De Orat. is so rich in its representation and formulation of 
community. 
 The synoptic reading of the dialogues, suggested by Laelius and enabled by the 
spectrum of classification here described, allows for the dialogues to be put into a sort of 
interdialogue dialogue that can help to highlight Cicero’s political views and strategies.  
The identification of Cicero’s own particular view is complicated even in an individual 
dialogue like, for instance, Acad.  This dialogue’s very topic, Academic skepticism, is 
borne out by its method.  That is, all speakers, even the character Cicero, are subjected to 
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critical evaluation, and no final consensus is reached.  It would seem that “Cicero takes 
both (or all) sides seriously and invites his readers to do the same.”11  As Brittain 
concludes, “the purpose of dialogue is to investigate the arguments for and against 
Academic skepticism, not to show that one side is right.”12  This conclusion writ large 
applies to the dialogues as a whole.13  Neither a Varro nor a Cicero, nor even a Torquatus 
from Fin. can be totally dismissed as a component of Cicero’s opinion.  The method 
Cicero the author supports is one that demands several voices.  If it could be reduced to 
one character or another, there would be no need for dialogue.  
By putting the dialogues themselves into dialogue with one another in a sort of 
Bahktinian dialogism one can come to some conclusions about what is probabile 
regarding Cicero’s views.  When Crassus makes a statement that is reiterated elsewhere 
by Scipio and later by Cicero himself, Cicero’s opinion – or at least what he seems to 
want to represent as his opinion – begins to come to the fore.  These sorts of reiterated 
statements tend to belie a text’s independence, even when a particular text is playing a 
particular role at a particular moment.  Not only can such a synoptic reading lead to a 
probable understanding of Cicero’s thought, but it recommends epoche, a withholding of 
assent to any single position in the dialogues until all of the dialogues are considered. 
Speaking strictly in terms of Bahktin’s dialogism, there is no reason to imagine 
the dialogues are unpolluted by Cicero’s other writings.  The treatises, however, do not 
observe dialogic activity internally, and so will be considered only incidentally as 
components of the external dialogue.  The one exception is Cicero’s last theoretical work, 
                                                
11 Brittain (2000) xii. 
12 Ibid. 
13 On Cicero’s pluralized voices in Div., see Schofield (1986). 
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De Officiis.  The absence of a second speaker in Off. is conspicuous; it is the only 
philosophical or ethical work to lack one.  In 43, the monologue of Off. seems to 
announce that Cicero has lost faith in the dialogue form.  It seems likely that, with the 
opening up of the political scene following the death of Caesar, Cicero preferred the more 
overt political participation of oratory to the subtlety of dialogue.  The handling of the 
subject matter in Off. seems to reinforce Cicero’s loss of faith in the community ideals of 
his dialogic program. 
Off. contains three books, the first dealing with virtue (honestum), the second 
dealing with the expedient (utile), and the third a sort of Hegelian synthesis of the two.  
Many of the positions taken in the second book stand in slight contrast to the ideals 
expressed in the first, and in many of the dialogues that precede Off.  There remains, 
however, a sort of dialogic character to the work’s form.  Cicero still presents two distinct 
positions, as he had, e.g., in Fin.  Only here he uses only one mouth to speak those two 
positions.  There are also moments within Off. when he invites the younger Cicero into a 
sort of dialogic examination, and at least acknowledges the possibility of viable 
arguments on another side.14  And Cicero couples these vestiges of dialogue with a 
division of his works into oratory and philosophy (1.3).  These two fields represent two 
halves of Cicero and demonstrate two styles of speaking/writing.  That Cicero counts Off. 
among the philosophical works which he says demonstrate a particular softened mode of 
speaking suggests again his recognition of an oral, dialogic component to Off.  All of 
these factors hint at a continuity between Off. and the dialogues.  But the changes are just 
as clear: the address to his son instead of a social peer, the absence of the second speaker, 
                                                
14 Off 1.2, 3.33. Cf. Dyck (1996), “at some points in Off. Cicero attempts a kind of dialogue, with the 
possibility of different premises on the other side ostensibly left open” (11). 
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and the priority of the utile.  These formal differences are signs that Off. has a different 
orientation than the dialogues.  Cicero’s form has retreated into the conventions of the 
treatise and no longer seeks to replicate or generate the community of the dialogues.  He 
is content to describe appropriate social and political behavior here, while reassuming his 
mantle as orator to demonstrate the appropriate behavior in public.  Perhaps he had been 
disappointed in the failure of the form to achieve its aims.  Perhaps he simply found a 
release from the burden of enforced otium that had demanded his retreat to dialogue.15  
Perhaps he would have returned to dialogue had he lived a little longer.  Whatever the 
case, Off. encroaches on dialogue, but never fully matches its formal potential.  Despite 
these differences, because it emphasizes many of the same principles of social interaction 
as the dialogues do, I will at times involve Off. in my discussion of the dialogues as a 
comparandum.  At these times the difference in form is regularly manifested in Off.’s 
less-idealized representation of community.  
 
The superior power of dialogue in relation to a treatise like Off. lies in its unity of 
form and content.  It is a forum for both the explanation and demonstration of skeptical 
philosophy and communal activity.  Cicero the dialogician sought to merge this 
philosophy and community in his own person even as he gave an exemplary 
representation of such a merger in the speech and interaction of his interlocutors.  A 
group of individuals with training in philosophy and dedicated to virtuous communal 
activity held the promise of resisting populist movements and restoring the traditional 
glory of the republic.  With a view to achieving such a scenario Cicero focused in his 
                                                
15 Off 3.2-4. 
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dialogues on three aspects of communal activity that befit the virtuous: imitatio, 
memoria, and gratia.  These three concepts, characteristic of a community of the 
virtuous, are integral to Cicero because they can are the aspects of community that can be 
both exemplified in and performed by dialogue.  Cicero discussed these three concepts 
with the characters’ words, demonstrated them in the characters’ actions, and performed 
them as author of the text. 
 Towards the end of Leg. Cicero comes to propose one of his laws which will ensure 
the survival of a “moderate and harmonious condition of the state.”16  This law takes on 
particular importance in the face of civil strife and the upsetting of the constitution that 
characterized the 50s and 40s in Rome.  It states: “Let this order (the senate) be free from 
vice, and let it be an example to others.”17  It is a law for an ideal state, one to be applied 
to a senatorial order started from scratch.  Atticus assures Cicero that not even he could 
weed out the vices of the present senate, despite that order’s most grateful recollection of 
his consulship (Ille vero etsi tuus est totus ordo, gratissimamque memoriam retinet 
consulatus tui, pace tua dixerim: non modo censores sed etiam iudices omnes potest 
defatigare).18  But Cicero in Leg. did not have the goal of weeding out bad senators; as 
author of the dialogue and the ideal state it described the order was his to create.  And it 
is this very act of creation of a new order that Cicero performs in all his dialogues.  In the 
face of the reality of a compromised senate he begins to populate an ideal ordo.  Ideally it 
will maintain the good element of the current senate Atticus summarizes: a gratissimam 
memoriam.  At the same time, it should be entirely free of vice, and therefore fitting as a 
                                                
16 Leg. 3.28: moderatus et concors civitatis status. Trans. by Rudd. 
17 Ibid.: Is ordo vitio careto, ceteris specimen esto. 
18 Leg. 3.29. 
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specimen for those not in its ranks.  For Cicero, such an ordo, demonstrating memoria, 
gratia, and fit for imitatio is key to the “moderate and harmonious condition of the state.” 
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Chapter 2 - Imitatio 
 
Unlike the other forms which the ancients employed for philosophical, ethical, 
and rhetorical theorizing, the dialogue is inherently mimetic.  The very essence of the 
form gives the action within it the illusion of being recollected and represented in a way 
that creates a certain amount of distance between the author and the immediacy of the 
conversation.  A dialogue writer assumes the persona of a recorder of an external event.  
Even when Cicero names himself as a chief interlocutor in a dialogue, as he does on 
several occasions, the nature of the dialogue suggests that the claims he makes as 
interlocutor are those of Cicero then, and not Cicero now.  In the case of Cicero the 
imitation extends to a second level.  Not only is the dialogue form mimetic, but by 
employing the dialogue form Cicero seems to be imitating some of the great philosophers 
of the Greek 4th century.  In this chapter I will seek to evaluate Cicero’s opinions on 
imitation as expressed in the dialogues and then to consider what effect these opinions 
have on his own method of imitation as author of the texts. 
Richard McKeon made a significant distinction seventy years ago between several 
meanings given by the ancients to imitation.19  These meanings boiled down to their 
essentials are basically two: a). the imitation of reality or something real, and b). the 
                                                
19 McKeon (1936) 1-36. According to McKeon, the definition of imitation (of which he gives five) largely 
depends on which of the ancients you ask.  For Plato, limiting the meanings of imitation to any number is 
not quite accurate, and it can only be understood as that which seeks to approximate the real. For Aristotle, 
imitation refers not to the imitation of an idea or form, but of an actual thing, usually the actions of men 
(Poetics 2.1448a1), and his definition is confined to the context of poetry. A plot in a tragedy must appear 
to be something that could happen, with one episode following another seamlessly, organically. Dionysius 
and the teachers of rhetoric slightly alter this definition to refer to the imitation of the character or thought 
of a specific exemplum (29). I follow Fantham (1978) in boiling McKeon’s five meanings down to two, 
which cover most of the semantic range of mimesis and imitatio. As Fantham points out, this distinction 
influenced Kennedy’s in his fundamental monograph, and is necessary in order to avoid confusion between 
two basic, but completely different, functions of the literary artist.  
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imitation of another person.  The first meaning – the one which became the object of 
poetry-invalidating criticism from Plato in the Republic (especially book 10) and served 
as the most basic activity of the dramatist in Aristotle’s Poetics – refers to the writer’s 
ability to imitate reality, that is, how well he/she can convey an actual object or 
experience through his/her words.  Such imitation, skillfully employed, plays an 
invaluable role in the construction of the characters and settings of the dialogues.  The 
second definition, the one most common to rhetorical treatises and of seminal importance 
in most Roman social circumstances, refers to the imitation of an exemplum.  
Quintilian, who valued the exemplum of Cicero above all others, appealed to this 
second definition of imitation as a pillar of rhetorical education, summarizing the 
rhetorical view of imitation that passed in some way through Isocrates, Cicero, 
Dionysius, and “Longinus” to himself:   
It is undeniable that imitation makes up a large part of the ars of rhetoric.  
For just as discovery is first and most important, so too it is useful to 
imitate those very things that have been discovered.  And so our entire 
way of life consists of this: that we wish to do the things we approve of in 
others.20 
 
According to this definition of imitation, orators imitate other orators, writers other 
writers, or artists other artists in an effort to improve themselves, to identify with an 
ideal.21  This type of imitation, done creatively, is of course one of the hallmarks of Latin 
                                                
20 Neque enim dubitari potest quin artis pars magna contineatur imitatione. Nam ut invenire primum fuit 
estque praecipuum, sic ea quae bene inventa sunt utile sequi. Atque omnis vitae ratio sic constat, ut quae 
probamus in aliis facere ipsi velimus (Inst. Or. 10.2.1-2). 
21 For this position expressed in Cicero, see Antonius’ speech at De Oratore 2.88-97. Fantham (1978) 
offers a fuller discussion of Cicero’s stand on imitation for education. She compares the DO passage with a 
later discussion of imitation in the Brutus, eventually drawing the conclusion that in Cicero’s developed 
theory, the mentored orator must not even necessarily seek the ideal model, but only the ideal model for the 
particular genus dicendi for which he is equipped by his natural talent and disposition. Cf. also Leeman-
Pinkster II 284-88. 
 
 20 
literature, and in a broad sense stems from the fact that Latin literature takes its origins 
from imitation of its Greek tradition.22  It creates continuity and identity; it leads to – 
though is not restricted by – genre; and it serves as a marker by which the audience can 
both identify the context at hand and determine how to cope with it.  It is a method (ratio) 
of consummate importance, and thus, to Quintilian, artis pars magna. 
 For Quintilian the artes in question, those of which imitation forms a large part, 
are the literary and oratorical arts.  But the principle of exemplarity extends into other 
social and cultural spheres as well.  Jane Chaplin has discussed exemplarity in the 
histories of Livy in some detail.  In Livy exempla serve as both positive and negative 
models of political action, military action, and social interaction.23  Like oratory, 
historiography is a particularly fruitful medium for the use of exempla since, like oratory, 
it often aims to instruct its audience.  In its essence, the imitation of exempla, the second 
half of McKeon’s definition of imitation, is a means for education.  It is a magna pars of 
several artes insofar as it enables individuals to master various skills, from concrete 
actions such as writing literature to abstract behaviors such as acting virtuously.  
                                                
22 See among others, Russell (1979) 1ff., who, while focusing on poetic imitation, collects much of the 
Roman theory of imitation from Cicero, Dionysius, Sallust, Seneca, and Quintilian, each prose authors in 
the first instance. More broadly see the entire collection of papers of West & Woodman, which again focus 
on poetry. 
23 A recent study by Franz Bücher has generally explored the Romans’ use of the past, with particular 
attention paid to oratory. Bücher spends a great deal of space discussing Cicero’s own use of exempla, and 
draws some familiar conclusions about the malleability of an exemplum in the hands of a skilled speaker 
(he also compiles a useful list of figures appealed to as exempla). Bücher also examines the exemplarity of 
Cato in De Amicitia, but as one reviewer has suggested, the use of an exemplum in a dialogue is different 
than the use of an exemplum in a speech (BMCR 2007.03.20, though she seems to confuse the role of Cato 
in De Amicitia with his role in De Senectute). The difference occurs not so much because the figures in the 
dialogues are idealized, as the reviewer suggests (many successful exempla are), but because of the 
extended treatment of characters in the dialogues and the indirectness of an exemplum which is adduced for 
an internal audience while being eventually intended for an external one. For more on the exemplum in 




It is because of its potential to affect others so powerfully that imitation tends to 
tread on thin ethical ice.24  Plato’s distrust of mimesis is proverbial and Cicero himself, in 
his first dialogue has Antonius hint at the dangers of imitation: 
 
Quod si fictus aliqui dolor suscipiendus esset et si in eius modi genere 
orationis nihil esset nisi falsum atque imitatione simulatum, maior ars 
aliqua forsitan esset requirenda. 
 
But if pretended grief must be assumed and if there is nothing in this 
manner of speaking except what is false and feigned through imitation, 
perhaps some greater ars is needed. 
       (De Orat. 2.189) 
 
Imitation in these terms is a matter of deceit and dissimulation, an ars of faking.  
In spite of such ethically negative potential, the fact remains that Cicero’s 
dialogues are mimetic in their very form, in both senses outlined by McKeon.  Like 
drama they simulate a social scene, and like oratorical or historical exempla, they 
regularly appeal to individuals from the past as models for behavior.  In the remainder of 
this chapter I will seek to analyze Cicero’s evaluation of the ethics of imitation as 
presented in the dialogues.   
I will begin with an examination of the personae theory of Off., a theory which 
connects ethical behavior to stage acting.  Comparing this theory to Cicero’s description 
of imitation in the dialogues, I will seek to show that Cicero generally considers imitation 
to be a necessary means by which an individual can live in accordance with nature, and 
                                                
24 Dionysius of Halicarnassus wrote a now-lost treatise De Imitatione, in which he attempted to instruct his 
reader on how to imitate correctly, and so avoid the potential complications of choosing a bad example or 
imitating bad qualities.  It is apparent from an epitome, however, that his criteria are concerned less with 
ethics and more with lexis, and so his treatise amounts to little more than “a purely practical handbook for 
the rhetorical schools” (Bonner [1969] 39). Almost certainly it had great influence on the tenth book of 
Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria, the most similar of surviving ancient works (cf. Russell [1979] 6). 
Apparently no theorist ever constructed a discrete system for choosing and imitating positive ethical 
models. For a fuller discussion of the content and history of Dionysius’ treatise, see Bonner. 
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so live virtuously.  I will then move on to a consideration of who can imitate and be 
imitated, after which I will explore the ways in which the process of imitating creates a 
social network linking the right kind of imitandi and imitatores.   
After considering these ideas as represented within the dialogues I will seek to 
compare them to Cicero’s own imitation of his formal models for the dialogue, 
particularly Plato.  At the end of the chapter I will conclude that Cicero turns to Plato as a 
model because Plato himself uses a form (the dialogue) which attempts to follow the 
example of nature.  By imitating a formal example that aligns with nature, Cicero seeks 
to make his own theoretical writings both natural and virtuous.  
 
Cicero on Imitation 
 In accordance with the ideals expressed in his first dialogue (De Orat.), Cicero 
refused to limit himself to being either an orator or a philosopher.  In the same way, he 
did not settle on a single definition of imitation.  For him, imitari in all its forms 
functioned easily in both of the senses outlined by McKeon.  The philosopher in Cicero 
emphasized the imitation of the real or nature, and the orator in him appealed regularly to 
exempla and the imitation of a person or his actions, often doing both in the same work.  
Because of this polyvalence of meaning, Cicero never explicitly describes in full what he 
sees as imitation’s significance.  Only once does he even come close, in Antonius’ speech 
at De Orat. 2.88-98.  In this passage Antonius emphasizes not only the importance of 
choosing models, but the necessity of choosing the right ones.  Even here, though, 
imitation is limited to the second sense, that of imitating exemplary models.  The first, 
ontological definition of imitation does creep into Antonius’ theory, but not until much 
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later, when he is discussing emotions (De Orat. 2.189-96).  The enthusiasm he had shown 
for the second type is expressly contrasted by his universal mistrust of the first.25  The 
imitation of genuine emotion, Antonius claims, falls into the same category (both 
semantically and ethically) as lying (falsum) and faking (fictus, simulatum).26  It entails, 
in a sense, imitating oneself under other emotional circumstances or imitating another 
person’s emotions. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Crassus offers a balancing opinion to Antonius’ in Book 
3.  Though he supports the basic tenets of Antonius’ discourses on imitation and emotion, 
Crassus makes an effort to rehabilitate the ethics of the imitation of reality.  In discussing 
the emotions of the orator in comparison with those of the actor Crassus says ironically, 
“no doubt, reality always has the advantage over imitation.”27  In fact, though, he goes on 
to argue that the orator cannot always feel the genuine emotion necessary for the 
presentation of his case, and therefore has no choice at times but to imitate reality.  And 
whereas such imitation cheapened real emotion in Antonius’ speech, for Crassus it 
                                                
25 There is one point at which Antonius seems to advocate the imitation of reality, at De Orat. 2.94: 
Demosthenes, Hyperides, Lycurgus, Aeschines, Dinarchus aliique complures, etsi inter se pares non 
fuerunt, tamen omnes sunt in eodem veritatis imitandae genere versati, quorum quam diu mansit imitatio, 
tam diu genus illud dicendi studiumque vixit. The grouping of orators given here has seemed to many 
commentators to be rather forced (e.g., May and Wisse [2001] 148). Not to mention the linking force is 
something Antonius elsewhere criticizes. The key is to be found, as Fantham (1978), 9-10, points out, in 
the figure of Isocrates. Having immediately preceded this generation, Cicero gives Isocrates credit as the 
great imitated, the one who served as the model for the entire next generation. His pupils are divided up 
into the historians (Ephorus, Theopompus, et al.) and the orators. The first group was linked through their 
imitation of Isocrates’ epideictic oratory; the second group was linked through their imitation of Isocrates’ 
non-epideictic oratory, i.e., the mode of “imitating reality.” So Antonius here does not so much advocate 
the imitation of reality (which only distinguishes the Isocratean orators from the Isocratean historians), but 
the imitation of the figure Isocrates, the source for the next generation’s genus dicendi. 
26 De Orat. 2.189: Quod si fictus aliqui dolor suscipiendus esset et si in eius modi genere orationis nihil 
esset nisi falsum atque imitatione simulatum, maior ars aliqua forsitan esset requirenda. 
27 De Orat. 3.215: Ac sine dubio in omni re vincit imitationem veritas (tr. May and Wisse).  See also May 
and Wisse’s note (291n300) which calls attention to the fact that Crassus’ irony (sine dubio) here is 
intended to recall Antonius’ discussion of emotion in order to mediate it. As usual it is not simply Crassus 
or Antonius who has presented the fullness of an issue, but a synthesis of the two. 
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involves attuning oneself to nature and embracing the emotions’ very essence.28  That is 
to say, for Crassus, the imitation of unfelt emotion can be ethically acceptable so long as 
the one selects the right imitandum (here nature itself).   
This sentiment on imitation is the last one expressed in the dialogue, coming just 
moments before the end.  In a sense it is the final word, but it is not the one we have been 
prepared to expect.  The second type of imitation, as in most rhetorical works, had 
dominated the dialogue, but it is the first type that concludes it.  And what had been 
ethically questionable up to this point (imitating reality) is referred to the realm of 
ethically appropriate conduct, the approach towards the natural ideal.29  
As usual, De Orat. takes both sides on an issue.  Both definitions of imitation fall 
into the domain of the ideal orator, the imitation of men and actions is regulated into 
acceptability, and the imitation of reality proves to have as much potential to be good as 
bad.  And as usual, it is tempting to find Cicero’s own opinions hiding behind the words 
of Crassus.  But Crassus is merely Cicero’s starting point.  Whereas Crassus fades from 
the scene of Cicero’s dialogues at the end of De Orat., Cicero does not.  He continues to 
debate the merits and ethics of imitation through many interlocutors and dialogues, and 
while he never gives a dogmatic statement of his position on imitation, he does begin to 
present a coherent picture of how imitation relates to virtue and nature and what it means 
to be a good imitator. 
 
Persona Theory, Self-performance, and the imitation of others 
                                                
28 De Orat. 3.215-6: discutienda sunt ea, quae obscurant, et ea, quae sunt eminentia et prompta, sumenda. 
Omnis enim motus animi suum quendam a natura habet vultum et sonum et gestum. 
29 Though it will be treated more fully below, it should be noted here that this rehabilitation at the end of 
the De Orat. is also important because of the fact that the dialogue is itself mimetic. 
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Cicero gives his most extended treatment of imitation at the end of his theoretical 
career, in Off.  As noted in the introduction, Off. does contain elements of dialogue; the 
three book structure allows for the honestum of book 1 and the utile of book 2 to enter 
into a sort of dialogue in book 3.  The danger of this altered type of dialogue is that the 
utile has no voice in book 1 and the honestum none in book 2 (theoretically), which 
makes Cicero’s expressions of those positions – especially those of book 1 – seem  
particularly dogmatic when the books are read individually.30  And the interpretation of 
Cicero’s personal position is further complicated by the Panaetian influence on Off.  
Cicero is dealing with a Stoic model and operating in Stoic terms, although he does not 
identify himself as a Stoic.31  These complications warn against accepting Off. as a 
statement of Ciceronian belief or excerpting book 1 or 2 without reference to 3.   
At the same time, Off. comes at the end of Cicero’s career where it is colored by 
the positions and theories expressed in all of his dialogues.  The dogma of Off. can 
accordingly be cross-referenced with the positions detailed in the dialogues.  On the topic 
of imitation we can begin with the dogma of Off. as a basis for comparison with the 
dialogues, and then move on to an understanding of the dialogues’ general positions on 
imitation. 
                                                
30 In fact, the distinction between books 1 and 2 is not quite that black-and-white. The honestum does 
appear regularly as a backdrop in book 2, but it is at times difficult to determine to what extent it is 
informing the discussion of the utile. Cf. Off. 2.9: honestatem ab utilitate secernens constitueret esse 
honestum aliquid, quod utile non esset, et utile, quod non honestum. The utile, in practice, plays very little 
role in book 1. 
31 An interesting moment in book 2 comes when Cicero is discussing the acceptability of defending the 
guilty (2.51). He claims that prosecuting the innocent is never acceptable, but it is under certain vague 
circumstances permissible to defend the guilty. Recognizing the potential inconsistency of this position he 
refers the blame to Panaetius. Panaetius held this opinion, he says, and so may I (non auderem, nisi idem 
placeret gravissimo Stoicorum Panaetio). Cicero here reminds the younger Cicero and the reader that 
Panaetius, and not Cicero himself, is our authority in De Officiis. 
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Off. contains twenty-five uses of forms of imitari, offers several different objects 
for imitation, and regularly appeals to both of McKeon’s general types.  The sheer 
relative quantity of statements on imitation makes it possible to construct the kind of 
classification that Cicero never explicitly offers, and can lead to some conclusions about 
why imitation plays such an important function in the dialogues as a whole.32 
On five occasions in Off. Cicero uses imitation in the sense so prevalent in the 
rhetorical dialogues: the imitation of a positive exemplum is of value in the education and 
edification of the individual.33  These references to exempla, however, are little more than 
passing glances at imitation.  Of more interest is Cicero’s most concentrated discussion of 
imitation from 1.110-21.   
Beginning perhaps as early as 1.98, and certainly by 1.107, Cicero outlines 
Panaetius’ theory of the four personae that govern the choices and lives of individuals.34  
Persona theory, which both De Lacy and Dyck consider to be a Panaetian invention, 
appeals to the language of theater masks and roles in order to identify the different 
component parts of an individual which, when assembled, lead him to make various 
choices about his life and his character.35  Cicero identifies four personae between 107 
and 121: 1). the persona common to all humans, the universal nature which consists of 
                                                
32 By this I mean not conclusions simply based on discussions of imitation in the dialogues, but the role of 
imitation as a whole in the choice and execution of the form. 
33 Off. 1.133, 1.146, 2.46, 2.57, and 2.76. Similar to these, but with slightly more significance are 1.78 and 
3.6, where Cicero presents himself as a model. In her study on the use of exempla in Livy, Jane Chaplin 
(2000) defines an exemplum as “any specific citation of an event or an individual that is intended to serve 
as a guide to conduct” (3). She then subdivides the types of exemplum in Livy’s history. The first is the 
exemplum introduced by the author, Livy, as an example worthy of imitation. The second is the exemplum 
that individual characters cite as their model for a particular action. The third kind of exemplum is the one 
that characters can cite and interpret as a past action to be followed or ignored. This third kind of exemplum 
introduces a high level of subjectivity, which may be characteristic of Cicero’s own use of exempla in his 
oratory, but does not find its way into his discussions of imitation. For Cicero in his dialogues, an example 
is either good or bad, its quality is manifest, and it is open to just one interpretation. 
34 Dyck (1996) ad 1.107. 
35 On personae theory in Cicero and Panaetius, see De Lacy (1977), Dyck (1996) ad 1.107, and Gill (1988). 
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ratio;36 2). the individualized nature (propria natura); 3). the persona of each individual 
as dictated by fortune; and 4). the persona chosen by each individual, which amounts 
essentially to a choice of profession in Off.37  The sum of these personae constitutes the 
character of an individual. 
The vocabulary of persona theory creates an implicit connection between the 
behavior of an actor and the ethical behavior of any individual.  Like the actor, the 
individual must perform a role.  At Off. 1.114 Cicero draws this connection explicitly 
when he compares the activity of identifying one’s own nature with an actor selecting the 
role most appropriate for him: 
quisque igitur noscat ingenium acremque se et bonorum et vitiorum 
suorum iudicem praebeat, ne scaenici plus quam nos videantur habere 
prudentiae. Illi enim non optumas, sed sibi accomodatissimas fabulas 
eligunt. 
 
So each person should know his strengths and show himself a keen judge 
of his own good and bad qualities, lest actors seem to have more prudence 
than we do.  For they do not pick the best roles, but the ones most suited to 
themselves. 
       (Off. 1.114) 
 
Actors had also been the source of comparison for the orator in his use of emotions in De 
Orat. 3.215-6.  In the De Orat. passage Crassus introduces actors precisely because their 
                                                
36 Cicero outlines two very specific types of natura in this passage, the universa natura and the propria 
natura.  It is the universal nature of humans to be endowed with reason and speech (ratio and oratio).  It is 
this ratio that sets men apart from beasts, which allows them to synthesize present sensations with 
knowledge of the past and a reasoned outlook on the future.  And it is oratio, the ability to communicate 
through language, that leads men into communities. Universal nature, the nature of all men, is also what 
drives them in search of truth (Cf. Off. 1.11-14). 
 The personal, individualized nature is, like the universal, still natural.  It consists of innate, 
unchangeable qualities.  These qualities, though, are not those that separate men from beasts, but those that 
separate one individual from another.  Individual natures need not be ethically good or bad.  One may show 
severitas, another hilaritas; one calliditas, another simplicitas without anyone being wrong.  When 
personal nature does show a bent towards something bad it should be avoided, but otherwise each 
individual should attempt to regulate his actions by his personal, inborn nature. 
37 Dyck ad 1.107. 
 
 28 
entire art consists of imitation.38  In Off. they appear first for the preliminary step: 
selecting a model.  But then Cicero takes the connection a bit farther.  According to his 
logic the comparison of an actor’s role-selection to decorum in turn implies that living in 
accord with one’s own nature means not only identifying it, but then, like an actor, 
executing the performance of it (i.e., his “role”) as fully as possible.  Like an actor knows 
he will make a good Epigonid and so performs as such regularly and with utmost fidelity 
to the role, each person must recognize nature’s role for him and execute it in the same 
way.39   
But in contrast to the actor, in persona theory the individual performs as himself.  
The theory of personae thus externalizes the individual’s character, making it an object 
that the subject may attain with varying levels of success.  Each person’s role is, to a 
certain extent, predetermined by nature or chance, but, as particularly demonstrated by 
the fourth persona, each individual must make a voluntary assent to the dictates of nature 
and fortune.  The process of assent is the means by which the individual accesses his 
externalized personae, the way he performs himself.40 
                                                
38 Cicero actually draws an interesting distinction between actors, as imitatores veritatis, and orators, as 
actores veritatis in De Orat. 3.214. Narducci (1997) sees Cicero using this difference to excuse the 
potential ethical difficulties produced by the orator’s conjuring of certain emotions on demand. The orator 
does not fake emotions, he actually feels them, but is able to feel them at will. And his feeling of the 
emotions leads his audience to truth, rather than deceiving them (87).  Imitation is unethical in this context, 
but only because it is identified with the actions of the actors, who perform falsehoods (cf. Off. 1.111 
discussed below). Elsewhere Cicero considers imitation as true performance to be acceptable. 
39 Off. 1.114: qui voce freti sunt, Epigonos Medumque, qui gestu Melanippam, Clytemestram, semper 
Rupilius, quem ego memini, Antiopam, non saepe Aesopus Aiacem. ergo histrio hoc videbit in scena, non 
videbit sapiens vir in vita?  See also 1.115: ipsi autem gerere quam personam velimus, a nostra voluntate 
proficiscitur. 
40 De Lacy (1977) considers various implications in the choice of the vocabulary of persona (and prosopon 
by Panaetius). He sees the externalization of the self as the most natural meaning, but also notes that a 
persona can have an individualizing implication. So the Agamemnon role limits a playwright in certain 
ways, because the Agamemnon persona has certain inherent characteristics that differentiate from, for 
example, Thersites. De Lacy eventually comes to a conclusion similar to that of the four-part division given 
by Cicero: some meanings of persona are individual, some universal, some a matter of choice, some 
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At stake in Cicero’s discussion of the personae is one of the four basic principles 
of moral virtue – wisdom, justice, courage, and temperance – which Cicero outlines in 
Off. 1.  He has, by 1.93, moved on to the fourth and final of these principles, the one 
dealing with order and moderation, in quo inest modestia et temperantia.41  What he goes 
on to discuss, however, is a concept which he believes contributes fundamentally to the 
attainment of all of the cardinal virtues: decorum.42  So important is decorum that it 
functions nearly synonymously with virtue (honestum) itself: 
 
Huius vis ea est, ut ab honesto non queat separari; nam et quod decet 
honestum est et quod honestum est decet. 
 
Such is the force of propriety (decorum) that it cannot be separated from 
virtue; for what is proper is virtuous and what is virtuous is proper.43 
       (Off. 1.94) 
In his discussion of personae Cicero further clarifies his idea of decorum, 
describing it as something like living in accordance with one’s personalized nature 
insofar as that nature does not conflict with humanity’s universal nature, the use of 
ratio.44  The personalized nature he here evokes is the second of the four personae, the 
propria natura, and the universa natura used as a backdrop is the first persona.  The 
logic of this series of statements goes something like this: virtue is decorum and decorum 
                                                                                                                                            
determined by outside forces. In any case, there remains the potential for the self to perform the persona 
either well or poorly, and the action of performing, in whatever form it may take, represents a method for 
the actualization of an externalized persona. 
41 This phrase comes from 1.15, where Cicero introduces his four-part structure. 
42 As he points out, the Greek prepon. See Dyck (1996) ad 93ff. for Cicero’s definition of decorum, 
especially as it relates to Panaetius’ position and the idea of honestum itself. 
43 I have translated honestum as virtue in a non-technical sense. Something along the lines of “moral 
rectitude” might be more precise, but is also more cumbersome. 
44 Off. 1.110: Admodum autem tenenda sunt sua cuique, non vitiosa, sed tamen propria, quo facilius, 
decorum illud, quod quaerimus, retineatur. Sic enim est faciendum, ut contra universam naturam nihil 
contendamus, ea tamen conservata propriam nostram sequamur, ut etiamsi sint alia graviora atque 
meliora, tamen nos studia nostra nostrae naturae regula metiamur; neque enim attinet naturae repugnare 
nec quicquam sequi, quod assequi non queas. ex quo magis emergit quale sit decorum illud, ideo quia nihil 
decet invita Minerva, ut aiunt, id est adversante et repugnante natura.  
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is living in accord with one’s own nature, with the result that failing to live in accord with 
one’s own nature is a sign of lacking virtue. 
Cicero clearly implies that each individual is an agent who may chose to what 
extent he will follow (sequamur) his personal nature.  To do so fully is to be decorous, 
and therefore virtuous.  But as he continues Cicero explains that one does not merely fail 
to live decorously by not following his personal nature.  One may also forfeit decorum by 
actively following someone else’s propria natura. 
 
Omnino si quicquam est decorum, nihil est profecto magis quam 
aequabilitas [cum] universae vitae, tum singularum actionum, quam 
conservare non possis, si aliorum naturam imitans, omittas tuam. 
 
If any kind of decorum exists at all, it is nothing more than the consistency 
of one’s life as a whole and all its individual actions, which you cannot 
maintain if, imitating the personalized nature of others, you lose sight of 
your own. 
        (Off. 1.111) 
 
Here for the first time Cicero explicitly includes imitation in his discussion of the 
personae, and it is unethical.  Though persona theory implies a method of accessing an 
externalized nature, Cicero’s vocabulary distinguishes between two different processes.  
When one performs one’s own nature, he “follows”; when he performs another’s nature, 
he “imitates.” 
Cicero gives an example of an indecorous performance of the self in an unlikely 
place: the Brutus.  Not surprisingly, because of its rhetorical subject matter, the Brutus 
places strong emphasis on imitation in the second of McKeon’s senses, the imitation of 
exempla.  Only once (Brutus 225) does it touch on the imitation of nature, and even then 
it is in a context of the second kind of imitation.  In the passage in question, Cicero is 
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warning Brutus not to do anything which could be imitated by someone wishing to mock 
him.  To make his point he gives the example of a certain Titius, who was a regular target 
of abuse because of the effeminacy of his oratorical performance.45  According to Cicero, 
this effeminacy inspired others to give exaggerated imitations of Titius, imitations more 
to be aligned with caricature than imitation proper.  The relevant type of imitation in the 
passage is not this caricaturizing of Titius the imitated, but Titius’ own imitation of 
another’s nature, which gives rise to the ludic imitations of him.  Titius’ mannerisms are 
open to criticism precisely because they seem to his audience to be a poor imitation, or 
even misrepresentation, of the natural order (tam solutus et mollis in gestu).  To the mind 
of his audience, Titius’ gestures are not those of a man.  He is either following universal 
nature poorly because of his personal nature, or, as suggested in Off. 1.111 he has 
misconstrued his own personal nature by imitating the personal nature of a woman.  The 
caricaturized imitation of these behaviors, then, is akin to the painting of the table in 
Plato’s Republic 10: it stands in double remove from the original.  The caricature is an 
exaggerated imitation of an already poor imitation of nature.  As such it is entirely 
farcical and offers no pretensions towards reality.  At the same time, Titius’ imitation of 
another’s nature leads to this sort of ridicule because it is not decorus. 
As the example of Titius helps to demonstrate, the imitation of another is a poorer 
method for performing the self than is the following of nature.  But Cicero has not written 
off imitation entirely.  Though he has generally disparaged imitation in favor of following 
nature in the description of the first two personae, when he begins his discussion of the 
fourth persona, Cicero admits to the inevitability of the imitation of another.  As he 
                                                
45 Brutus 225: ita cavendumst, ne quid in agendo dicendove facias, cuius imitatio rideatur. 
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explains, the average person has no choice but to imitate a model (Off. 1.118).  People 
must imitate others, Cicero says, because they tend to have to make decisions about 
career and lifestyle before they have the appropriate wisdom or leisure to do so (1.117).  
Practically speaking, then, each person must imitate the example of others (especially 
parents) in selecting the best course for behavior insofar as that imitating does not lead to 
a conflict with one’s own nature (as it did with Titius).  In these terms, Cicero identifies 
imitation as the path most ethically appropriate for the majority of people, who, limited in 
their options by fortune (the third persona), do better to imitate than to make a decision 
based on their immaturity.   
Ideally fortune would play no role in an individual’s assessment of how he should 
regulate his life according to his personal nature, but very few have such an opportunity.  
Illud autem maxime rarum genus est eorum, qui aut excellenti ingenii 
magnitudine aut praeclara eruditione atque doctrina aut utraque re ornati 
spatium etiam deliberandi habuerunt, quem potissimum vitae cursum 
sequi vellent; in qua deliberatione ad suam cuiusque naturam consilium 
est omne revocandum. 
 
Then there is that extremely rare group of those who are endowed with 
either an abundance of natural talent, or extraordinary cleverness and 
learning, or both, and have also time for reflecting on what course of life 
they want to pursue most of all. In this reflection, they ought to assess 
every plan with reference to their own personal natures. 
        (Off. 1.119)46 
This rarum genus, exemplified by Hercules, is the limited group for whom the perfect 
identification with personal nature is possible.  The members of this class have both the 
time to deliberate and the intelligence necessary for identifying their personal natures, for 
attaining self-knowledge.  But time and talent are both products of fortune.  Good fortune 
                                                
46 Quintilian, no doubt imitating Cicero, makes a similar point regarding orators: Et hercule necesse est aut 
similes aut dissimiles bonis simus. Similem raro natura praestat, frequenter imitatio (Inst. Or. 10.2.3). 
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can render imitation unnecessary; imitation is a sort of compensation for the lack of this 
fortune, a shortcut towards finding one’s personal nature when one does not have the 
leisure to wait. 
 Thus, though he shows a preference for following nature over imitating another in 
his discussion of the first two personae, in his discussion of the final two personae Cicero 
rehabilitates the process of imitation.  He initially offers only two alternatives for living a 
life in accord with one’s personal nature: one can be lucky and so be given the 
opportunity to follow his nature perfectly, or one can, by default, imitate those around 
him.  Since neither of these options is particularly satisfying Cicero offers a new 
alternative to his theory by including in his discussion the exemplum of the Scipios.47  
The Scipios offer a twist on the traditional imitation of parents.  Because of the martial 
and moral excellence of the Scipios over several generations, Cicero tells us, when a 
Scipio imitated an ancestor he was in fact making progress towards virtue.  Personal 
nature (as in the case of the invalid elder son of Africanus) limited the way in which the 
younger Scipios could imitate the older ones, but where a military triumph could not 
always be imitated, the virtue that enabled that triumph could.  Since, as Cicero tells us 
elsewhere, virtue is the full realization of nature (in the universal sense), the imitation of 
virtue is akin to the imitation of nature itself.48  In this model, the two types of nature 
begin to overlap.  A Scipio can identify with his personal nature by making his actions 
conform to universal nature.  More importantly, the Scipionic model demonstrates a 
morally approvable notion of imitation: the imitation of a person who follows (universal) 
nature. 
                                                
47 Off. 1.121. 
48 As Cicero says in Leg. 1.25: est autem virtus nihil aliud, nisi perfecta et ad summum perducta natura.  
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 We can see then, that in his discussion of decorum and personae, Cicero has laid 
out two stipulations regarding imitation: a). all people should follow their own nature; b). 
the imitation of another’s nature is wrong.  Practically speaking, these principles are 
enacted by three groups: 1). most people must imitate others as long as they do not find 
themselves to be violating their own nature; 2). a limited group can follow nature alone; 
and 3). there is another group (like the Scipios) who can by imitating others 
simultaneously follow nature. 49  Groups 2 and 3 conform fully to stipulation a).  Group 1 
does not; it acts until it has violated stipulation b)., then corrects itself. 
 The distinction here is akin to the one made between Diogenes and Antipater in 
Off. 3.50-57.  These two Stoics, as Cicero frames it, disagree about whether a grain 
merchant should give full disclosure to his buyers about the imminent arrival of other 
grain merchants, or simply seek as much profit as possible through concealment of 
information without lying.  According to Julia Annas, Diogenes here argues in terms of 
legal obligations, Antipater in terms of moral duties.50  Thus the former insists on selling 
at the high price, the latter on disclosure.  Because of his emphasis on duty, Antipater 
talks in terms of boni viri.  This group, the good men, resemble Group 2 or 3.  Diogenes’ 
group, the group that uses as its standard not a positive idea of what duty is, but a 
negative idea of what does not violate law, fits in with Group 1.  Antipater’s group 
chooses positive activity; they intentionally imitate the terms of societas demonstrated in 
nature.  As Annas argues, Diogenes’ group, on the other hand, might view full disclosure 
                                                
49 Antonius almost gets to the point of supporting this mixed type of imitation in De Orat. 2.93-5, but 
ultimately substitutes Isocrates for reality, continuing his emphasis on McKeon’s second type of imitation. 
Cf. n21 above. 
50 Annas (1989) 151-73, whose chief focuses are the fact that Cicero just doesn’t quite understand 
Diogenes, and the importance of dealing with the distinction between moral duties and legal rights. 
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as a threat to all legal institutions (why not just give the grain away?), which themselves 
have been established for the preservation of societas.51  Annas argues convincingly that 
Cicero misses the point here, that Diogenes and Antipater are simply talking about 
different topics, and that their positions are reconcilable so long as Antipater takes 
account of legal institutions.  Even if he is mistaken, though, Cicero’s siding with 
Antipater’s limited theory agrees with his broader views on imitation.  The emphasis on 
legal institutions introduces a middle-man in the following of nature; the one who 
prioritizes these institutions imitates something else, he does not follow nature herself.  
Such imitation is not necessarily wrong (if the middle-man is himself virtuous, as with 
the Scipios), but in this case it distracts from the direct following of nature.  Legal rights 
and institutions, which take effect primarily through restriction, are obeyed through 
inactivity, through the absence of violation.  Moral duties, on the other hand, are 
responsibilities which require deliberate activity.  Whether he fails to grasp the fullness of 
Diogenes’ argument or not, the conflict Cicero details remains the same: doing what is 
right vs. not doing what is wrong.  Group 1 does the latter, Groups 2 and 3 the former.   
The limited Group 2 plays a limited role in the rest of Cicero’s thought on 
imitation.52  This is the group of Hercules (1.118); it is an almost inaccessible ideal 
                                                
51 And such institutions are of utmost importance to Cicero the advocate and author of Leg. 
52 It is tempting to see this group as the one referred to at De Orat. 2.98: Atque esse tamen multos videmus, 
qui neminem imitentur et suapte natura, quod velint, sine cuiusquam similitudine consequantur. Those 
mentioned here, however, are using nature to attain what they want (quod velint…consequantur), not, as in 
Leg. 1.26, the necessities of life (artes uero innumerabiles repertae sunt, docente natura, quam imitata 
ratio res ad uitam necessarias sollerter consecuta est). The difference lies in the differing meanings of 
natura. In Off. and Leg., it seems to refer to the quality of reality. In De Orat. 2.98, it is simply a character 
trait (like cleverness or wittiness), qualities that mark certain models as more decorus, but do not allow for 
the full-scale imitation of reality. Cf. Gunderson (2000) 215: “Taken to its extreme, this idea of nature 
obviates imitation. We can get around this impasse by denaturalizing the category nature: these two models 




whose dependence on fortune ensures it can have no practical effect on the reader.53  
Group 1, since it does not meet the standard of stipulation a). or the one outlined by 
Antipater, also does not suit Cicero’s standards for the truest use of imitation.  Only 
Group 3 offers the right method of imitation that accords with both stipulations a). and 
b).; its imitation mimics the following of nature. 
In the end, Cicero’s expression of Panaetius’ persona theory points to a positive 
type of mimetic performance.  The very notion of personae implies an externalization of 
the truest self to which each subject must attain through assent to various parts of his 
nature.  He must accept his role as a rational human being, and he must behave in 
accordance with his individual characteristics.  Cicero identifies the processes of assent 
as either following nature or imitating another.  In this sense, imitation leads the 
individual away from his personal nature.  But Cicero offers a rehabilitated idea of 
imitation through the example of the Scipios.  Because the Scipios themselves follow 
nature, the imitation of them leads not away from, but towards nature.  Such imitation is 
decorous because it leads to virtue.  But Cicero qualifies even the imitation of the 
Scipios.  In the next section I will explore how Cicero uses the Scipios and other 
aristocratic exempla to construct a limited network of the boni, who alone have the 
capability to select and imitate the right examples. 
 
The Imitandus and the Imitator 
The Scipios, whom Cicero introduces as an exemplum of Group 3, play an 
important exemplary role in much of Latin literature, and especially in the theoretical 
                                                
53 This is, of course, not to say that Hercules cannot himself serve as an exemplum (cf. Off. 3.25, treated 
below, p. 23). His actions are imitable, but the situation into which he is born is not. 
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works of Cicero.  As a family the Scipios are particularly interesting not only for their 
achievements in many generations, but for the survival of their epitaphs.  Andrew 
Riggsby points out that these epitaphs “emphasize evaluation of individuals by the 
community and in terms of their effects on that community.  Obligations are both based 
on the social role of the individual and defined in terms of the interaction of that role with 
other roles and with the society as a whole.”54  Through a coincidence of language, 
Riggsby speaks of the “roles” that the Scipios played.  The Scipios performed the Roman 
ideals of civic virtue in much the same way that every individual must perform himself 
through his various personae.  In the case of the Scipios, the “roles” they played had the 
same intended audience as the epitaphs themselves: the aristocracy of Rome.  Or as 
Habinek has it, “the Scipionic epitaphs all describe the assessment of aristocratic 
performance.”55  It was a performance of which the Scipios were acutely aware: in 
making ethical choices a younger Scipio had to choose whether or not to perform the role 
of a Scipio (a component part of his personal nature).  His performance both determined 
his decorousness and virtue insofar as it agreed with his personal nature, and structured 
his relationship with his community.  Even at the composition of their epitaphs the 
Scipios were positioning themselves as practicers of virtue to be imitated by other people.  
And to reinforce this exemplarity, the Scipionic epitaphs all contain similar 
characteristics, forming a multi-generational program in which each family member is 
                                                
54 Riggsby (1998) 78-9. He adduces the first of the known epitaphs, which I reproduce here with his 
translation simply as an example: 
Honc oino ploirume consentiont R[omai] 
     Duonoro optumo fuise uiro . . . 
     Hec cepit Corsica Aleriaque urbe. 
     Dedet Tempestatebus aide mereto[d].  
     Most at Rome agree that this one was the best man of all the good . . . He took Corsica and the city of    
     Aleria. He rightly gave a temple to the Storms.       (CIL I2.8-9) 
55 Habinek (1998) 50.  
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portrayed as an exemplar of virtue and an imitator of the actions of his ancestors.56  Even 
in the case of one who did not live long enough to imitate his ancestor’s actions, his 
epitaph still announces that “he was never outdone in virtue.”57   
When Cicero mentions the Scipios in Off. 1.116 he does not make explicit 
reference to the epitaphs of the family, nor does he detail an exemplum’s consciousness 
of his own exemplarity.58  Even so, when he appeals to the Scipios as exempla, Cicero 
accepts the role as external audience to their self-conscious exemplarity.  He marks them 
as worthy imitandi, for himself as well as for their own descendants.  At the same time, 
just as the Scipionic epitaphs have both familial and external audiences in mind, Cicero 
also conceived of a dual audience for his treatise.  He wrote both for his family (his son) 
and an external audience (his reader).  His implicit approval of an external audience to 
familial exemplarity embodied in his own citation of the example of the Scipios 
encourages his reader to embrace his role as audience fully.  The reader should not 
simply view the text from the outside, he should consider himself equally inscribed with 
the younger Marcus. 
As with the epitaphs, though, Cicero conceives of the external audience of Off. as 
an aristocratic one.  Because the descendant functions as internal audience in both the 
epitaphs and the Off., the instructions or exhortations of both texts can only extend to an 
audience with comparable social standing and understanding.  Only someone with an 
upbringing similar to the younger Marcus could respond appropriately to Off.  Cicero 
                                                
56 Habinek (1998) 52: “[T]he concentration and interconnectedness of the epitaphs invite the reader to 
imagine the continuity of the Scipionic tradition….” 
57 The full line reads: Is hic situs quei nunquam victus est virtutei (CIL I2.11). 
58 Elsewhere not only does Cicero conceive of the Scipios as exemplary, but even ascribes to them a self-




gives an example of the appropriate extension of the audience of aristocratic performance 
through the evocation of another Roman family with multi-generational significance at 
Fin. 2.61.  Here Cicero is arguing against the Epicurean notion proposed by Torquatus 
that a guilty conscience or fear of retribution – both disturbances to a pleasurable life – 
are sufficient deterrents against wicked behavior (Fin. 2.53).  To this end he introduces 
the exemplum of Torquatus’ own ancestor, Torquatus Imperiosus, in the hope that the 
personal connection will convince the Epicurean.59  Even more than this, however, 
Cicero uses Imperiosus to introduce his consular colleague, Publius Decius Mus, and the 
noble military achievements of himself and his descendants (Fin. 2.61).  Like the Scipios, 
the Decii exhibited a multi-generational excellence worthy of imitation.60   
The exemplary model works here as a network connecting Torquatus the 
Epicurean to the Decii.  At first, Torquatus’ own ancestor is his model; then an 
immediate parallel is offered for that model (P. Decius Mus); and that parallel evokes 
other exemplars (the descendants of Decius Mus) who are notionally parallel to 
Torquatus himself (as descendants of the original set of exempla).  The implicit 
externalization of the audience given in Off. ripples out a little more explicitly here in 
Fin. to encompass parallel families.  The exemplum of someone like P. Decius Mus is 
effective (and decorus) for someone like Torquatus because the latter is closely linked 
ancestrally to the former.  Such direct networking is of course not necessary in the use of 
an exemplum, but it offers a representation of the way in which appropriate models could 
                                                
59 Torquatus Imperiosus was a three-time consul of the mid 4th C BCE (347, 344, 340). Along with P. 
Decius Mus, he conquered variously the Latins, Volsci, and Aurunci. Several apocryphal stories of 
exemplary behavior attached to him, including his three tenures as dictator, his proclivity for one-on-one 
dueling, and his defense of his father who was accused of maltreating him. 
60 It is the multi-generational military success of the Decii that seems to make them more apt as an 
exemplum than Imperiosus himself, who also sustained many military victories. 
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be identified.  Just as the limited audiences of the Scipionic epitaphs and the Off. suggest, 
the network of Fin. further confirms that Ciceronian imitation is an aristocratic project.  
The emphasis on networking and the aristocracy in the end triangulates Cicero’s 
theory of imitation.  The selection of a worthy (aristocratic) model suggests a self-
awareness on the part of the imitator.  He is aware both that he is imitating and that he is 
included (or trying to include himself) in a network.  The awareness of the network 
suggests that the imitator understands his own potential role as imitated for some other 
part of the network.  So, in addition to his instructions to follow nature/virtue and to 
imitate worthy ancestors, Cicero adds a third component – one also present in the 
epitaphs of the Scipios – to imitation: offering oneself to the appropriate, aristocratic 
audience as an exemplum for imitation. 
The description of appropriate imitation laid out in Off. eventually depends on this 
final limitation to the aristocracy.  Cicero begins his discussion of imitation with a 
negative example.  He defines decorum as living in accord with one’s personal nature, 
and closely identifies decorum with virtue.  The failure to live in accordance with one’s 
nature leads to an absence of virtue, and the cause of such a failure is often the fact that 
one has imitated someone else’s personal nature.  From the outset imitation is a threat to 
virtue.  But imitation can still approximate virtue if one imitates in the right way.  Cicero 
gives three possible styles of imitation that can work.  In the first place, it is permissible 
to imitate the personal nature of others up until which time as that personal nature 
violates universal nature.  This is the default type of imitation, available to all.  One can 
also, given the right circumstances, imitate nature directly.  This kind of imitation is the 
province of a rarum genus.  But one may also imitate those who are themselves followers 
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of nature.  These worthy exempla demonstrate their imitation of nature by their 
(aristocratically-defined) virtue, as is the case with the Scipios.  Cicero sets up this kind 
of imitation as the best kind, but in the end one must have the right personal nature to 
perform this kind of imitation.  Those with the right kind of nature are the people who 
recognize virtue in others and know how to choose good models, without falling back by 
default into imitation of their own parents.  It is, in sum, the boni who are fit to be 
imitated and the boni who will choose to imitate them. 
Cicero’s Laelius summarizes the ideas of Off. succinctly in his one reference to 
imitation in the dialogue on friendship, returning again to the example of Scipio.  
According to Laelius, Scipio “never put himself before Philo, Rupilius, or Mummius, nor 
any of his friends of inferior rank.”61  This behavior, Laelius says, 
faciendum imitandumque est omnibus, ut, si quam praestantiam virtutis, 
ingenii, fortunae consecuti sint, impertiant ea suis communicentque cum 
proximis, ut, si parentibus nati sint humilibus, si propinquos habeant 
imbecilliore vel animo vel fortuna, eorum augeant opes eisque honori sint 
et dignitati. 
 
should be performed and imitated by all, so that, if they have attained to 
any excellence of virtue, talent, or fortune, they should impart these things 
with their circle and share them with their intimates, so that, if some are 
born from inferior parents or have relatives of either inferior mind or 
fortune, they might increase their standing, and be for them a source of 
honor and dignity. 
       (Laelius 70) 
Scipio is the imitandum, virtue is his imitable characteristic, and the audience that should 
imitate is his close friends (suis and proximis).  It is also noteworthy that imitation within 
the aristocracy does not seek the elevation of the individual.  In this context, exemplarity 
                                                
61 Laelius 69: numquam se ille Philo, numquam Rupilio, numquam Mummio anteposuit, numquam 
inferioris ordinis amicis. 
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results in the integration of others into the group, leveling the playing field between those 
who have proved they belong within the circle of the boni. 
Finally, Scipio himself, speaking on imitation and self-conscious exemplarity in 
Rep., adds one more qualification to imitation.  He confirms with Laelius and Cicero that 
only the boni are to be imitated and that only the boni are capable of imitating other boni, 
but he offers a slight nuance to the picture.  According to Scipio, the imitandus should not 
offer himself as an example only to the acceptable imitator.   
‘huic scilicet’ Africanus ‘uni paene—nam in hoc fere uno sunt cetera—, ut 
numquam a se ipso instituendo contemplandoque discedat, ut ad 
imitationem sui vocet alios, ut sese splendore animi et vitae suae sicut 
speculum praebeat civibus.’ 
 
[The good statesman ought to dedicate himself] to pretty much just this 
one thing – for all other things are essentially contained in this one – that 
he never stop training and contemplating himself, so that he may summon 
others to the imitation of himself, and so that, because of the shining 
example of his soul and life, he may offer himself as a mirror to the 
citizens. 
       (Rep. 2.69) 
 
Here Scipio finally satisfies the other interlocutors of Rep. 2 with this description of the 
statesman, though his statement takes an ironic turn by insisting that the key to the 
governing others lies in focusing on oneself.  That irony not withstanding, Cicero claims 
here as he later would in Off. that the worthy exemplum has a full understanding of his 
own nature; he is, of course, also to be virtuous, i.e., to demonstrate a splendor of mind 
and life.  Notably, though, Scipio instructs his statesman to offer himself as an example 
not simply to the boni, but to the citizens in general (civibus).  The self-conscious 
exemplar does not have the responsibility of limiting his audience; indeed it would be 
folly to want others not to follow an example of virtue.  It is the responsibility of the 
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imitandus to offer a general example; it is the responsibility of the imitator to seek out a 
specific model. 
The general exemplarity Scipio here supports does not suggest that anyone is 
capable of imitating a worthy example.  As he continues the discussion in Rep. 2, he 
describes the circumstances under which class distinctions govern the imitation of the 
virtuous.  To make his point Scipio turns to the analogue of musicians.  Scipio describes 
two possible scenarios for musicians playing together: they may play either in harmony 
or disharmony.  The same options, he says, apply to governance.  The different social 
classes can operate harmoniously in their own affairs or they can fail to, and so generate 
dissonance.  Missing from both the music and the state is the option of unison.  Scipio 
does not allow the imitandus to choose his imitators, but he does clearly imply that only a 
limited group will be able to match the pitch of the exemplary statesman; others will 
merely be able to approximate it, to harmonize with it.62  This sentiment closely 
resembles the limitations imposed by the third and fourth personae.  As Scipio confirms, 
only the boni are worthy of imitation, and those who can fully imitate the boni are, by 
definition, boni themselves.63 
From the collective picture provided by Off., Laelius, Rep., and Fin., imitation 
begins to emerge not merely as a characteristic of the aristocracy, but as a criterion for 
the very definition of the boni.  The group self-selects its members as certain figures self-
consciously perform virtue with a full awareness of their audience, while others 
demonstrate their own awareness of virtue through the imitation of the virtuous 
                                                
62 Ideally the boni eventually become the model to be imitated by the people. On Cicero’s division of 
classes in both Rep. and Leg. and the senatorial class’s function as unified model, see Asmis (2005). 
63 Cf. also Laelius 70, in which Laelius says that one should share his virtues only with those close to him, 
his friends and family. 
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exemplum.  The process of identifying the bonus, follows a string of conditions like this: 
Who is a bonus?  The one who is virtuous.  Who is virtuous?  The one who lives 
decorously.  Who lives decorously?  The one who lives in accordance with nature.  Who 
lives in accordance with nature?  The one who imitates the right models.  By this chain of 
reasoning, imitation functions as an avenue to inclusion among the boni. 
It is, of course, much easier for one to choose and imitate a good model when 
one’s own ancestors are the model.  If imitation of parents is the default model, the 
children of aristocrats will far more often select the appropriate model, by accident more 
often than not.  So despite an exemplar’s presentation of himself as an example to all 
citizens, the default pattern of imitation assures the reiteration of the limits of the 
aristocracy from one generation to the next.  The network of the aristocracy, the boni, 
remains highly insular insofar as the children of the aristocracy are good by default, while 
those outside the aristocracy must generate their own goodness. 
 
Imitation and Society 
I have thus far argued that Cicero, in his dialogues and Off., conceives of 
imitation as an important method for identifying with nature and achieving virtue.  
Imitation can only lead to virtue when the imitated is himself virtuous.  By the same 
token, only a virtuous person can identify and imitate a worthy example.  Accordingly 
both those who imitate and those who are imitated are identifiable as boni.  I now wish to 
consider the implications of the imitation of the boni.  As I will argue, the reiteration of 
the boni from generation to generation enabled by imitation produces a society, and so 
reflects the community-orientation of the dialogues.   
 
 45 
The intergenerational reiteration of the boni highlights an important dual function 
of imitation: it both occurs within a limited network and generates that network (or, 
roughly, societas).  That is to say, the act of imitation produces society.  The imitative 
process acts a medium enabling the joining together of individuals.   
But before he makes a claim for imitation as a socially-generative action Cicero 
begins by locating the original impulse towards society in nature.  Cicero makes the 
important fundamental claim early in Off. that human beings are essentially social, 
endowed not only with ratio, but with oratio.64  He soon turns to the theories of Plato and 
the Stoics to justify and elaborate on his position: 
But since, as Plato perfectly expressed it, we are not born for ourselves 
alone, and since our fatherland has a part in our upbringing, our friends 
have a part, and since, as the Stoics like to say, what things exist on earth 
were all created for humankind’s use, and even men are born for the sake 
of other men, so that they can work for the benefit of one another, for 
these reasons we ought to follow nature as our example, to make a 
contribution to the common good through the exchange of duties, through 
giving and receiving, and then by our skills, our effort, and our talents to 
bind together men with men in societas.65 
       (Off. 1.22) 
 
Nature, here as ever, “defies fixed definition.”66  In the first place it is here, as it will be 
later in Off., something to be followed, a leader.  It can be personal or universal, the 
world of men or the world of beasts.  But the structure of Cicero’s argument, which is 
                                                
64 Off. 1.12. At Off. 15 Cicero gives four governing principles for virtuous living.  The second of these 
principles states that all virtue is contained in hominum societate tuenda tribuendoque suum cuique et 
rerum contractarum fide.  Cf. Fin. 5.65-66. A similar argument is given to the Stoic Chrysippus in Fin. 
3.67, and is of course also a key component of Aristotelian political thought (Pol. 1.1-2). 
65 Sed quoniam, ut praeclare scriptum est a Platone, non nobis solum nati sumus ortusque nostri partem 
patria vindicat, partem amici, atque, ut placet Stoicis, quae in terris gignantur, ad usum hominum omnia 
creari, homines autem hominum causa esse generatos, ut ipsi inter se aliis alii prodesse possent, in hoc 
naturam debemus ducem sequi, communes utilitates in medium adferre, mutatione officiorum, dando 
accipiendo, tum artibus, tum opera, tum facultatibus devincire hominum inter homines societatem. 
66 Connolly (2008) 78. 
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essentially chiastic, sheds light on nature’s role in society.  Cicero offers three closely-
related reasons for society to exist (a, b, and c) and then offers three similar appropriate 
responses in reverse order (c, b, and a), as illustrated below by underlined, bold, and italic 
fonts: 
But since, as Plato perfectly expressed it, we are not born for ourselves 
alone, and since our fatherland has a part in our upbringing, our 
friends have a part, and since, as the Stoics like to say, what things exist 
on earth were all created for humankind’s use, and even men are born for 
the sake of other men, so that they can work for the benefit of one another, 
for these reasons we ought to follow nature as our example, to make a 
contribution to the common good through the exchange of duties, 
through giving and receiving, and then by our skills, our effort, and our 
talents to bind together men with men in societas.67 
 
Cicero takes his inspiration for following nature as a leader (response c) from the Stoic 
principle that nature has produced all things for humankind’s benefit (reason c).  Humans 
ought, therefore, to take advantage of all that nature has provided, including other 
humans.  The argument, however, runs backwards.  The contentious premise that requires 
proving is not that humans should follow nature as leader.  Because of the broad range of 
the idea of nature, that kind of claim is generally acceptable.  The potentially contentious 
statement is the Stoic one which Cicero takes as a given, that all things are created for the 
good of man.  Cicero intends for the acceptability of the response, that it is proper to 
follow nature as leader, to imply the acceptability of the reason.  Cicero therefore never 
constructs an argument to prove that society is natural; this he takes as already proven.  
He has only to argue for the appropriateness of following nature, which is easily done.    
                                                
67 Sed quoniam, ut praeclare scriptum est a Platone, non nobis solum nati sumus ortusque nostri partem 
patria vindicat, partem amici, atque, ut placet Stoicis, quae in terris gignantur, ad usum hominum omnia 
creari, homines autem hominum causa esse generatos, ut ipsi inter se aliis alii prodesse possent, in hoc 
naturam debemus ducem sequi, communes utilitates in medium adferre, mutatione officiorum, dando 
accipiendo, tum artibus, tum opera, tum facultatibus devincire hominum inter homines societatem. 
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The description of society’s origins that Cicero gives here moves beyond the mere 
association of society with nature adumbrated in 1.11.  Nature itself, it turns out, does not 
create society.68  Society exists in nature, but nature endows men only with a). the 
impulse to join in society and b). the means (ratio and oratio).  To achieve society in 
Cicero’s natural world, human beings must perform the act (sequi, adferre, devincere) 
that leads to society and have an inspiration for performing that act.  As Connolly has put 
it, human beings “require some external stimulus to transform impulse into action.”69  
The process resembles the assent to the externalized personae of Off. 107-21.  Just as 
humans might ideally determine their character through the perfect following of nature, 
following nature is one way for humans to translate their impulse to society into the 
actualization of that society.  That is to say, both the character of the individual and 
society are external objects, which can be accessed through the following of nature. 
Cicero regularly returns to the idea of following nature, or nature as leader or 
teacher.  In the dialogue named for him Laelius also asserts the value of following nature 
for the creation of a society.  Laelius’ topic is, of course, amicitia, which itself bears 
certain similarities to societas.70  Most notably amicitia, like the particular definition of 
societas discussed above, only exists in true form among the boni (18-19).  The 
restriction to the boni also recalls the sphere of the best kind of imitation.  Here Laelius 
names the qualities that define the limits of the boni, and hence those who have the 
potential to be true friends: they include fides, integritas, aequitas, and liberalitas.  More 
                                                
68 Nederman (1988) 6: “[Cicero’s account] makes it impossible to say that man’s associative nature is 
sufficient to inspire and incite the creation of a community.” 
69 Connolly (2008) 87. She goes on to explain the disjunction of impulse and action as symptomatic of 
Cicero’s general inability to resolve the political impulse and the impulse towards self-preservation. 
70 Laelius makes the point, however, that friendships occur aut inter duos aut inter paucos (20). 
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than these qualities, though, Laelius insists that the people who deserve to be called good 
are those who “follow nature, the best guide to living well” (sequantur naturam optimam 
bene vivendi ducem).  Goodness’ role in nature closely resembles that of societas.  Just as 
nature does not create societas but the impulse to societas, nature creates only the 
impulse for goodness; the action (of following) is what permits men to become good.  
And, as in the case of the Scipionic exemplum, wherein the act of imitating a virtuous 
man marked one as both capable of selecting and copying a good model and by extension 
inscribed one into the circle of the good, the use of nature as guide marks one as capable 
of selecting and successfully following the right leader, and hence good.   
The processes of imitation and following thus appear somewhat analogous: they 
are both the actions of the good man by which he actualizes his potential, instilled in him 
by nature, to live in society and to achieve goodness.  As in the personae theory of Off. 
imitation of men is a sort of subset of the following nature, the acceptable alternative 
when performed correctly (as in the case of the Scipios).71   
The entire process by which the good define themselves through alignment with 
nature is further enabled by the individual’s capacity to recognize his own need to 
perform the action of imitation or following.  This capacity, also natural to men, is ratio, 
an idea to which Cicero regularly returns in his discussions of imitation and nature.  
Cicero explores the relationship between the ideas of nature, imitation, goodness/society 
                                                
71 Cicero does eventually create a space for the transmission of the goodness of the boni to the rest of the 
populace in Rep. It again involves the association of nature and imitation.  Connolly (2008) describes it 
thus: “[W]hen Cicero represents the republic as advancing toward a condition of perfection by natural 
means (Rep. 2.30), what appears here as a ‘natural’ process turns out to rest on the collective choice of 




and ratio in his own voice in his excursus on natural law which serves as the opening of 
the discussion in Leg.  From 1.22-45 he says: 
“When ratio has matured and been perfected it is rightly called ‘wisdom’.” 
quom [ratio] adolevit atque perfecta est, nominatur rite sapientia. (1.22) 
 
“For virtue is nothing but nature perfected and brought to its best point.” 
Est autem virtus nihil aliud, nisi perfecta et ad summum perducta natura. 
(1.25) 
 
“And many skills have been discovered through nature’s teaching. And 
ratio, having imitated nature, has accomplished in its skillful way the 
things necessary for life.” 
Artes vero innumerabiles repertae sunt, docente natura, quam imitata 
ratio res ad vitam necessarias sollerter consecuta est. (1.26) 
 
“And to those to whom nature gave ratio she also gave ‘right ratio’; and 
therefore nature has also given these law, which is ‘right ratio’ in 
arranging and forbidding; and if she gave them law, she has also given 
them justice; and nature has given ratio to everyone. Therefore nature has 
given justice to everyone.” 
Quibus enim ratio a natura data est, isdem etiam recta ratio data est; ergo 
et lex, quae est recta ratio in iubendo et vetando; si lex, ius quoque; et 
omnibus ratio. Ius igitur datum est omnibus. (1.33) 
 
“For virtue is the perfected ratio of some good individual, which is surely 
present in nature.” 
Est enim virtus boni alicuius perfecta ratio, quod certe in natura est. 
(1.45) 
 
Cicero returns regularly to ratio throughout his explanation of natural law because 
it is the fundamental endowment of nature upon all humans.  It is what makes humans 
human.  It is the bond they share which dictates that they should live together in 
community through justice.  But Cicero also identifies degrees of ratio: all humans have 
ratio but in some cases ratio can be ‘perfected’ and it can be ‘right’.  Right ratio leads to 
laws and justice; perfected ratio is wisdom.  Later, in a way suggesting his belief in the 
unity of the virtues, Cicero identifies the perfected ratio of the good man, not only as 
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wisdom, but as virtue itself.72  All men have ratio by nature; virtuous, good men have a 
developed kind of ratio.  As was the case with societas and goodness, nature gives ratio 
to humans, who must then realize it in its fullness (recta or perfecta ratio) through their 
own actions. 
This kind of description of ratio helps to explain why Cicero can simultaneously 
describe virtue as perfected ratio (perfecta ratio) and perfected nature (perfecta natura).  
Perfect ratio refers to an individual’s perfect understanding of the workings of nature, 
nature in its fullness, which is itself embodied in the idea of virtue.  Once a man 
comprehends virtue (via ratio) he is virtuous.   
Into this nexus of relationships between nature, ratio, and virtue Cicero introduces 
imitation.  Ratio, Cicero explains, relates to nature through imitation.  In order for ratio to 
grasp nature in its perfected state and so produce virtue ratio must become an imitator of 
nature.  In its common state, this ratio achieves the artes, the necessary things for life, 
through its imitation of nature.73  Cicero never specifically tells Atticus and Quintus what 
perfect or recta ratio could achieve through its imitation of nature, but it is almost 
certainly the thing necessary for a perfect life, virtue.   
The process is consistent with that outlined in Off.  Nature implants in mankind 
certain instincts, like those towards virtue/goodness and societas.  Nature also gives 
humans the faculty of ratio by which they can recognize those instincts and determine 
                                                
72 Compare also the association of ratio with ius in Leg. 1.33. 
73 The derivation of artes from the imitation of nature is an idea not unique to Cicero. Aristotle 
(Meteorologica 381b6) offers a very similar formulation: µιµεται γαρ ἡ τέχνη την φῦσιν. To this equation 
Cicero adds both the idea of ratio itself, i.e., the faculty by which humans know to imitate, and the 
extended ideas of the perfected ratio and perfected nature. 
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their source.  It is then the process of imitating or following nature, either directly or 
through the medium of a virtuous individual, that leads a man to the realization of the 
fullness of those instincts, a virtuous life lived in community.74 
A synthesis of the ideas of Off., Rep., Leg., Fin., and Laelius, shows Cicero 
painting a consistent picture of a vital role of imitation for a good man. Somewhat 
unexpectedly, imitation fits tightly into the semantic web of nature/reality, virtue, 
societas, and ratio.  Nature, virtue, and societas all exist externally for the individual.  
Ratio, as described in Leg., enables the individual to recognize the gap between himself 
and these external ideals, but it is only through the dual processes of following and 
imitating that an individual can achieve them.  Cicero identifies “following nature” as the 
preferred method, but this method is not always available.  When the individual cannot 
follow, he may instead imitate.  Though the process of imitation is qualitatively neutral, 
when performed by the good man, imitation allows an individual to access the natural 
and so to attain to virtue and the community of like-minded virtue-seekers.75 
                                                
74 I have deliberately left the gods out of the equation so far.  In fact the gods do play a role in Cicero’s 
philosophy of imitation, but their role in many ways merely duplicates the role of nature.  The gods are the 
ultimate imitandi, the full realization of the potential embedded in men by nature.  The affinity between 
nature and the gods creates a paradox: they are worthy of imitation, but in many ways inimitable. 
Cicero expresses this paradox artfully in the final book of Off., before moving fully into his explanation of 
how to synthesize the utilis and the honestum.  Here he begins to discuss a famous statue of Venus begun 
by the Greek sculptor Apelles.  In spite of, or more appropriately because of the beauty of Apelles’ Coan 
Venus, no sculptor had risen to the task of its completion.  Cicero says that Apelles’ sculpting of the face 
was so finely executed that no sculptor dared try to finish it out by “imitating” (imitari) the body of the 
goddess (3.10).  Cicero’s use of the Venus statue recalls the three groups of imitators he had described in 
book 1.  There are some, the Apelles of the world, who can fully imitate the gods.  These though are the 
rarum genus.  As Cicero goes on to suggest, though most men are not part of this rarum genus, the gods 
should be imitated insofar as it is possible to do so. 
75 For an example of the dangers of imitation done wrong see Leg. 3.31-32. The conversation here centers 
on the latest law Cicero has presented regarding the Senate: “Let this order be free of vice; let it be an 
example unto others” (Is ordo vitio careto, ceteris specimen esto; 3.28). Cicero goes on to insist that 
senators are natural examples. If they live lives of vice their vice will be imitated. The imitation of vice, in 




Cicero as an Imitator of Plato 
Cicero’s ideas on imitation help to elucidate Cicero’s own processes as an author 
of dialogues.  Cicero’s career as a theorist had not begun with dialogue; his first work of 
theory, De Inventione, adopted the form of the works on rhetorical theory from Greece: 
the techne, or treatise.  But by the time a mature and politically-seasoned Cicero began to 
write his new and improved Roman exposition of rhetoric in 55 BC in an effort to replace 
the more conventional De Inventione of his youth, he had turned to a different, and 
perhaps unexpected model: Plato and his dialogue. 
The dialogue form was by no means the strict province of Plato, especially not by 
the time of Cicero.  Aristotle and Heraclides Ponticus among others not only wrote 
dialogues, but had a distinct influence on Cicero.  And there is no need to assume that 
Cicero limited himself to selecting the works of one author as a formal example.  But I 
will argue that Plato is Cicero’s fundamental model in the composition of the dialogue 
form, and that Cicero chooses Plato as imitandus based on the principles of acceptable 
imitation that he (Cicero) outlines in his dialogues. 
Cicero’s career as a dialogician began with De Oratore, and his motivations for 
selecting the dialogue as the dominant literary form of his post-exile career must at least 
partially be explained by its relevance to this first dialogue.  It hardly seems an obvious 
choice.  Before Cicero dialogues had been predominantly Greek in origin and 
 
 53 
predominantly philosophical in orientation. 76  But both of these factors no doubt played 
some role in his choice of the form.   
The relationship between Greekness and Romanness constantly hovers around 
Cicero’s thought in the dialogues and regularly informs the way he defines himself and 
his theory.  This relationship becomes especially important in terms of vocabulary and 
definition.77  A word of particular importance to De Oratore is the one in its title: orator.  
The closest Greek equivalent to the term, and the one that orator often translates, is 
rhetor.  While the Roman orator is always civically involved, as A. Michel has said, “le 
rhetor pouvait être un simple maître de rhétorique.”78  That is to say, the Roman tradition 
of rhetoric, emerging from figures like Cato, while clearly influenced by Greek rhetoric, 
did not match up with it identically in terms of figures like Gorgias.   
Perhaps it is for this reason that Cicero abandons the form of earlier Roman 
rhetorical treatises like the Rhetorica ad Herrenium and his own De Inventione.  These 
works, stemming directly from Greek technai, inherited the ideas of the Greeks in content 
as well as form.  Accordingly the political activity incumbent upon the Roman orator was 
elided.  Cicero did not want to follow in this budding Roman tradition which based itself 
on an illegitimate Greek source.  Instead he returned to an alternative Greek source.  But 
in order to avoid the mistakes of earlier Roman treatises he had to find an entirely 
different generic model. 
                                                
76 Fantham (2004) 51 discusses the exceptions to these rules, including Cicero’s Roman predecessor, M. 
Junius Brutus, who wrote a dialogue on civil law. 
77 See, e.g., De Fin. 1. (preface) 
78 Michel (1960) 4. He goes on: “Or, on constate que, dans ce deuxième [non-political] sens, les Latins ne 
parlent pas d’orator mais gardent le terme grec de rhetor.”  
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The dialogue form was just such a model, one whose primary genre was the one 
so often opposed to rhetoric in the 4th century Greek world: philosophy.  The 
philosophy/rhetoric dichotomy that Plato first describes in the relationship of Socrates 
and the sophists like Gorgias and Protagoras seems to have emerged in the late 5th 
century.  But the two disciplines as they were understood in Cicero’s day truly began to 
clash after each had attained a level of autonomy and respectability.  This maturing of 
disciplines revolved especially around the dynamic figures of Plato and Isocrates.  Plato, 
like his teacher Socrates, attracted disciples, and Isocrates, a student of Gorgias did the 
same.  Each became a proselyte for a particular method, leading to a concretization of 
their differences.79  The conflict, as Isocrates saw it, was more than anything a fight for 
the legitimacy of rhetoric as a virtuous discipline. 
Cicero inherited and redirected this history.  Imitating the subject matter of 
Isocrates (in a broad sense) and the form of Plato, Cicero had the opportunity to 
circumvent the potential failures of a solely rhetorical work in favor of something that a 
reader would first identify as philosophy.80  At the same time, Cicero, as an orator needed 
a bridge into more philosophical topics.  The dialogue form of De Orat. solved both 
problems.  Just as Antonius and Crassus would debate and coalesce within the dialogue, 
the dialogue form itself managed to encapsulate the debate and coalescence of the 
historical rivals Isocrates and Plato, as well as the oratorical and philosophical halves of 
Cicero.   
                                                
79 Cf. De Orat. 3.59ff., esp. 3.61: hinc discidium illud exstitit quasi linguae et cordis, absurdum sane et 
inutile et reprehendum. 
80 On the imitation of Isocrates’ content, see Cic., Fam. 1.9. 
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Even by this logic, however, Plato was not at all the obvious choice to someone 
seeking to set out the principles of oratory.  Plato had himself twice used dialogue to treat 
rhetoric, and in neither case did he do so particularly favorably.81  In the Gorgias rhetoric 
is a tool of violence and deception in the unethical hands of characters like Polus and 
Callicles.  It is irresponsible to teach rhetoric because one never knows to what uses a 
pupil might turn it.  In the Phaedrus rhetoric fairs some better.  Plato’s Socrates does 
outline a way for the orator to be successful, including beginning with definition, making 
sure a speech is a complete body, and familiarizing oneself with the minds of the 
audience.  But he still remains critical of conventional written technai on rhetoric, and he 
insists that the rhetorical training of a treatise-writer like Tisias is of no positive value, 
unless it is the gods one is seeking to please.82  And it is only the philosophical education 
that can genuinely effect the appropriate level of knowledge that an orator would require, 
and this education would not lead him into the forum where he would use such skills.  So 
while rhetoric is theoretically allowed a place, it is not the place of a professional orator 
and cannot be expressed by a manual on the subject.   
In the face of all of these differences in subject matter and orientation, Cicero 
wrote De Orat. and the dialogues that followed it in direct imitation, not simply of the 
Platonic tradition, but of Plato himself.   I in no way intend to argue that Cicero did not 
also absorb some of the characteristics of Aristotelian dialogue, both in De Orat. and the 
other dialogues, in form and in content.  Cicero himself tells Atticus that he borrowed the 
first-person preface to many of his dialogues from Aristotle (Att. 4.16.2).  The preface is 
                                                
81 Gorgias and Phaedrus. See Fantham (2004), ch. 3 for a comparison of the Platonic dialogues with the De 
Oratore. May and Wisse (2001) see Cicero as an imitator perhaps less sympathetic to Plato’s positions (23-
26). Michel (2003), like Fantham, makes an attempt at describing a reconciled Plato and Cicero (86-96).  
82 Phaedrus 273c-e. 
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a regular feature in Ciceronian dialogue and is certainly nowhere to be found in Plato.  In 
another letter Cicero also says that he has written De Oratore “in the manner of 
Aristotle” (Aristotelio more) and that he has sought to blend Isocratean and Aristotelian 
theory (Fam. 1.9).  Both of these letters point to Aristotle as a major, even primary object 
of imitation.  But they do not tell the whole story.  The references to Aristotle in the 
letters are in fact included in those letters precisely because Aristotle’s influence was not 
manifest.  Cicero had to explain the ways in which he had borrowed from Aristotle.   
But readers of Cicero’s dialogues from Quintilian to Gallus Zoll have consistently 
come away from them with the impression that it is really Plato who underlies Cicero’s 
formal project.83  Quintilian after all identifies Cicero as Platonis aemulus.  But why?  
Why do readers see Plato where they do not see Aristotle, or even Heraclides?  Certainly 
the modern reader inevitably brings with him the bias of transmission.  Though we know 
Aristotle was a prolific dialogue author, none of his dialogues survive.  The absence of 
Aristotelian dialogues has a pair of potentially misleading effects on our impressions of 
Cicero’s sources: we are missing both theme and detail. 
If a dialogue of Aristotle’s dealing with rhetoric had survived from antiquity, it 
would be hard to push him aside as Cicero’s prime influence in De Orat., especially with 
Cicero’s own reference to Aristotelio more.84  By the same token, if we had a better 
                                                
 83 The definitive treatment of dialogue before and after Cicero remains Rudolf Hirzel’s Der Dialog, which 
details many practitioners of dialogue beside Plato and Aristotle who were available to Cicero for imitation.  
Cf. von Albrecht (2003): “The quiet, balanced and fluid diction of Cicero’s dialogues results from his 
emulation of Plato rather than from mere theoretical reflection” (128; Cf. Orator 10). And Michel (1960): 
“Ici, le dialogue devient un moyen d’approfondir la recherche. Il favorise la discussion. Il s’inspire des 
méthodes de Socrate” (80). The issue of Plato’s influence is most extensively treated in Zoll (1962), and 
most concisely expressed by Quintilian, who calls Cicero Platonis aemulus (Inst. Or. 10.1.123). 
84 Based on the treatises of Aristotle which do survive it is easy to understand Aristotelio more as a 
reference not to Aristotle’s form, but to his content, which clearly influences Cicero on several occasions. 
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understanding of the specific content of Aristotle’s dialogues we would be equipped to 
trace his influence on Cicero through the latter’s allusions and borrowings.  For instance, 
in the case of De Orat., despite Cicero’s claim to write in the Aristotelian manner, the 
Platonic influence is heavily felt.  The perception of this influence stems in large part 
from the setting of the scene of the discussion under a plane tree, a clear reference to 
Plato’s Phaedrus.85  Scaevola even refers explicitly to the Phaedrus as an example (an 
interesting metatextual moment in its own right).  In Leg. Cicero makes another allusion 
to the setting of the Phaedrus, but this time without direct citation of that dialogue 
(1.14).86  It is this kind of allusion that we may overlook when Aristotle is the object of 
the allusion.  Had we no knowledge of the details of the Phaedrus, the evocation of the 
shaded grass in Leg. would inevitably go unnoticed as a Platonic allusion.  Because none 
of Aristotle’s dialogues are extant, it is impossible to identify the details that could lend a 
Ciceronian dialogue a decidedly Aristotelian flavor. 
Still, based on the evidence we do have, it is highly unlikely that Aristotle’s 
dialogues interjected themselves into the roots of Ciceronian dialogue in the same way or 
to the same extent that the details of Plato’s dialogues did.  That evidence which points 
away from this kind of influence is the dialogues themselves. 
 Readers do not come away from Cicero’s dialogues with Plato in mind by 
accident; the dialogues regularly point directly to Plato.  On a general level the dialogues 
do this through their very titles: Rep. and Leg. undoubtedly take their origins from Plato’s 
                                                                                                                                            
On Aristotelian ideas in De Orat., see Fortenbaugh (2005). In general see the collection of papers by 
Fortenbaugh and Steinmetz, Cicero’s Knowledge of the Peripatos (1989). 
85 De Orat. 1.28. For a discussion of the Phaedrus’ specific influence here and in the Leg. cited below, see 
Görler (1988) 216-223. 
86 Cicero does eventually make the allusion specific in the preface to the second book (2.6). 
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dialogues of the same names.87  But Cicero’s dialogues are even more explicit than this.  
When in the preface to Fin. 1 he wants to defend his very writing on philosophical 
subjects in Latin, Cicero conjures the figure of Plato.  Why, he asks, should no one object 
to Ennius’ translations of Greek poets and yet object to the type of project that renders 
Plato in Latin (Fin. 1.5)?  Cicero seems to be talking both about translations of Plato into 
Latin (such as his own Timaeus) and about the general project he is here undertaking: 
writing philosophy in Latin in the style of Plato.  It is not Aristotle he mentions as the 
Greek philosophical model par excellence.   
In the preface to Leg. 1, when Cicero is contemplating in the company of Atticus 
and Quintus what his next literary endeavor should be, Atticus points him to the model of 
Plato, whom he says Cicero “admires, prefers to everyone, and esteems most of all” 
(quem tu admiraris, quem omnibus anteponis, quem maxime diligis; Leg. 1.15).  This 
description of Cicero’s tastes admittedly comes in Leg., whose Platonic influence is 
indisputable, but there are no such similar descriptions of Aristotle, Heraclides, or anyone 
else as a model in the other dialogues.  In the Tusc. Disp., though, Cicero does reiterate 
Plato’s priority: Ex hoc igitur Platonis quasi quodam sancto augustoque fonte nostra 
omnis manabit oratio (5.36). 
Perhaps most telling of all is the sheer magnitude of explicit references to and 
quotations of Plato in relation to Aristotle.  Eleven of Cicero’s dialogues survive, 
consisting of at least parts of 33 books.  Through the course of all of those books Cicero 
makes more than twice as many references to Plato by name (167) than he does to 
Aristotle (82).  In only one dialogue (De Fato) do the references to Aristotle (1) exceed 
                                                
87 See Leg. 2.14. 
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the references to Plato (0).  Only six of the 33 books mention Aristotle more frequently 
than Plato, and only once is Aristotle mentioned more than 2 more times than Plato (De 
Orat. 2, which approaches a treatise by Antonius in the tradition of Aristotle’s Rhetoric).  
The predominance of Plato is consistent, regardless of the subject matter or length of the 
dialogue, and no matter how much of a particular dialogue survives. 
Cicero also directly translates Plato’s dialogues on at least six occasions (Rep. 
1.66, Leg. 2.45, Fin. 2.52, Tusc. Disp. 1.20, Tusc. Disp. 5.35, Div. 1.60), while never 
translating Aristotle.  Cicero does summarize a position of Aristotle’s in Div. 1, but it is a 
position expressed in a treatise, not a dialogue (the Eudemian Ethics in Div. 1.52).  He 
also specifically names Plato’s dialogues on a regular basis.  Cicero names Plato’s 
dialogues on 25 occasions; seven of Cicero’s dialogues name at least one dialogue of 
Plato, and 12 different dialogues of Plato are mentioned overall (Phaedrus, Charmades, 
Gorgias, Republic, Protagoras, Hippias Minor, Timaeus, Laws, Meno, Apology, 
Menexenus, Crito). 
This kind of statistical data proves very little, but it strongly suggests several 
things about Cicero’s relationship to Plato and Aristotle: first, that Cicero had a greater 
familiarity with the dialogues of Plato; secondly, that he more readily appealed to the 
words or example of Plato; and finally that he considered Plato more authoritative as a 
source than Aristotle or others.  Certainly in the case of Heraclides Ponticus, when Cicero 
mentions him in the dialogues he does so with the formulation Platonis auditor (e.g., Div. 
1.46).  While both Heraclides and Aristotle may have influenced Cicero, it is ultimately 
Plato who is the source even for them. 
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While each type of evidence gathered here (names of dialogues, specific quotes 
regarding Plato’s priority, statistics of mentions of Plato, quotations of Plato, and 
mentions of his specific dialogues) can be explained away individually – the names of 
only two dialogues are Platonic, quotations come from only a select few dialogues, the 
statistics are not a direct measure of influence –, the combination of all the evidence helps 
to explain what readers tend to feel without this kind of analysis, that Plato lurks behind 
every corner of the dialogues, that Cicero is Platonis aemulus. 
Cicero’s selection of Plato should come as no surprise.  In the end, Plato not only 
gave Cicero the shape of his literary style, but he also gave him the shape of his 
philosophical method: Academic skepticism. 88  This method of philosophical inquiry, the 
one Cicero inherited from Philo, if it is to be represented by a text, insists on something 
akin to the dialogue form.  One of the fundamental principles of Academic skepticism is 
the rejection of the possibility of knowing.  The philosopher, since he cannot know, can 
only approximate knowledge through the probabile.89  The search for the probabile 
inevitably requires the philosopher to balance the dogma of several schools or individuals 
in order to educate himself on which position seems best. 90  The dialogue form, unlike a 
treatise (e.g., Off.) or even a poem (cf. Lucretius), provides a textual medium to express 
                                                
88 Cicero’s philosophical thought, of course, is not monolithic. As has been noted earlier, various arguments 
have been proposed for his allegiances to different Academic figures and to the so-called Old and New 
Academies. Rudolf Hirzel (1895) proposed over a century ago that Cicero, whose beginnings as a skeptical 
follower of Philo are undisputed, switched his allegiance to Antiochus of Ascalon and the Old Academy in 
the 70s (511n2, 534). This switch resulted in more dogmatic thought, most clearly expressed in Off.  John 
Glucker (1988) modified this theory to include a return to the skeptical Academy in 45. Most recently, 
Görler (1995) has argued against any “conversion” to the Old Academy of Antiochus, claiming Cicero was 
a skeptic throughout his life. 
89 See Powell (1995). To the skeptic, knowledge is “either not possible at all, or at least extremely difficult 
to come by.  The most one can normally aim for is an opinion which is probable, plausible, or persuasive” 
(19).  
90 On probability and the terminology of probability, see Glucker (1995). 
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the eclecticism of the Academic skepticism.  Fin. and Nat. Deor. are perhaps the best 
examples of the process, wherein individual representatives of the Stoics, Epicureans, 
Peripatetics, and Academics all compare views, but the spirit of the method is present to a 
certain extent in all the dialogues.  De Orat. does not compare philosophical positions, 
but it does collect many viewpoints on the topic of oratory so that both the internal and 
external audiences can weigh what factors they find most convincing.  This is not to say 
that dialogue cannot be dogmatic; both Cicero’s and Plato’s are on occasion.  But Plato 
had developed his dialogue form based on his philosophical method.  Since Cicero was 
an imitator of Plato’s skepticism it is only fitting for him to imitate his literary method as 
well. 
There is, of course, a certain irony to Cicero’s imitation of Plato.  On several 
occasions in his dialogues Plato warns against the dangers of mimesis.  As with rhetoric, 
Plato considers mimesis a threat to the individual’s virtue and wisdom.  So in the Ion 
Plato’s Socrates conclusively criticizes the art of the rhapsode as entirely derivative, and, 
more prominently, the myth of the cave in the Republic and the expression of the theory 
of forms in the Republic, Meno, Phaedo, and elsewhere emphasize the inferiority of 
copies with reference to their sources.  In the Ion, the rhapsode is not only imitating the 
reality of what is expressed by the Muses, but also the poetry of the composer (who 
himself comes in for extensive criticism in Republic 10).  In a sense, Cicero stands in this 
position with relation to his models.  And despite his criticism of mimesis, Plato is doing 
something of the kind in his own representation of Socrates and the other characters 
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within his dialogues.91  Cicero, who imitates Plato, who in turn gives a mimetic 
representation of Socrates’ actions, detaches himself by one more degree from the source 
in a manner similar to the rhapsode.  And this is to say nothing of Cicero’s consciousness 
of the exemplarity of his interlocutors.  In content and form as well as theory, Cicero 
embraces the mimetic representations so distasteful to his own model.  But for Cicero, as 
we have seen, far from being a force that detaches one from reality and nature, imitation 
is the action by which one identifies with nature.  Cicero’s theory of imitation ultimately 
helps to explain why, in addition to all the factors discussed above, Plato made the ideal 
model. 
According to Cicero’s theory outlined above, imitation is the process by which a 
person identifies with nature, and so attains to virtue.  In some cases this identification is 
mediated by an exemplum.  And imitation, again with nature as an example, leads to the 
formation of the bonus and the construction of societas, which is the medium and the 
forum for the expression of virtue.  
When Cicero imitates Plato’s dialogue form, then, he marks him as an acceptable 
exemplum.  As outlined in Off. 1.111-121, the imitation of another usually is harmful 
rather than good.  The exception is when the imitated is himself an imitator of nature.  By 
imitating his form specifically, Cicero implies that Plato’s form was the acceptable 
exemplum, and that Plato imitated nature by writing dialogue.   
                                                
91 The criticism of writing in the Phaedrus shows that Plato himself was aware of this potential 
contradiction. The form is nevertheless apparently justified because of its ability to include many voices, 
and thus more closely approximates dialectic than any other written form. See Annas (2003) 29. Also see 
below for further discussion of this aspect of dialogue. 
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Plato does not imitate nature in his representation of Socrates.  Generations of 
scholars and casual readers alike have used Plato to get to Socrates.92  The opinions and 
character of the un-literate fountainhead of ethical philosophy stand tantalizingly within 
reach to Plato’s reader.  But of course it is a mistake to suppose that Plato has faithfully 
represented actual conversations, that Plato’s Socrates is any closer to the historical 
Socrates than Xenophon’s.93  Cicero certainly shows that he did not lose track of the 
Plato behind the curtain.94  Neither is Cicero’s imitation of Plato seen in the choice or 
character of the interlocutors.  Cicero’s interlocutors tend to be more homogenized and 
less open to ridicule or embarrassment.  Plato’s true imitation of nature is located 
elsewhere, in his approximation of reality through dialectic.95   
In the use of dialectic, Plato begins to approach the truth itself (Republic 7, 533a).  
According to the Phaedrus, for teaching to be effective, four conditions must be met.  
Charles Kahn summarizes them thus: 
1). Knowledge of the subject matter on the part of the teacher, 
2). An appropriate audience, 
3). A discourse adapted to the character and intellect of the audience, and 
4). The opportunity for clarification and justification by means of question and  
answer. 
       (Kahn 379-80) 
 
                                                
92 It should be noted that the reverse is also true. So Blössner (1997): “Daß die von Platon im Rahmen eines 
fingierten Gesprächs gestalteten Beiträge der Dialogfiguren zu verstehen seien als Meinungsäußerungen 
des Dialogautors, ist mindestens eine ungedeckte Prämisse” (7). 
93 Rawson (1972): “Cicero’s admired Plato, whom he more than once follows for general plan and subject, 
is notoriously cavalier over fact and subject” (40). 
94 E.g., TD 1.97: quae est igitur eius oratio, qua facit eum (i.e., Socrates) Plato usum apud iudices iam 
morte mulctatum? Or De Orat. 3.15: Neque enim quisquam nostrum, cum libros Platonis mirabiliter 
scriptos legit, in quibus omnibus fere Socrates exprimitur, non, quamquam illa scripta sunt divinitus, tamen 
maius quiddam de illo, de quo scripta sunt, suspicatur. See also Rep. 1.16. This is not to say Cicero does 
see a realism in Plato’s characterization, or that he fails to achieve that kind of realism in his own 
dialogues.  But, in an almost Thucydidean way, Cicero gives a clear representation of reality not 
necessarily as it was specifically, but as it is generally. See Fam. 9.8.1. 
95 As he says at Rep. 1.16, his leporem Socraticum subtilitatemque sermonis. 
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The first of these conditions, Kahn goes on, is the only one actually met in the writing of 
dialogue, but the other three “can be represented, or ‘imitated,’ by Plato’s use of the 
dialogue form, in which Socrates does in fact present material differently to different 
interlocutors.”96  In essence, Plato’s use of the literary dialogue imitates dialectic, that is 
“philosophical dialogue conducted through systematic, one-to-one, question and answer,” 
aimed at attaining objective knowledge.97  And since dialectic itself is this avenue 
allowing access to truth, imitation of dialectic through dialogue in turn gives access to 
this avenue.  Plato’s use of the form depends largely on this ability to approximate 
dialectic. 
Summarizing Socrates’ position regarding the isomorphism of the tripartite soul 
and city in the Republic, David Roochnik explains that “[j]ustice, in both city and soul, is 
construed as internal coherence, the absence of faction.”98  There is a potential for that 
natural harmony in dialogue that Cicero sees, where (comm)unity leads to virtue.  He 
sees that, for Plato, “the attainment of … objective knowledge depends on participation 
in certain specified types of shared or collaborative activities, rather than being attainable 
by individuals in isolation.”99  Dialogue, in addition to imitating dialectic, dramatically 
enacts the community, the “collaborative activity” that can lead to objective knowledge 
and virtue.  For Plato the goal is objective knowledge; for Cicero, the ultimate end of 
collaborative activity is the collaborative activity itself, and the pursuit of the fullness of 
virtue and society present in nature.  By imitating the use of dialogue in Plato, Cicero 
imitates collaborative activity with a view to identifying with nature.  By this argument, 
                                                
96 Kahn (1996) 380. 
97 This definition of dialectic comes from Gill (1996) 285. 
98 Roochnik (2003) 14. 
99 Gill (1996) 284. 
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dialogue has an inherent formal capability to access nature.  It achieves its state of 
“naturalness” because of its dependence on societas (through the approximation of 
dialectic), its representation of societas (through dramatic reenaction), and its 
contribution to societas (through the removal of faction and the allowance for virtue).  To 
put it another way, for Cicero Plato offers a fitting example because of his approximation 
of the attainment of objective knowledge and virtue through the communal functions of 
dialogue.  Not only does dialogue imitate a conversation among real figures, it imitates a 
communal method (dialectic) whose goal is knowledge, justice, and virtue itself. 
As Cicero quotes Plato to have written, “we are not born for ourselves alone” 
(Off. 1.22).  Plato’s dialogues depict a Socrates interested in getting to the crux of an 
issue, a process that regularly requires him to enlist the “aid” of others.  Of course many 
times, especially in the early dialogues, the answers are never accessed, and Socrates’ 
pleas for help hint of disingenuousness.  This is perhaps true because for Socrates true 
society had to be established through the overthrow of conventional understandings of 
society by means of the elenchus.  Cicero, of course, wanted the opposite, “not to 
overthrow existing mos maiorum, but to enlist Greek education in its service.”100  Even 
so, Cicero sees in Plato that the means to construct society lies in the interaction and 
imitation of those that form it.  In Plato he finds the potential of a form (if not its 
actualization) for the expression of societas, a concept that is so important to his 
understanding of virtue.   
The appropriateness of Plato as a model for Cicero derives chiefly from the 
related methods of skepticism and dialectic.  By selecting him as a model Cicero 
                                                
100 Fantham (2004) 53. 
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implicitly identifies him as a bonus.  Aristotle, Heraclides, Zeno, Philo and others are also 
worthy of imitation in certain ways; they too are boni, the aristocracy of the philosophical 
societas.  But Plato is most decorus as a model as the best literary imitator of nature in 
Cicero’s experience.  
There is also a final, more immediate reason for Cicero to select Plato as his chief 
model, a sense in which Plato is more decorus than others: because his own personal 
situation closely resembles that of Cicero.  In a letter to Atticus (9.13.4), Cicero compares 
his own political opposition to Caesar to that of Plato to Dionysius of Syracuse, as 
expressed in Plato’s 7th letter.  Again Cicero’s form mimics Plato; again it is a form that 
encourages societas.  And societas is what stands under threat from both Dionysius and 
Caesar.  Plato is an exemplum decorum because he positions himself as a defender of 
society in the face of rising tyranny.  And he does so from a politically disengaged, 
literary perspective.101  No archon or council-member, Plato the philosopher expressed 
views in favor of society through a mimetic literary form.  Cicero the recalled exile did 
precisely the same thing.   
Imitating Plato allows Cicero to appeal to a base of support, a seconding voice, an 
ally in the quest for the virtuous imitation of nature.  For Cicero, the society that deserves 
forming is the one that closely imitates nature, that embraces virtuous thought, and that 
fights for its own existence against the threat of the unnatural vice of tyranny.  He finds 
expression of this society in the dialogues of Plato. 
 
                                                
101 According to the seventh letter, Plato spent his life seeking the right moment for political engagement, 
only to come to the conclusion that political systems were too flawed to be corrected without the 




 When he wrote De Orat., Cicero submitted a new public persona to the Rome that 
had recently exiled him.  The consular authority and oratorical superiority of his pre-exile 
career were not gone, but they were qualified.  The political ascendance of Pompey and 
Caesar had altered the backdrop against which influence was judged, redefining the 
criteria for power.  Cicero had, it would seem, two choices: 1). to accept the altered 
landscape, or 2). to seek to repair it in his now less-authoritative voice.  His solution went 
beyond both of these.  Cicero enlisted the voices of others and adopted a new voice of his 
own.  The orator merged with a philosopher and produced dialogue.  Within his dialogues 
Cicero outlined a theory of imitation, a concept squarely settled within the unassailable 
authority of mos maiorum.  Imitation, Cicero said, is the key to virtue because it enables 
the imitator to identify with nature.  And when this identification with nature is enacted it 
results in the actualization of the impulses to virtue and society that nature has implanted 
in all humans.  By imitating the voices of others through the form of dialogue and by 
imitating Plato in his use of the form, Cicero coupled his theory of imitation with a 
formal argument for the reevaluation of the political landscape.  Imitation, and not 
innovation, is nature’s way, and the fruits nature bears are goodness and societas, not the 
concentration of power in the hands of the individual.102  In direct contrast with the 
authoritarian univocality of the treatise form, the dialogues argue for the virtuous society 
of the good produced through the inherently social act of imitation, and Cicero’s own 
                                                
102 Compare what Cicero says in Rep. 3.43: crudelitate unius oppressi essent universi, neque esset unum 
vinculum iuris nec consensus ac societas coetus, quod est populus (“all are oppressed by the cruelty of one, 





actions as imitator of Plato in the writing of the dialogues bear out his belief in the 
desirability of cooperation among the boni. 
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Chapter 3 - Memoria 
 
 Hannah Arendt, in her study of the American Revolution, traces the success of the 
founding fathers’ nation-building project to their imitation of the Roman model of 
foundation.  She argues that, while the Constitution, Declaration of Independence, and 
other writings of Adams, Jefferson, Madison, et al. repeatedly make appeals to ideas such 
as natural law and a Judeo-Christian Creator-God, America’s stability following the 
revolution lay in its “worship” of the Constitution and its vestment of authority in an 
institution (the Supreme Court) which served as an ongoing reiteration of the moment of 
writing the Constitution.  That is, instead of locating the republic’s authority in an 
external absolute, the founders located that authority in the very act of founding.103 
 In identifying the republic’s foundation as the source of authority Arendt claims 
that the founders followed the example of the Romans.  For the Romans, she notes, the 
reiteration of this authority existed not in a judicial institution, but in the senate, the 
patres.  The senate was the seat of Roman auctoritas not merely because the institution 
itself traditionally consisted of authoritative men, but because its members “reincarnated 
the ancestors” who had founded the republic.104  There is an important distinction to be 
drawn here.  The patres did not merely have the inheritance of their ancestors’ authority, 
they participated in the augmentation – as Arendt points out, augere and auctoritas have 
the same root – of the project of founding, and so performed the same authoritative act as 
the ancestors.  This kind of reiterated authorizing produces a senate whose earlier and 
later members are working together in a sort of transtemporal cooperation.  This 
                                                
103 Arendt (1963) 199-202. 
104 Arendt (1963) 201. 
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transtemporality stands in contrast to conceptions of Roman history as progressivistic or 
teleological.  This method suggests that, rather than finding in, e.g., Cicero, a culmination 
of an evolution, or even an instance of resistance in the republic’s decadence, we should 
see in him a replication of the republic of the decemvirs, of Cato, of Scipio, and of 
Crassus.  By the rules of this system Cicero’s own authority and relevance are 
irretrievably linked to the survival of the republic, and the survival of the republic in turn 
demands the presence of a transtemporal society.105 
 In this chapter I explore Cicero’s attempt to generate just such a society (or at 
least an awareness of one) by taking advantage of the formal capabilities of the dialogue.  
In particular I turn my attention to his idea of memoria (a combination of English 
memory and memorialization) as the medium by which to define this transtemporal 
society.  The transtemporality that Cicero envisions requires effective and vivid memoria 
to erase the temporal lines that tend to structure perceptions of the past.  Memoria in 
Cicero’s dialogues grants Cicero not merely access to the past, but membership in it.  I 
will begin by exploring briefly the way in which the settings of the dialogues (being both 
diverse and often set in the past) help to mark memoria as communal.  I then turn to the 
communal nature of the Roman funeral to examine Cicero’s role as memorializer in 
mortuary contexts.  Several scholars have noted Cicero’s memorialization of great heroes 
of the republic in the dialogues.  Here I will focus specifically on Cicero’s 
memorialization of those figures in community.  That is, Cicero as a part of a community 
remembers them, and he remembers them as members of community themselves, a 
project that requires the dialogue form if it is to be translated into text.   
                                                
105 Connolly (2006): “To Cicero, virtuous self-cultivation and its preservation in human memory goes hand 
in hand with the flourishing of the republic.” 
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I then move on to the role of writing as a repository for memory and its role in 
communalizing the memory of the individual.  Next I will discuss the role of otium in 
providing opportunity for remembering and in transtemporizing the interactions of the 
interlocutors in the dialogues.  Finally, in the second half of the chapter, I look more 
specifically at the individual figures in the dialogues in an effort to explore Cicero’s 
actual identification of certain members of his transtemporal society, what I identify as 
the “Ciceronian circle.” 
I eventually conclude that Cicero uses the processes of memory to integrate both 
his exempla and himself into the same society in the hopes of communicating the validity 
of his transtemporal conception of the seat of authority as a counter to those who would 
believe that Rome itself could survive the death of its republican constitution, that 
authority could be derived through military or popular power. 
 
The Settings of the Dialogues and the Idea of Communal Memory 
 In his study of Cicero’s emulation of Plato, Gallus Zoll finds Cicero’s greatest 
similarity to his imitandus in the memoria veterum.106  Zoll says that this memoria 
derives from two motives: the desire to show gratitude to a teacher (Socrates and Crassus, 
respectively) and the intention to communicate that teacher’s thought to a new generation 
of reader.107  The attribution of these motives to Plato is problematic to begin with; in the 
case of Cicero this summary of motives is incomplete at best.  It certainly does not seem 
                                                
106 According to Zoll, this is the basic reason Cicero is identified by Quintilian as Platonis aemulus: “Für 
dieses Motiv der memoria beruft sich Cicero auf Platon als Vorbild” (76). The phrase memoria veterum 
comes from Orat. 120: Nescire autem quid ante quam natus sis acciderit, id est semper esse puerum. Quid 
enim est aetas hominis, nisi ea memoria rerum veterum cum superiorum aetate contexitur? 
107 “Er gedenkt aus persönlicher Dankbarkeit und Verehrung seines Meisters, der selbst kein schriftliches 
Denkmal hinterlassen hat” (82). 
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a point of comparison.  One of the most notable dramatic differences between the 
Platonic dialogues and the Ciceronian ones is the latter’s increase in the diversity of 
characters and settings.  Crassus, for example, is not Cicero’s only teacher.  Coupled with 
this diversification is a marked dedication to accuracy in historical detail.108  Elizabeth 
Rawson, for instance, compiles an extensive list of sources that Cicero used, including 
oral tradition, official documents, writings of any character appearing (if any existed), 
poets, elogia, incidental detail in philosophical works, and historians from the second 
century.109  Such extensive research is required by the multiple historical settings of 
Ciceronian dialogue where it was not necessary for Plato purporting to write of what he 
had experienced.   
When Cicero sets his dialogues in the past he intentionally forfeits the role of 
experiential rememberer, as one who has an “organic experiential relationship” to the 
remembered experience.110  He does approximate the role of rememberer by adducing a 
direct chain of witnesses who have related the events of a particular dialogue to him, but 
the commission of his accounts to writing serves as a concession that the time has come 
for a physical representation.111  In Halbwachs’ terms, Cicero does not have the 
autobiographical memory of a Plato, but the chain of rememberers he adduces renders his 
dialogues “historical memory,” the type of personal memory that must rely on historical 
                                                
108 Cicero describes his own researches in Att. 12.20.2 and 12.23.2. See also Att. 13.30.2, 13.32.3, 13.33.3, 
6.4, 4.1, and 5.1. Cf. Hirzel (1895) I 475, Zetzel (1995) 12-13, Rawson (1991) 71-5, and esp. Rawson 
(1979) 40ff, who calls Plato “notoriously cavalier over fact and chronology.” See further 40n68. 
109 Ibid. 40. 
110 The phrase “organic experiential relationship” is Halbwachs’ (1992), what he elsewhere identifies as 
“autobiographical memory.” 
111 Hedrick (2000) identifies this distinction between remembering the recent past and the distant past as the 
distinction between memory and history, with history being the point at which memory must be written 
down to ensure its preservation (143). By this distinction Plato falls in a unique middle ground, writing 
history when memory is still possible. This distinction between writing, history, and memory will be 
explored further below. 
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record due to the passage of time, and not simply “history,” to which the rememberer has 
no ‘organic’ relation.112  The forfeiture of autobiographical, experiential memory 
produced by the past settings of the dialogues, motivated in part by Cicero’s reluctance to 
make the action of the dialogues too immediate and threatening, leads to a pair of 
consequences: firstly, that none of his readers are experiential rememberers either, though 
they may likewise have an historical memory of the past events, and secondly, that the 
historical validity of the settings is less assured.  To combat the latter consequence Cicero 
showed an appreciable attention to historical detail in his descriptions of settings and in 
the references of the characters to contemporary events.  The thoroughness of his 
research contributes greatly to the plausibility of the settings.  It is a thoroughness that 
reflects the spirit of antiquarianism among Cicero’s peers.  
According to Rawson, Cicero’s activity can more accurately be described as 
antiquarian than historical.113  Antiquarianism, which had a renaissance in the 50s 
through figures such as Varro and Nepos, differs from history essentially in its appeal to a 
remoter past.  In this sense it is a movement almost entirely identified with mos maiorum.  
The remote past can contribute auctoritas to an account, it offers a hopeful escape from 
                                                
112 Halbwachs (1992) gives four categories for memory and history: autobiographical memory, historical 
memory, history, and collective memory. 
Regarding Plato’s autobiographical memory: Plato does not represent himself as present at all of the 
dialogue scenes, but he is so intricately involved in the circle of those who are present that an eyewitness 
account is always available to him. There is never a need for a written account as intercessor. So Feeney: 
“Plato still authenticates his productions by oral links to the ‘event’ (or else, conversely, distances himself 
from responsibility for the account by means of the multiple layers of memory which preserve it)” (243). 
The series of rememberers which Feeney (1993) cites as Plato’s method of distancing himself from a 
setting is the same method by which Cicero associates himself with a setting. As noted below, the chain of 
rememberers does not stand as an alternative to personal remembering for Cicero, but as an alternative to 
citing an impersonal, historical source. 
113 Rawson (1979). She divides Cicero’s antiquarianism into two parts: an appeal to antiquarian institutions 
and attitudes, and an appeal to antiquarian figures, “the great individuals of Roman history” (39). She also 
distinguishes Cicero the antiquarian from, e.g, Varro the antiquarian. While having an antiquarian spirit, 
Cicero is more critical of his sources than his contemporary (37). 
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the problems of the present, and it has the particular appeal of being largely unproveable.  
In order to counter the problems of mistrust engendered by this third trait, antiquarians 
often overwhelm their work with the specifics which lend an air of accuracy.114  Cicero is 
too good a stylist to overwhelm his work with anything.  He does include specifics, but 
he tries to avoid any academic flavor such specifics might bring by describing a chain of 
people through whom the story of the dialogue was presented to him personally, making 
the dialogues historical memory and not history.115   
Cicero’s appeal to the past therefore does not fictionalize Cicero’s 
representations; it does, however, broaden his sphere of operation.  Because he does not 
limit his dialogues to his personal experience, he can choose from several appropriate 
milieux, depending on the needs of each dialogue.116  And he does; he is interested not 
only in hearing the voice of one Socrates, but of M. Piso, Crassus and Antonius, Q. 
Mucius Scaevola, Scipio and Laelius, Cato, and more.  As a result he is able to give 
snapshots of these figures, but he never presents the consistent slideshow of their “lives” 
that Plato gives for Socrates.  Crassus cannot be, as Zoll calls him, a Roman Socrates 
because he is only a leading figure in one of Cicero’s dialogues.  Crassus, while fully 
developed, is presented in only one conversation, in one moment, and is therefore 
partially left open to interpretation; his historicality is only partially expressed.  His 
presence in one dialogue is only fully realized through his absence in the others.  As a 
result, no reader can come away from De Orat. believing Crassus’ full life has been 
expressed.  Cicero’s account has the opposite effect; it whets the reader’s appetite, 
                                                
114 One need not read far in Varro’s De Lingua Latina to come to this conclusion. 
115 E.g., De Orat. 1.26.  
116 Many of the dialogues are so limited, but Laelius, Cato, De Orat., and Rep. marginalize the significance 
of those limits. 
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encouraging him to try to remember Crassus more fully.  The same holds true for the 
many other historical figures Cicero adduces through the course of the dialogues.  The 
diversity of settings and characters leaves the reader with less information.  At the same 
time, Cicero’s forfeiture of experiential memory compromises his own authority as 
rememberer in relation to other rememberers.  The variation of settings and the 
deauthorization of Cicero’s voice work together to persuade the reader to work with 
Cicero to remember the historical Crassus or Scipio, etc., rather than being satisfied with 
the author’s version of those characters (as one might be tempted to do with Socrates if 
faced with Plato’s oeuvre).  The diversification thereby communalizes Cicero’s version 
of events; it makes memorialization possible for Cicero in a less auctor-centric way than 
in Plato. 
There is a distinction to be drawn here between memory and memorialization, 
both of which are contained in the idea of memoria.  It is tempting to associate memoria 
with the idea of personal memory, and to identify this personal memory as the type of 
autobiographical memory of Halbwachs.  This kind of memory, the kind present in Plato, 
whereby one remembers from personal experience, however, is not perfectly identifiable 
with memoria, especially as understood by Cicero.  For him, memoria is “a process 
aimed at producing a particular effect, rather than one determined by a casual process of 
actual recollection…; memoria is always looking both to the historical referent and into 
some undefined moment of future reading.”117  That is to say, unlike memory, which is 
entirely backward-looking, memoria carries also with it the sense of memorialization or 
                                                
117 Fox (2007) 165. His definition of Ciceronian memoria comes from a reading of Brutus 62, which 




commemoration.  It does not seek to relocate the present in the past, but to transfer the 
past into the future, or rather to transtemporize.  The vividness of Plato’s Socrates is 
largely a condition of Socrates’ singularity.  His actions do not present a paradeigma to 
be reiterated by Plato’s reader.  Cicero’s memorializing, though, seeks to generate a 
“sense of connectedness to history,” so that his reader may feel himself inscribed in the 
flow of events and responsible for continuing this progress.118 
 Cicero’s diversification of settings and characters then already begins to reveal 
the communal character of his idea of memoria.119  The absence felt through the limited 
presences of Cicero’s interlocutors and the distance created by appealing to figures from 
the past enlists the reading community as co-agents in the process of remembering those 
figures fully.  At the same time, memoria does not consist merely in the one-way look 
back to a past referent; it contemporizes the present rememberers and the past 
remembered.  Cicero’s memoria is in fact a kind of communal memory through which a 
group finds identity, whether through fact or fiction.120  For Cicero this communal 
                                                
118 Fox (2007) 165. 
119 As with imitatio, Cicero does deal with less ideal connotations of memoria. In the most basic rhetorical 
sense, memoria is one of the five activities of the orator, and refers in general to the memorization of a 
speech before its delivery, or even the memorization of loci or categories of types of status (topica).  
Another use of memoria resembles the rhetorical use of imitatio.  The orator recalls exempla to use in his 
speech or recalls the great speech of an earlier orator in an effort to imitate it himself (e.g., De Orat. 1.88)  
It regularly characterizes jurists, who must recall precedents (e.g., De Orat. 1.128 and 1.201).  In all of 
these senses memoria is a characteristic of the mental capacity of the individual, important for success, 
instilled by nature, and enhanced by training. 
120 The community in which such memory can be active is a very tightly defined to the aristocracy. So 
Habinek (1998): “[T]he past … is a scarce resource, and the literati help to make certain that the aristocrats 
maintain their hoard” (53). 
When calling this memory “communal”, I implicitly overlook the individuality of authorship. As both 
Habinek (1998) 53-54 and Fox (2007) 158-61 have demonstrated, an appeal to the past by a Cicero or a 
Livy does as much to invent the conditions of that past as it does to draw upon a true record of events. 
Speaking in general terms, Habinek succinctly says that “[Ciceronian literature] both participates in the 
invention of tradition and makes itself part of the tradition that is being invented” (54). Such a process can 
privilege an individual rememberer’s memory if that individual successfully incorporates it into the general 
terms of mos maiorum. As Fox notes, a presentation of the self as connected to the past can help to create 
auctoritas (161). The “communal” quality of Cicero’s memory does not so much mean that he as an 
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memory means more than recalling an image of the humanitas that defines community; it 
is the act of remembering itself that sustains the community.121  In De Orat. Cicero 
reminds his reader that the origins of mnemonics, the ars memoriae, are also communal 
in nature.122   
 At the end of De Orat. 2, when Cicero gives Antonius the most concentrated 
description of memoria in the dialogue, the interlocutor concerns himself primarily with 
the individualized, rhetorical type of memoria.  In order to introduce this type of memory, 
though, he narrates a famous story on the beginnings of mnemonics, that part of memory 
that goes beyond nature’s endowment (the ars memoriae).123  It is the story of Simonides 
of Ceos, which at first seems to relate more to piety than memory.  According to the 
familiar story, Simonides had written a poem in honor of Scopas, interweaving the story 
of the Dioscuri.  He performed the poem at a banquet at the home of Scopas, but was told 
by Scopas that he would receive only half of his commission, and should expect the other 
half from Castor and Pollux, whom Simonides had honored excessively in the poem.  As 
the story goes, two young men then summoned Simonides away from the banquet, and 
while he was outside, the banquet room collapsed, killing Scopas and all of those within.  
                                                                                                                                            
individual is not playing a major role in constructing it, but that he is conceiving of a past that lends 
auctoritas to his specifically defined community, rather than to himself as individual. 
The phenomenon of “communal memory” as I describe it is similar to what sociologists identify as 
“collective” or “social” memory. For a summary of the history of social memory, see Olick and Robbins 
(1998). 
121 Koortbojian (1996) draws a similar conclusion about the joining of imagines and nomina in necropoleis, 
or what he calls ‘streets of tombs’: “The complicity that was established by these monuments between the 
memories they preserved and those who beheld them guaranteed the persistence of cultural ideals…. In the 
enactment of this fundamental aspect of culture these sepulchral monuments play an especially eloquent 
and powerful role – because the monuments speak, not merely with their texts, but with their imagery” 
(233). Cicero’s dialogues are, like these monuments, uniquely equipped in their form to offer both text and 
image. 
122 Narducci (1997) discusses the role of memory as a unifying theme in the whole dialogue in his chapter 
(ch. 2) on De Oratore. 
123 De Orat. 2.352-54. Yates’ The Art of Memory traces the mnemonic skill – which relies on space and 
spatial relations – here introduced (the ars memoriae) from Rome to the Renaissance. 
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The moral, in part, is that hubris is ultimately destructive towards those that display it and 
their community.   
 The story, however, does not end there.  The relatives of the deceased grew 
distraught when the bodies proved too mutilated to identify.  Simonides solved the 
problem by remembering the places in which each of the guests had been sitting, thereby 
identifying them for their relatives.  The poet attributed his power of memoria to physical 
arrangement: physical placement and order, he concludes, somehow makes things more 
memorable.124  This eventual outcome shifts the moral of the story decidedly.  Impiety 
and destruction are not the end points; but they are half of the story.  Cicero, through the 
mouth of Antonius, paints a picture of redemption that had not been immediately 
apparent.  Where hubris or impiety destroys a community, memoria reestablishes it on 
the principle of ordo.  Simonides uses memoria to rebuild the community in order, to 
remake it for the relatives of those gone, so that natural relationships can be preserved.125  
This moment of origin for memoria provides a theme for Cicero’s discussion in the 
dialogues of the function of communal memory.  Memory makes community: it is the 
process of remembering where people fit in relation to one another and then putting them 
there. 
 
Death and Memory 
Few Roman institutions exhibit the communal character of memoria as much as 
the memorialization of the dead.  It should perhaps not come as a surprise, then, that 
                                                
124 De Orat. 2.353: hac tum re admonitus invenisse fertur ordine esse maxime, qui memoriae lumen 
adferret. Emphasis mine. Compare the use of loci by orators for mnemonic purposes, as detailed in 
Rhetorica ad Herrenium 3.21-22, De Orat. 2.357, et al. 
125 On Simonides as master of memory, cf. Callimachus fr. 64. 
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Cicero’s process of remembering in the dialogues often takes on a funereal character. 
Cicero makes explicit comment on the mortuary context of his memorial to Crassus at De 
Orat. 3.14. 
sermonemque L. Crassi reliquum ac paene postremum memoriae 
prodamus, atque ei, si nequaquam parem illius ingenio, at pro nostro 
tamen studio meritam gratiam debitamque referamus. 
 
And let us entrust to memory the remaining and pretty much last speech of 
Crassus, and give him gratitude, merited and deserved, an expression of 
my utmost devotion, even if not equal to the thanks his talent deserves. 
 
Cicero makes this expression of gratitude in the somber preface to book 3, wherein he 
reminds Quintus that Crassus died shortly after the setting given, and that the rest of the 
interlocutors would suffer even worse fates through their roles in the Sullan civil war that 
followed.126  By evoking Crassus’ death Cicero calls attention to the close resemblance of 
his dialogue and two of the most important media by which the Romans memorialized 
their dead: the funeral procession and the Roman tomb.127   
For the Romans, the memorialization of a dead family member was a communal 
experience, be it through epitaphs, imagines, or funerals.  By choosing to contextualize 
his gratitude and his memorial with the death of Crassus (both here in the preface of De 
Orat. 3 and generally in the setting of the dialogue shortly before Crassus died) Cicero 
begins to associate himself with the community of the Roman funeral, to align himself 
with other mourners, to identify his own memorialization with theirs.  It is a strategy he 
repeats on several occasions.  
 The imminent death of the interlocutors figures into several of the dialogues. 
                                                
126 Cf. Connolly (2008) 100. 
127 Gratia is itself a communal notion, as explored in the following chapter. 
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Cato occurs in the year before Cato’s death, Rep. immediately precedes the death of 
Scipio, the interlocutors of Fin. died shortly before the publication of the work, Laelius 
follows right on this same Scipio’s death, and, of course, Crassus’ death is imminent in 
De Orat.128  In one sense this type of memorialization bears similarities to dialogues like 
the Euthyphro, the Apology, the Crito, and the Phaedo, which lead up to Socrates’ death.  
But again Cicero differs from Plato in the variety of figures and settings he involves.  
And his tributes to the dead are, in fact, tributes, not contemplations of the afterlife.129 
 As Zoll rightly points out, this type of memorial fits only into a Roman setting.  
By fully fleshing out the characterization of the supporting cast in De Orat., Zoll says, 
Cicero makes this memorial a communal activity akin to a funeral procession, complete 
with imagines.130  The comparison is a fruitful one.  The use of imagines in the sense of 
ancestral masks originated following the conflict of the orders, as part of an effort to 
distinguish office holders from non-office holders.131  As Flower explains, the imagines 
could be very powerful symbols, blurring lines between reality and representation, both 
                                                
128 On this feature of ancient dialogue, see Cameron (1966) 28-9 and (1967) 259-59. Cf. Hirzel (1895) I 
467. 
129 The setting of the dialogues shortly preceding times of crisis has the added effect of making them even 
more memorable. The Rhetorica ad Herrenium (3.22) and De Orat. (2.358) both make reference to the 
value of imagines agentes (“active images”), which are more easily remembered than static images. These 
are the images that are exceptional and noteworthy. Koortbojian (1995) argues that the memorable quality 
of active images is what leads sarcophagus sculptors to use novel and dramatic presentations of mythic 
scenes (116). So too the impending crises in the dialogues mark out these moments as more “active” than 
other moments in which the interlocutors might also have met. 
130 Zoll (1962) 80: “[W]enn er das Bild zum Teil verstorbenen Dialogspersonen … so intensiv und 
möglichst historisch getreu aufleben läßt, so kommt darin etwas von dem Traditions- und 
Gemeinschaftsbewußtsein zum Ausdruck, das in dem eigenartigen römischen Brauch lag, bei 
Leichenbegängnissen eines vornehmen Römers die Wachsmasken der Ahnen und ihre Insignien, die zu 
Hause aufbewahrt wurden, mitzutragen, auf dem Forum aufzustellen und ehrend ihrer Ämter und Taten zu 
gedenken.” 
131 Flower (1996) 59. 
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memorializing and resurrecting the dead, serving as a junction for past and present, all in 
the context of social distinction.132   
In addition to its funereal associations, imago commonly referred simply to the 
artistic representation of an individual.133  Cicero’s representations of his interlocutors are 
not pictorial representations, but they are imagines nonetheless – portrayals meant to 
convey the presence of figures in their absence.  Cicero’s use of the interlocutors thus is a 
metaphorical donning of an imago in the sense of artistic representation which, through 
the funerary context of the dialogues, shifts to a wearing of an imago in the sense of 
funerary mask.134  In both senses, the imago introduces one who is absent and situates 
him within a social context.  Flowers concludes, “[t]he traditional wax mask symbolized 
the memory of the deceased and his position within the extended family of those related 
by blood and marriage.”135  Cicero’s imagines, the interlocutors, were likewise 
expressions of memoria, but it is not blood relations that they are intended to reinforce, 
but a very specific type of social relations.136  Cicero, by locating his dialogues 
temporally near the impending deaths of several interlocutors, introduces himself as a 
participant in their funerary memorials.  Even more than this, he is the one wearing the 
imago, putting on the persona of the interlocutor, and thereby assuming a role as close 
relation.  Laelius, almost a eulogy in its construction, concludes with Laelius’ brief 
discourse on the importance of memoria for consoling himself in the loss of Scipio (103-
                                                
132 See esp., Ibid., 32-35. 
133 Ibid. 33-4. 
134 The similarities of the processes of writing dialogue and wearing an imago in a funeral procession 
extend even to the similar attention to detail. We have already discussed Cicero’s own attention to detail, 
and cf. Flower (1996): “The actors wearing the imagines played the role of each ancestor in a studied and 
realistic way including gestures, and probably also words” (126). 
135 Ibid. 59. 
136 Cf. the stipulations outlined at Leg. 2.48ff. regarding the necessity of performing funerary rites and who 
is obliged to do so. 
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104).  In effect, it tempers the loss, or replaces Scipio.  Naturally Cicero himself here 
wears the imago of Laelius, and so assumes the role as the possessor of memoria. 
Cicero is the privileged mourner, but as Flower also points out, the performance 
of the role of ancestor was “enhanced by … entourage suited to each historical figure.”137  
In Cicero’s own memorialization in the dialogues, just as in funerals, figures of the past 
are universally remembered in the company and community of others. 
For Romans, funerary processions are communal activities.  They are designed to 
reinforce community bonds, connecting the mourners together, locating the deceased 
within his own community, and reincarnating the dead so that the mourners with their 
community and the deceased with his community may commune together 
transtemporally.  As in the case of the story of Simonides, memoria facilitates this 
community.138  Cicero approximates this kind of memoria in the dialogues.  He enlists his 
readers (and dedicatees) as fellow mourners, he presents his interlocutors in communion, 
and he shapes imagines of his interlocutors, giving them vivid, life-like words and actions 
to bring them to life in the present. 
 The dialogues’ function as death memorial, on the one hand, parallels the use of 
imagines in funeral processions to commemorate the dead.  But funeral processions have 
the disadvantage of operating within very specific temporal parameters.  To ensure the 
persistence of the deceased within the family following the funeral the aristocratic family 
                                                
137 Flower (1996) 127.  
138 Dugan (2005) 150-51 draws a similar conclusion about the Simonides story, emphasizing the 
“restructuring” of the identities of the interlocutors after sudden trauma. He also ties in this function of 
memory to Cicero’s relationship to Crassus, though he is more interested in Cicero’s representation of 
himself in the figure of Crassus than in the role of memory or association in the generation of community. 
So: “Instead of repeating his own traumatic event, Cicero represents it through the vehicle of Crassus’ and 
the others’ story, and seeks to gain mastery over his own political career by assimilating it to the narrative 
of a distinguished predecessor to whom Cicero can claim a connection through intellectual genealogy.” 
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followed two parallel courses of action.  The imagines were preserved, along with their 
tituli, the written records of the deceased’s accomplishments which accompanied the 
imagines.  After being used in the funeral procession, these objects were placed in the 
atrium of the family of the deceased.  These objects were then reduplicated even more 
publicly within the tomb, where the wax mask might be approximated by a statue and the 
titulus summarized or repeated in the epitaph.139  As artistic representations, the dialogues 
certainly resemble the imagines; as literary objects they also resemble and capitalize on 
some of the advantages of the epitaph, the inscribed memorial.   
The Roman grave inscription, as evidenced by the tomb of the Scipios, both 
describes the career of the deceased and locates him within the familial community.140  
As noted in the previous chapter, the epitaphs of the Scipios show an awareness of the 
epitaphs that preceded them.  We observed there that epitaphs emphasize social behavior 
and operate in the context of aristocratic social performance.  At the same time, the basic 
structure and content of the epitaphs is parallel and interconnected, even when one Scipio 
died too young to repeat the offices and accomplishments of his forebears.  This social 
component of the tomb of the Scipios is in turn balanced by its liminality.  In keeping 
with Roman law the tomb was located outside the pomerium where the illusion of the 
interconnectedness and communion of the ancestors was not interrupted (as in the atrium) 
by the daily activity of the living.   
As with the imago Cicero coopts this epitaphic model.  Taking De Orat. as an 
example, Crassus and Antonius are positioned in their ‘epitaph’ against the other figures 
who appear alongside.  The audience of De Orat. is the interested literate community, 
                                                
139 On the similarities in content between the titulus and the elogium, see Flower 180-184. 
140 Cf. Flower (1996) 159ff. 
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almost certainly the aristocrat, who would respond positively or negatively to the 
exemplum of Roman social virtue there expressed.141  The action of the dialogue occurs 
within a liminal zone, outside the city during the Ludi Romani, a period of otium.  And 
most of all, the record is inscribed, so that the memory preserved therein can withstand 
the passage of time and the forgetfulness of the human mind.   
Cicero purposefully and repeatedly sets many of his dialogues noticeably close to 
the time of death of his interlocutors.  By doing so Cicero identifies his dialogues as 
memorials which assume the role of death memorials in aristocratic Roman society.  In 
the first place, like Roman funerary practices, the memorial of the dialogues is 
communal.  Both the rememberer – as member of a funeral procession, reader of a 
dialogue, or reader of an epitaph – and the remembered – with his ‘entourage’ in the 
funeral, with his family in the Scipionic epitaphs, with his friends in the dialogues – are 
located within a social group.  And as with death memorials, Cicero seeks to create in his 
dialogues a sense of timelessness whereby the past community and present community 
may merge.  For Cicero the dialogue functions as both imago and epitaph, a tool for 
reincarnation and for preservation.  The imago brings the deceased back to life, the 
epitaph exists externally as writing and operates within a liminal zone wherein multiple 
generations of a family coexist.  Like funerals, dialogues aim at the preservation of 
family memory, but here family refers to a tight-knit group of aristocrats living (and 
dying) in cooperation. 
                                                
141 See Veyne (1985) 168-171. The imposing physicality of tombs, their location along thoroughfares, and 
the appeals in epitaphs to passersby all serve as reminders that these are neither merely graves, nor private 
monuments, nor generic epitaphs addressed to “la face du ciel.” The Roman tomb, Veyne argues, “ne 
s’addresse pas à la famille, aux proches, mais à tout le monde.”  Flower suggests the opposite: “these elogia 
were private, and not directed at passers-by on the Via Appia,” though it would seem the latter point does 





Writing and Memory 
The epitaph owes much of its memorial power to its inscription, the efficacy of 
which extends beyond the mortuary context.  Writing is alternately diagnosed by the 
ancients as a replacement for memory or a protector of memory.  The distinction is 
closely tied to the modern differentiation of history and memory.  According to one 
conventional distinction, history, in the sense of an account of the past, implies an 
inscribed, physical record. 142  Memory, on the other hand, while transmittable via 
history, can exist within an individual’s mind, without a physical record.143  As Hedrick 
puts it, it can exist in silence.  The writing of history can thus “give voice to something 
that is kept in the silence of memory and thus bring it to appearance.”144  The distinction 
is not so much the physicality of history vs. memory, but the need for physicality for the 
preservation of memory.145  Physical representations are not necessary when the 
possessor of a memory survives.  Once the rememberer does die, the function of memory 
                                                
142 Historians, sociologists, and anthropologists alike have made various distinctions between memory and 
history, using criteria such as social perspective, objective accuracy, physicality, and experiential 
relationship. For a summary of several of these positions, see Olick & Robbins (1998) 110-11. 
143 Even when they have not inscribed a memory, and thereby “historicized” it, the Romans tend to think of 
memories in terms of physical objects. So Simonides invents the science of mnemonics through his appeal 
to physical location in De Orat. 2, and the oratorical practice of using loci to aid memory discussed by 
Cicero, the Rhetorica ad Herennium, and by Quintilian. On the phenomenology of memory in Roman 
thought and practice, see Farrell (1997). 
144 Hedrick (2000) 131. This distinction is not as loaded as Halbwachs’ (1992), according to whom history 
(as opposed to historical memory) is “dead memory” which does not have an “organic” connection to the 
past. For Burke (1989), history is a very specific kind of memory, social memory. 
145 Closely related to this distinction between memory and history is the idea of the exemplum, which was 
dealt with in large part in the last chapter. In the Rhetorica ad Herrenium an exemplum achieves its desired 
effect by making a memory visual, by putting it before the eyes (exemplum ante oculos ponit; 4.62). As 
Chaplin (2000) notes, these visual exempla include the imagines (both during and after a funeral), statues, 
and literature (14-16). 
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is taken up fully by the physical representation.146   So the process of damnatio 
memoriae, which consists entirely in the effacement of physical representations of a 
person, is not fully effective while rememberers live on, because the memoria trying to be 
erased exists both physically and mentally.  Once the possessors of memory have died, 
though, the destruction of the physical representation is the destruction of the only source 
of memory.  
For Socrates in the Phaedrus the physical nature of writing obviates the need for 
memory; he accordingly vilifies writing as a crutch and, therefore, a threat to the mental 
activity of remembrance.  Cicero, on the other hand, conceives of a twofold function of 
writing in relation to memoria.  In the first place, writing works as a receptacle for 
memory, a storehouse to guard and preserve it.  However in order to ensure that the 
written word is a record of memoria and not static, inorganic ‘history,’ it is important for 
him that the written word maintain the qualities of memoria, especially its communal 
nature.  So, in the second place, Cicero conceives of writing as a medium through which 
to enlist others in the process of remembering.  In the preface of De Orat. 2 he describes 
his own writing of the dialogue in terms of both guardianship and community, as a way 
to externalize, but not depersonalize, memory.   
Quo etiam feci libentius, ut eum sermonem, quem illi quondam inter se de 
his rebus habuissent, mandarem litteris, vel ut illa opinio, quae semper 
fuisset, tolleretur, alterum non doctissimum, alterum plane indoctum 
fuisse; vel ut ea, quae existimarem a summis oratoribus de eloquentia 
divinitus esse dicta, custodirem litteris, si ullo modo adsequi complectique 
potuissem; vel me hercule etiam ut laudem eorum iam prope senescentem, 
quantum ego possem, ab oblivione hominum atque a silentio vindicarem. 
 
                                                
146 The externalization of memory in “artificial” sites, such as texts, is the second of the five stages of 
memory diagnosed by Le Goff (1992). In this stage the commitment of social memory to writing gives rise 
to two new phenomena: commemoration and documentary records.  
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And I [recorded this dialogue] the more freely so that I might entrust to 
writing this discussion which those men once had on these topics; I did it, 
in the first place, so that that opinion which has persisted for so long might 
be removed, namely that Crassus was not most educated and that Antonius 
was pretty much uneducated. In the second place I did it so that I might 
guard with the writing those things which I thought were said 
extraordinarily well by these best orators on the topic of eloquence, insofar 
as I could follow it and express it. In the third place, I did it by god so that, 
as much as I could, I might salvage the praise of these men from men’s 
forgetfulness and silence, praise that is nearly dead as it is. 
       De Orat. 2.7 
 
  The three memorial functions of writing as Cicero gives them include the 
correction of communal memory, the guarding or preservation of the past, and the 
immortalization of the (nearly) dead.147  We have already considered the third function 
expressed here, the memorilization function, in the discussion of epitaphs.  The first 
function, however, helps to clarify Cicero’s conception of communal memory and where 
the bounds of the remembering community should lie.   
According to De Orat. 2.7, there is a type of communal memory outside of the 
one he hopes to achieve through his writing, an opinio communis apparently transmitted 
orally and closely akin to something like fama.  This opinio, the opinio quae semper 
fuisset, represents the ill-founded consensus of the community at large, and Cicero seeks 
in large part to combat these ideas.  The communal memory that exists outside of 
Cicero’s written record has been susceptible to misrepresentation, a signifier floating 
about without a signified.  By writing Cicero intends to reunite the truth with the 
description of it, and to anchor it in the firm ground of his text. 
                                                
147 He goes on to elaborate on the third position saying he wants to render the memory of Crassus and 
Antonius immortal (hanc immortalem redderem). 
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But by simply writing alone against the opinio communis, against tradition, he 
runs the risk of abandoning the communal aspect of memoria altogether.  He therefore 
claims in De Orat. to involve the community as a sort of corrective to any fallacy he may 
present.  He cannot, he says, invent patent falsehoods when some of his readers will 
actually have heard Crassus and Antonius speak, or known of their political positions and 
significance (2.9).  That is to say, Cicero cites those with autobiographical memory of the 
described events as corroboration of his report, thereby pluralizing the authorizing 
voices.148 
This assertion appears to stand somewhat at odds with the opening of Leg.  As 
that dialogue opens, Cicero, Quintus, and Atticus are discussing the existence of an oak 
tree that, according to Cicero’s poem Marius, grows in Arpinum (Leg. 1.1-5).  The 
discussion centers around the effectiveness of poetry to immortalize coupled with its 
license to introduce falsehood.  Poetry, Cicero tells Atticus, can lie, and needs not worry 
about any corrective.  Atticus then responds in a potentially metatextual moment by 
introducing what is likely a concern over the accuracy of Cicero’s representation of the 
past in his earlier dialogues, De Orat. and Rep. 
 
Atqui multa quaeruntur in Mario fictane an vera sint, et a nonnullis quod 
et in recenti memoria et in Arpinati homine versatur, veritas a te 
postulatur. 
 
It is questionable whether many things in the Marius are true or false, and 
many people demand the truth from you since you are dealing with 
matters in recent memory and with a local man from Arpinum. 
       (Leg. 1.4) 
 
                                                
148 On Cicero’s discussions of the role of the audience and the viability of their judgments in both De Orat. 
and Brutus, see Schenkeveld (1988). 
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The fact that the events Cicero has written about in his poem occur in recent history, 
Atticus’ people claim, the fact that some have autobiographical, experiential memory of 
those events, dictates that Cicero must make a true record of them.  The argument recalls 
Cicero’s own in De Orat. 2.9.  But here Cicero responds by pointing out that such 
demands are made naively (imperite), because in fact poetry follows different rules than 
history.   
Because the prologues of dialogues so often are self-conscious, and certainly 
because of the inevitable self-consciousness that accompanies Cicero’s first use of 
himself as an interlocutor, it is tempting to read the Marius here as a stand-in for Cicero’s 
already-published dialogues, De Orat. and Rep.  His defense of the Marius is implicitly a 
defense of his use of ‘falsehoods’ in the earlier dialogues, and perhaps Atticus’ objection 
represents the actual objections with which Cicero had been faced since the publication 
of those dialogues.  Cicero would then be justifying his manipulation of historical detail 
in those earlier dialogues here at the preface of Leg. 1.  But when paired with his defense 
of the accuracy of his writing in De Orat. 2, it begs the question of whether Cicero 
imagines his dialogues as operating according to the rules of poetry or of history.  To 
what extent should recent history and communal memory be accepted as a corrective in a 
dialogue?   
 Andrew Dyck sees in this introduction to Leg. the framing of a crucial 
relationship for the dialogue’s broader theme: natura vs. opinio.149  Cicero discusses this 
conflict in full at Leg. 1.44-47, where he comes to the expected conclusion that trusting 
the opinio of the community is dangerous and foolish when making judgments, while 
                                                
149 Dyck (2004) 56. Natura, Dyck notes, is to be the foundation for law; Cicero’s legal system “will rest 
upon situating judgments of value on the side of natura rather than opinio.” 
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trusting to nature is virtuous.  The general public, as asserted here and passim in Rep., is 
naïve; opinio, as has already been shown in De Orat., is misguided.  On the other hand, 
Cicero is using this prologue to introduce appropriate rules for reader expectation.  He is 
trying to correct misguided opinion by instructing it, by correcting it through writing.  
Poets lie, historians do not.150  The naïve do not understand the distinction, and therefore 
their opinion should not be a corrective.  The memory of those who do understand, 
however, should be used as a corrective.151  It is not “when” alone that is important in 
remembering, but “who” is doing it.  Cicero’s writing expects a knowledgeable reader 
who is attuned to the significance of differences in form and genre.  In the case of 
dialogue, there is room for the corrective of the reading public, but not for the public in 
general.  Cicero has in mind a specific group of rememberers who can qualify and correct 
his writings, a group that depends not simply on opinio or rumor or a kind of self-
perpetuating understanding of the past generated through popular tradition, but on their 
knowledge of the context of the events.  The corrective force of this audience alone helps 
to define memory in social terms, but also along strict social lines.  The communal 
memory of writing stands in contrast to the opinio of the masses. 
Cicero treats this idea in one other place in the dialogues, at Rep. 2.28.  For all 
intents and purposes, the second book of Rep. is Cicero’s closest approximation of the 
history that Atticus asks for in Leg. 1.5-6.152  In it Scipio outlines the entire political 
history of Rome, leading up to his description of the ideal political situation.  When he 
comes to his discussion of Numa, Manilius interrupts to ask whether there is any validity 
                                                
150 Cf. Aristotle, Poetics 1451a36-7. 
151 For the fickleness and failure of the memory of the public, see Off. 2.55ff. 
152 Cf. Rawson (1972): “[Cicero] never … again gets so deeply entangled in the study of antiquity as in the 
De Republica” (35). As Leg. postdates Rep., it would seem Atticus was not satisfied. 
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in the common assertion of the elders and the crowd (vulgo) that Rome’s second king 
was a pupil of Pythagoras, an assertion that lacks the auctoritas of the public records 
(annalium publicorum).  Scipio responds vehemently that this tradition is a patent 
falsehood, one conceived naively and absurdly (imperite absurdeque fictum).  Those who 
study the records carefully (diligentissime), Scipio assures Manilius, can never hold such 
an opinion.  For them there has never been any doubt on the matter. 
Again Cicero sets the communal memory of writing, in this case the public 
annals, against the opinion of the masses, which is again rendered imperitus.  And this 
time Cicero via Scipio endows writing with auctoritas, that unique quality that defines 
the true aristocracy.  The fact that the period of history proves to be so far removed does 
not change the fact that there is a communal memory available.  Rather failure to account 
for the written and disregard for auctoritas leads some to the development of another less 
authentic community memory.  As with epitaphs, the writing Cicero adduces as an 
opponent of unwritten communal memory not only serves as an aide-memoire, but works 
to define the limits of its reading community.  The preface of Leg. 1 does not so much 
identify the foregoing dialogues as poetry in the vein of the Marius as it does indicate that 
only a restricted, educated, understanding audience should function as a corrective to 
falsehoods in writing.  Cicero’s appraisal of writing in Rep. reinforces the notion of a 
correct communal memory that stands in contrast to popular opinion or the idea that the 
collective memory of a majority vouches for that memory’s validity. 
 
The final function of writing that Cicero outlines in De Orat. 2.7-8 is also present 
in Scipio’s response to Manilius in Rep. 2.28: writing serves as a record of the past.  
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More specifically Cicero calls writing a guard (custodirem litteris) of the history it 
conveys.  In this sense Cicero seems to conceive of the dialogues as something very close 
to history, to being inscribed records like the annales publici.153 
 Cicero periodically drifts near the issues of history and historiography in the 
dialogues, and naturally he often touches on memoria in these situations.154  He 
universally proclaims the merits of records which give historically accurate pictures.155  
He even goes so far as to say that one can not mature without acquainting oneself with 
history: nescire autem quid ante quam natus sis acciderit, id est semper esse puerum.156  
But Cicero, for all of the historical detail that he gives in the dialogues, never turns to the 
writing of history until just before his death, in November of 44.157  There are many 
possible explanations for his reticence.  Rawson argues that Cicero’s interests are more 
antiquarian than historical, that he does not want simply to record the past, but to promote 
a conservative agenda.  And to write a book-length antiquarian work would not suit 
Cicero’s dignitas and auctoritas.158  Dyck takes it a step farther: 
An unvarnished version of the past from Cicero’s viewpoint would have 
offended Caesar; and, with the institutions of the republic suspended and 
most of the men who had sustained them passed from the scene, the 
dynamic of civic life was altered, and the point of historiography as a spur 
to the achievement of youth by glorifying the deeds of the past must have 
seemed blunted.159 
 
The political scene was simply not ripe for Cicero’s history. 
                                                
153 For the definition of memoria as ‘record’, see OLD s.v., 8. 
154 Cicero regularly uses memoria to designate a historical period, in the sense of “in our time” or “in our 
fathers’ time” (E.g., De Orat. 1.183). I do not consider these issues here. 
155 See, e.g., Leg. 3.46, Rep. 3.14, De Orat. 2.51-4. 
156 Orat. 120. Cicero also praises in this passage the annalistic work of Atticus, which has made a record 
(memoria) of the last seven hundred years in one book, and thus contributed to its reader’s ability to move 
beyond boyish considerations. 
157 Att. 16.13a.2. 
158 Rawson (1972) 35-6. 
159 Dyck (2004) 85. On his explanation of the point of historiography, cf. Orat. 120. 
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 Cicero himself (or through the person of his brother) gives two reasons for his 
failure to write history in the prologue of Leg. (1.7-12).  First of all, Quintus claims that 
he and his brother could simply not agree at which point to start the history, the ancient 
past or a time recent enough to include the modern era.  Secondly, Cicero says that he 
simply does not have the time to devote to such a large project.160 
 To the first point Atticus argues that Cicero is in the right, that the history must be 
recent enough to carry into the modern era.  He would much rather read about Pompey 
and Cicero himself than de Remo et Romulo.  Returning to Dyck’s point, however, 
choosing to write a contemporary history presents an inevitable set of political 
complications.  But the recording of the recent history did not only mean the Cicero 
would expose himself personally to the hostility of Caesar.  Touching on the recent past 
means committing to communal memory the decadence of the republic and the civil 
unrest figured in Caesar and Pompey.  Because of Cicero’s association of memoria and 
community, he is hesitant to undertake to memorialize the destruction of community 
through writing.161  A history de Remo et Romulo would also have to deal with unrest, 
with the archetypes of Roman civil war, but could find the resolution to that unrest in the 
institution of the senate.  But Cicero never wrote that history either. 
 Instead, Cicero wrote dialogue.  Like a history dialogue can preserve memoria 
and recalibrate popular conceptions about the past, but dialogue has the added advantage 
                                                
160 Cf. Att. 2.4.2, 6.1, and 7.1, where Cicero describes the greater-than-expected complexity and time 
consumption involved in his composition of Rep. 
161 Compare Antonius’ description of his speech in defense of Norbanus at De Orat. 2.199. There Antonius 
argues that sedition and the violation of the community status quo sometimes has positive outcomes. The 
difference seems to be the type of community that was violated. Antonius also takes pains to point out that 
he concluded his defense with appeals to his closeness to Norbanus and the offices that he held. He and 
Norbanus, he claims, represent the truest element of community, even though Norbanus’ actions had been 
held to be seditious. 
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of being communal.  Both history and dialogue have the potential to enlist the reading 
community as a corrective, but the multiplicity of voices within the dialogue de-
emphasizes the narratorial voice of the author, de-privileging him in relation to the other 
remeberers, thereby further necessitating the cooperation of the reader.  As the preface of 
Leg. 1 suggests, though, the cooperative reader must have an understanding of the 
context, condition, and form of written memory.  The audience best equipped to 
understand the aristocratic interplay of the dialogues was the group that participated in 
such interplay itself.   
At the same time, the dialogues avoid the inorganic disconnect of history, tethered 
as they are to Cicero himself by the line of experiential rememberers he adduces as his 
source.  For Cicero writing is not a threat to memoria, but an appropriate medium for its 
preservation, provided that the written memorial medium itself preserves memoria’s 
communal nature. 
 
Otium and Memory 
As his second excuse in Leg. for not writing history, Cicero insists to Atticus that 
he does not have the time (vacuum tempus et liberum).  He goes on to explain to Atticus 
that he is never free from care and worry (et cura vacare et negotio) and that the writing 
of historia demands otium preparatum.  Atticus pokes several holes in Cicero’s 
argument, insisting that he has sufficient leisure time to compose philosophical works 
such as De Orat. and Rep.  But Cicero continues to insist that such things can be 
composed in spare time (subsciva tempora) relative to the composition of a history.  He 
will only have such leisure, he says, when he reaches old age.  Atticus immediately sees 
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through this deferral as well, and insists Cicero will never cease from his negotium.  Even 
so, they shift their topic of discussion to civil law, and decide to take advantage of the 
subscivum tempus at hand for their dialogue.   
In the end, Cicero gets off (lets himself off?) the hook, but more through evasion 
than refutation.  In three different letters Cicero admits to the unexpected strain he 
experienced in his composition of Rep. and so would seem to confirm his reasons in Leg. 
Of course by the time of Leg., he had completed his extensive research into the ancient 
history of Rome, and would theoretically have been equipped to write a history on that 
period.  Likewise, if he intended to write about the political history in which he had 
participated, he would undoubtedly have had a more manageable task researching the 
events of his own life than the periods covered in Rep. 2.  Surely, one would think, if he 
can cram in an account of civil law he can do the same with history.  His sincerity in 
evading historiography through the excuse of negotium is difficult to judge, and 
ultimately unknowable.162  We have in fact already examined several other possible 
motives for Cicero to avoid history.  Even so, in making his excuse to Atticus he points to 
an important association between memoria  and the need for otium. 
Otium, like most terms adopted into propagandistic service, has a variety of 
meanings.163  It regularly functions as both the personal leisure time (often of the Roman 
aristocrat) and the communal or political peace that characterizes a society not at war.164  
This dual applicability of otium is clear from Cicero’s speech Pro Sestio of 56, the same 
                                                
162 On evasion within a social setting, cf. Hall (1996). 
163 On otium see André (1966). In general André uses Cicero himself to access the meanings of otium in the 
Ciceronian era, and so is of restricted use in understanding how Cicero’s uses are semantically 
contextualized. 
164 E.g. in Cicero: Personal: De Orat. 1.224, 2.57; Pro Balbo 15; Att. v.20.9. Political: Pro Caecina 43; Att. 
ii.1.2; Fam. xii.1.1; cf. Aeneid 6.813. 
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year in which he composed De Orat.  Cicero describes an ideal of personal leisure as 
otium cum dignitate (98).  But he also uses otium in its public sense, as “peace” when he 
pairs otium with communis salus in both Pro Sestio 5 and 15.165  In this political sense, it 
means not only peace, but refers to an internal peace, an absence of civil strife.166  This 
definition in particular allows the space for the personal and private meanings to overlap, 
the absence of public otium precluding the private.  If, in general, personal otium is the 
repose one achieves after a successful political career, then Cicero who was no longer 
politically active post reditum in the same way he was ante exilium, should have 
experienced this otium during the 50s and 40s.  But, of course, the republic itself was in a 
state of civil unrest, and therefore was by definition in a state of negotium.  This political 
negotium proved in turn to deny Cicero the otium he might otherwise have known.  He 
had unoccupied time, but the state of the republic rendered his time sine dignitate.167 
Idealized otium, which Atticus in Leg. warned Cicero he would never have in old 
age, does in fact prove to evade Cicero; it instead appears as a theme of the dialogues he 
wrote in his old age (and Off.), where it is a double-edged sword.  When he has finally 
reached the point at which he has intended to retire into the sophisticated leisure of the 
aristocrat, Cicero finds himself instead forced into retirement by Rome’s recourse to arms 
and civil war.  More than anything else, free will is in question.  The otiose retirement 
Cicero envisioned in Leg. 1.10-2, where he could leisurely write and receive clients still 
exists.  But because of the shift in political power, a shift in many directions, but all away 
                                                
165 Cf. Wirszubski “[I]t appears that otium … is conceived, by Cicero at any rate, as public tranquility born 
of undisturbed political order” (4). It was, according to Wirszubski, a political watchword of Cicero in 63. 
166 Cf. De lege agr. 2.9, where, as Wirszubski (4n28) notes, Cicero distinguishes pax aeterna (peace with 
other countries) and otium domesticum (civil, internal peace) as two distinct causes for which he is 
advocating. Cf. also Fam. 2.16.2. 
167 Cicero tells Mescinius Rufus that even should civic unrest be ended by the ascendancy of an individual, 
such otium could not be an honestum otium (Fam. 5.21.2). 
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from Cicero himself, Cicero’s retirement is drained of its auctoritas, its dignitas.168  What 
should have been an otium moderatum et honestum stands perilously close to inertia et 
desidia.169  What should have been a period of freedom is a period of enforced 
inactivity.170  In this position Cicero seeks to console himself by reasserting the value of 
his otium.  As I will go on to argue, when Cicero connects otium to memoria he begins to 
identify leisure as an important medium to enable him to take up the community-building 
project of memory.  Cicero may be involuntarily removed from the Roman political 
scene, but his leisure time allows him to access another, in many ways more valid, part of 
the Roman political scene through memory.    
Cicero summarizes his position in the opening of Off. 3 (1-3).  He first describes 
the otium of Scipio Africanus, whom he identifies as a contemporary of Cato.  It is telling 
that Cicero must reach back into the early second century to find a fitting example of 
what he considers the right kind of otium.  According to Cicero, Scipio’s leisure and 
solitude consisted of thinking about business (negotium cogitare) and talking to himself 
(secum loqui).  That is to say, for Scipio leisure and solitude consisted of their opposites, 
political engagement and community.  Cicero, over a century later, finds himself 
shunning the vulgar crowd and the Roman political scene that was but the remains of 
what had been the republic.  The only solace he can find is in writing. 
propterea et otio fruor, non illo quidem, quo debeat is, qui quondam 
peperisset otium civitati, nec eam solitudinem languere patior, quam mihi 
                                                
168 Cf. Fam. iv, 14, 1. On otium cum dignitate see further below. 
169 For Cicero’s own summary of the situation, see Brutus 7-9, where he, among other things, compares the 
two states mentioned here. 
170 For an interesting response by Cicero to this condition cf. Tusc. Disp. 1.1. He opens the dialogue by 
saying, “Since I am now free of my labors in the courtroom …” (cum defensionum laboribus … essem … 
liberatus), claiming his freedom. In fact, as Brutus well knew, Caesar had entirely realigned the court 
system, so that cases such as Pro Ligario and Pro Rege Deiotaro were heard by Caesar himself alone. See 
further, Douglas (1994) 89. Liberatus, it would seem, must be read ironically. 
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adfert necessitas, non voluntas… nos autem, qui non tantum roboris 
habemus, ut cogitatione tacita a solitudine abstrahamur, ad hanc 
scribendi operam omne studium curamque convertimus. 
 
For these reasons I am enjoying my otium, though it is not quite that 
which someone who has spared otium for the state deserves, nor am I 
passing this time of isolation lazily which necessity and not my own will 
has imposed upon me… Moreover we who do not have enough strength to 
avoid solitude through silent meditation turn all our effort and care to the 
task of writing. 
       (Off. 3.3-4) 
 
Unattainable is the civically involved otium of Scipio; gone is the otium of peace that he 
conferred upon the community of Rome in his consulship.  What is left to him is a 
shadow of that otium in which he has turned to the writing of dialogues.  Through the 
dialogues Cicero can reanimate the figures in his memory and so translate both the people 
and their ideas into the present.171  He tells the reader or unnamed addressee of the Brutus 
just this type of thing, where remembering the past in the company of friends helps him 
pass his otium.172  Remembering figures of the past while among his own waning 
community of familiares allows Cicero in effect to access and approximate the communal 
otium of the ancients while enacting what little is left of community among his 
contemporaries.  His otium is an otium of an isolation enforced by the collapse of the 
republic, but by remembering the dignified figures of the past in a similar condition of 
otium Cicero begins to suggest a connection between himself and them. 
 To this end he also gives a full picture of the otium of the past by setting all of the 
dialogues in periods of leisure for the interlocutors.  De Orat. begins with a reminiscence.  
                                                
171 For another appraisal of his enforced otium, see Acad. 1.11. 
172 Brutus 9-10: quorum memoria et recordatio in maxumis nostris gravissimisque curis iucunda sane fuit, 
cum in eam nuper ex sermone quodam incidissemus. Nam cum inambularem in xysto et essem otiosus 
domi, M. ad me Brutus, ut consueverat, cum T. Pomponio venerat, homines cum inter se coniuncti tum mihi 
ita cari itaque iucundi, ut eorum aspectu omnis quae me angebat de re publica cura consederit. The 
addressee is presumably Brutus, but may also have been Atticus (cf. Ch. 4). 
 
 99 
The fifth word of the text, of the dialogues as a whole, is memoria.173  Cicero tells his 
brother in true antiquarian style that he envies those who lived in the past (the perbeati) 
because they had the choice to live politically engaged lives or lives of otium cum 
dignitate.  As noted above, the phrase otium cum dignitate reappears in Cicero’s speech 
in defense of Sestius (§98) given in the same year as the publication of De Orat. (56 
BCE).174  The case itself involved Clodius and Caesar on one side, with Cicero, Sestius, 
and Pompey on the other.  Cicero had at this point of his speech begun to outline a 
distinction between political leaders that act as populares or optimates, naturally 
emphasizing the moral superiority of the latter.  The optimates, by Cicero’s definition, are 
the group of those right-minded, good, and blessed men, who live their lives with a view 
to otium cum dignitate.175  Those who accomplish this balance are the summi viri.   
As in De Orat. Cicero locates such summi viri in the past by implication in Pro 
Sestio.  According to Cicero’s argument, these great men had the liberty of choice in the 
past.  At times of threat to the republic, some of those who enjoy otium cum dignitate 
failed to act in the hopes of maintaining their otium even at the cost of their dignitas 
(100).  In his contemporary situation, as he outlines in Off., the reverse is true: the true 
good men must sacrifice their otium in an effort to maintain their dignitas.  Cicero moves 
on in his defense of Sestius to give exempla of this type of sacrifice, including that of Q. 
Catulus, an interlocutor in De Orat., whom Cicero characterizes as only recently alive 
                                                
173 De Orat. 1.1: Cogitanti mihi saepenumero et memoria vetera repetenti perbeati fuisse, Quinte frater, illi 
videri solent. 
174 On Pro Sestio, see Kaster (2006). For another use of the same phrase, see Fam. 1.9.21, written around 
the same time as the dialogue and speech: cum omnibus nobis in administranda re publica propositum esse 
debeat id, quod a me saepissime dictum est, cum dignitate otium, non idem semper dicere, sed idem semper 
spectare debemus. 
175 Pro Sestio 98: quid est igitur propositum his rei publicae gubernatoribus quod intueri et quo cursum 
suum derigere debeant? id quod est praestantissimum maximeque optabile omnibus sanis et bonis et beatis, 
cum dignitate otium. See also §§99-102. 
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(eorum aliquem qui vivunt nominem, qualis nuper Q. Catulus fuit).176  The reference to 
Catulus’ death recalls both that good men stand under the threat of death for such actions, 
as well as the fact that otium cum dignitate cannot exist in the present political 
situation.177 
The entirety of the first part of the prologue to De Orat. deals with this otium, 
available to figures of the past, but lost to Cicero himself.178  The state of the republic and 
the complications introduced by both his friends and enemies have rendered his otium 
brief; nevertheless, he tells Quintus, he will use what leisure time he does have for 
writing per his brother’s request, to make a fitting record of his memory of good men of 
the past.179  The scenario he outlines closely resembles the one he presents in the 
prologue to Off. 3.  His otium is not equal to the otium of the past, in large part because, 
as shown in Pro Sestio, the community of the past has been replaced by an inferior one 
where friends, enemies, and the republic itself demand negotium.  Cicero informs 
Quintus that the best way to make his leisure resemble the leisure of the best men of the 
past, as it had been in Brutus, is to record his memoria of those very men. 
                                                
176 Pro Sestio 101. 
177 Cf. Wirszubski (1954): “Thus it appears that in order to have cum dignitate otium all the components of 
the republican form of government must be preserved, because that form of government is the condition 
under which alone the realization of cum dignitate otium is possible” (7). 
178 Dugan (2005) 149 identifies dignitas rather than otium as the chief operating term in the passage. He 
concludes that “Cicero uses the ennobling themes of intellectual enquiry and scholarly equanimity to drown 
out the details of his implied deficit of dignitas and his grievances against his circumstances. His pledge 
that he will devote all of the time and energy now available to him in his politically marginalized 
circumstances suggests that writing has become a substitute for direct political involvement, and an 
alternative route to recuperate his lost prestige (dignitas). Cicero thus articulates the De Oratore’s self-
fashioning agenda.” While I agree in large measure with this conclusion, I think it does not fully articulate 
the role that writing, memory, and otium play in community-fashioning, itself a substitute for the 
autocentric activity that characterized Cicero’s political ascent. 
179 De Orat. 1.3-4: quantum mihi vel fraus inimicorum vel causae amicorum vel res publica tribuet oti, ad 
scribendum potissimum conferam; [4] tibi vero, frater, neque hortanti deero neque roganti, nam neque 
auctoritate quisquam apud me plus valere te potest neque voluntate. Ac mihi repetenda est veteris 
cuiusdam memoriae non sane satis explicata recordatio, sed, ut arbitror, apta ad id, quod requiris, ut 
cognoscas quae viri omnium eloquentissimi clarissimique senserint de omni ratione dicendi. 
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It is perhaps noteworthy that he occupies his otium by agreeing to a request of his 
brother.  This kind of agreement is a reminder that Cicero is not alone, and it helps 
characterize Cicero’s leisure as communal.  At the same time his agreement to write is set 
in contrast with the causae amicorum, his obligation to represent his friends in legal 
disputes (e.g., Sestius).  Both activities involve Cicero in community, but the writing is 
an activity of otium, the forensics naturally a matter of negotium.  Cicero seems to 
suggest that the dignitas he feels is not attending his otium would still less attend the 
activity of the forum, the activity by which he had garnered his authority to begin with.  
The forum no longer provides the space for dignified activity; that space is now provided 
by the past, or more precisely, the space wherein Cicero can access the past. 
Cicero invites his reader in the opening lines of De Orat. to find this space in the 
idealized otium of the dialogue’s interlocutors.  The political setting of Rome in 91, 
however, was hardly the dignified and safe ideal Cicero describes.  The Social Wars and 
the ascendancy of Marius in fact closely resembled the concentration of power in the 
hands of Pompey and then Caesar during the 60s and 50s.  Dugan notes that the 
tumultuous imagery and meteorological metaphors that Cicero uses to characterize the 
difficulties of his own political situation in the prologue are repeated to describe Crassus’ 
situation in 91.180  Nevertheless, the beginning of the dramatic part of the dialogue finds 
Crassus and his friends relaxing at his villa in Tusculum during the Ludi Romani (1.24).  
They undertake their discussion of oratory beneath a plane tree a la the Phaedrus, and 
add to their comfort with cushions to sit on.  But they do not discuss oratory until the 
second day; they had passed the first day discussing the state of the republic and the 
                                                
180 Dugan (2005) 149-50, comparing 1.1-3 with 3.7. 
 
 102 
disasters that loomed over it.  Like Cicero, their leisure is complicated by the threats of 
powerful individuals to the republic.  Their leisurely aristocratic communal activity can 
only occur after the politics of civil strife have been dealt with or ignored. 
The setting of the dialogue outside of Rome during a holiday goes some way 
towards removing the activity and otium of the interlocutors from reality.  Cicero has 
shifted them into a sort of idealized counter-reality from which they can discuss the 
political situation at a remove before forgetting about it and moving on to their discussion 
of the ideal orator (himself unreal).  This idealized otium more closely resembles the 
leisure addressed in the opening of the dialogue than the historical leisure that Crassus 
and the others would have had in the midst of civil unrest.  Like the ideal orator, even 
though the communal otium pictured has not existed historically, Cicero represents it as a 
worthy goal.181  In this context Cicero can depict the communal otium of the De Orat. as 
a replacement for the political failure of the republic, an otium involving a strictly 
delimited set of characters within a strictly defined aristocratic setting.182  By then 
identifying this ideal as a memoria and committing it to writing, Cicero suggests it is an 
historically accurate representation, thereby reincorporating the ideal into reality.  It is, in 
fact, Cicero’s reality, for he has ‘heard’ the story from C. Cotta, who had himself 
                                                
181 On the ideal nature of the orator in question in the dialogue, see De Orat. 3.83-5. As Crassus says, “the 
essential nature of a thing, its character and magnitude, cannot be understood unless it is put before our 
eyes in perfect form” (vis enim et natura rei, nisi perfecta ante oculos ponitur, qualis et quanta sit intellegi 
non potest.; tr. MW). On the perfection of nature, see Ch. 1 supra. 
182 The interlocutors of the dialogue themselves discuss the purpose and pleasure of otium at De Orat. 2.20-
28. Caesar calls attention to the fact that this discussion of leisure, a discussion of whether or not to discuss, 
has itself been a worthy use of otium, simply because it allowed him to listen to Crassus speak (2.26).  
Likewise Crassus, after convincing the young new arrivals Caesar and Catulus to listen to Antonius, insists 
that they earn this reward by agreeing to stay for the remainder of the day (2.27).  All of the interlocutors 
seem to agree that the best use of otium is to share it in the company of others. 
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participated in the dialogue, and he has filiated himself to Crassus through the 
identification of their situations.183 
Several other dialogues also show the interlocutors at leisure.  Rep., Nat. Deor., 
and Fin. 3 all occur during holidays.184  The Tusculan Disputations naturally take place at 
Cicero’s villa in Tusculum, Leg. at his home in Arpinum.  Brutus and Atticus find Cicero 
strolling otiosus to begin the Brutus (10).  Laelius has a doubly framed dialogue, the first 
showing Cicero’s memory (memini) of himself and some familiares listening at the feet 
of Scaevola to the second dialogue, that of Scaevola and Fannius with Laelius.  In the 
outer frame Scaevola sits in his hemicyclium in an intimate setting; in the inner frame 
Laelius gives his discourse after having missed the most recent assembly of the 
collegium.  Both suggest a disjunct with political activity.  Likewise, Cato flows from the 
mouth of Cato already in his senectus, which he claims is not politically disengaged, but 
still characterized more by auctoritas than by labor (Cato 60).185   
But the otium of all of the dialogues set in the past is about to be disrupted by 
death or civil unrest; the dialogues in Cicero’s present show him removed from the 
political engagement of his youth, as described in Off. 3.  All of the cases re-exhibit what 
is first expressed in De Orat.: here are small groups of familiares, engaged with one 
another in discussion, demonstrating appropriate social customs with humanitas, at times 
and places of idealized otium when such otium could not historically exist.  
 The shift of all the interlocutors into otium contributes significantly to Cicero’s 
transtemporizing of the various communities he represents.  In spite of all the factors 
                                                
183 On filiation more broadly, see below. Also Dugan (2005) Ch. 2 and Gunderson (2000) Ch. 6. 
184 Rep. 1.14, Nat. Deor. 1.15, Fin. 3.7-8. 




complicating their individual situations, all the interlocutors can retreat to a timeless 
space of otium.  Cicero, too, has access to this otium.  It is a space in which all the 
interlocutors can coexist, where the identification of their experiences with one another 
can confer the dignitas of one upon the leisure of all.  Otium is not simply a rest from 
business, it is the place of an ideal, transtemporal counter-reality.  Cicero accesses this 
counter-reality through memoria and then reintegrates the ideal into reality through a 
chain of historical figures that give him an experiential connection to the remembered 
moment. 
 
Pedigree and Filiation 
 What makes the settings of these dialogues particularly relevant then, is that, in 
spite of their idealization, they do not stand as mere exempla for aristocratic behavior, but 
paint a detailed picture of a society of a select group of Romans that stretches 
uninterrupted from Cato to Cicero himself.  The otium which Cicero does not have in full 
in his contemporary setting he recreates through the characters in the dialogues, finding 
them in similar states of unrest, but shifting them into settings of sophisticated otium.  
Once he has shifted them into this idealized otium he can join them there through the 
written word.   
As the medium for this formation of community he again employs memoria, but 
not in a general sense.  He introduces very specific agents through which memoria has 
been communicated, establishing a pedigree of individuals who can enter the community 
of idealized otium while simultaneously tying them to historical reality.  To put it another 
way, Cicero uses the personal communication of memoria from one generation to the 
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next to establish a community of specific individuals that substitutes for the family as the 
ideal, but historically real social unit par excellence. 
For the remainder of the chapter I will give a dialogue-by-dialogue survey of the 
interlocutors, paying particular attention to how Cicero’s choice of interlocutors 
structures each individual dialogue, how the reappearance of several interlocutors serves 
to bind the dialogues into a larger project, and how memory operates as a circularizing, 
transtemporizing force to demonstrate the involvement of all the featured interlocutors in 
a single aristocratic community that served as the seat of authority which gave Rome its 
identity. 
The process begins, as usual, in De Orat.  Cicero claims in his preface to the first 
book to relate to his brother Quintus what he had himself heard from C. Aurelius Cotta.  
Cotta had, of course, been present at the “original” setting of the dialogue, making him an 
authoritative and realistic source.186  Still, Cicero is able to dissociate himself enough 
from the speakers to make his own words seem to be another’s.  His method here recalls 
the opening of Plato’s Symposium, wherein Apollodorus (=Cicero) reports to Glaucon 
(=Quintus) the recollection of Aristodemus (=Cotta) regarding a dialogue from several 
years before at which he was present.187  A pair of differences between the methods of De 
Orat. and the Symposium, however, leads to opposite results.  In Plato’s dialogue, 
Apollodorus includes the additional step of relating to Glaucon not the story as he had 
heard it from Aristodemus, but the story as he himself (Apollodorus) had just recently 
related it to an unnamed friend.  This extra step is entirely superfluous except insofar as it 
                                                
186 Cf. Q. fr. 3.6, where Cicero reports that Sallustius praised the method in De Orat., where Cicero had 
oratorum sermonem… belle a [se] removisse; ad eos tamen retulisse, quos ipse vidisse[t].  
187 In the Symposium Apollodorus adds an additional step by  
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gives the unnamed friend the opportunity to comment on the character of Apollodorus; 
that is, this is Apollodorus’ moment to be a character before he becomes the narrator. 
And this characterization of Apollodorus yields the second difference between the 
Symposium and De Orat.: the players in the former, far from being the respectable 
political figures that Cotta and Cicero himself are, show themselves to be ridiculous and 
overzealous.188  Apollodorus combines his own Socratic infatuation with that of 
Aristodemus, whose own character is further complicated by his inferior social standing. 
In both instances of difference, the Platonic dialogue appears to be undercutting the 
reliability of the source, Apollodorus.  His only credibility comes from the claim that he 
has cross-checked Aristodemus’ story with Socrates himself, though this claim too must 
certainly be suspect.  Combined with Plato’s regular elision of himself, the introduction 
to the Symposium uses its string of sources to shift the narrative into the realm of fiction. 
For Cicero the string of sources is intended to have just the opposite effect.  He 
himself is the culmination of the chain, both as character and author, and the intermediary 
Cotta is a necessary link to Crassus and Antonius, whom Cicero could not simply consult 
as Apollodorus claims to have done with Socrates.  By inscribing himself into Cotta’s 
circle, which already includes Crassus and Antonius, Cicero begins a process of multi-
generational filiation that stretches through all his dialogues.  In direct contrast with 
Plato’s dialogues, Cicero offers no single Socrates who can confirm or deny, but a bevy 
of characters whose greatest authority derives from their interdependence.    
In addition to Cotta, L. Licinius Crassus, and M. Antonius, the circle of De Orat. 
includes P. Sulpicius Rufus and Q. Mucius Scaevola, the augur and father-in-law of 
                                                
188 The unnamed friend refers to Apollodorus’ apparently well-known nickname, “the manic” (173d). 
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Crassus.189  The second book sees the introduction of Q. Lutatius Catulus and C. Julius 
Caesar Strabo, and the departure of Scaevola.  Despite this departure of Scaevola, 
Crassus accommodates the augur’s physical absence by evoking him and his memory 
soon after the arrival of Catulus and Caesar.190  Specifically Crassus remembers having 
been told by Scaevola of his memory of his father-in-law Laelius and Scipio (in the 
passage describing their otium).  Though this famous pair is long since dead at the time of 
De Orat., they are adduced to play much the same role for Scaevola that Crassus and 
Antonius play for Cotta, matching Crassus with Cicero and extending the circle back 
farther in time.  It is at first glance tempting to view these relationships as a line 
extending unwaveringly from the past to the present rather than as a circle, but 
Scaevola’s physical absence from the scene, foregrounded by comparison with his 
presence in the first book, reminds us that Crassus can access Scipio and Laelius via 
memoria, without Scaevola’s immediate help.  Likewise, in the opening to book 2, Cicero 
fortifies his own relationship to Crassus and Antonius without the mediation of Cotta.  
Instead it is Cicero’s own father and uncle, as well as C. Aculeo, who have structured his 
impressions of Crassus and Antonius through their own personal interactions with the 
orators.191  There is then a network formed already in De Orat. that stretches from 
Laelius and Scipio to Scaevola [or to Crassus] to Crassus and Antonius to Cotta [or to 
Cicero’s father and uncle and Aculeo] to Cicero himself [and his brother] to Quintus.192  
                                                
189 I have put in bold the names by which each character is usually addressed. 
190 Several hypotheses have been offered to explain Scaevola’s absence after the first book. Cicero himself 
tells Atticus that he has removed Scaevola both because, as with the model of Plato with Cephalus in the 
Republic, he feels Scaevola would have been too old to sit through such a lengthy discussion, and because 
the technical discussion of books 2 and 3 did not suit him (Att. 4.16).  
191 Catulus also attests to his own personal familiarity with Scipo, Laelius, and Furius (all interlocutors in 
Rep.) at De Orat. 2.154-5. 
192 The brackets here are intended to indicate alternate routes by which the pedigree is reported to pass.  
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Cicero seems to have had some hesitation in continuing his extension of the circle 
in Rep..193  According to Cicero’s own words to his brother (Q.fr. 3.5.2), the same 
Sallustius who had praised Cicero’s use of characters in De Orat. criticized the setting of 
Rep. as too remote.  The conversation was already fifty years old when Cicero “heard” it 
for the first time.  Cicero sees the most significant complication of such drastic temporal 
removal in the subsequent impossibility of introducing even the seeds of some of the 
current civil discord which had inspired him to write the dialogue in the first place.194  In 
his letter to Quintus Cicero suggests that he intends to transfer the conversation into the 
mouths of himself and Quintus (and perhaps Atticus?) on the model of Aristotle in his 
Republic.195  This change, however, would have presented the additional problem of 
offending contemporaries.196  Based on the text as it survives, Cicero eventually decided 
on some kind of compromise.  According to Zetzel the dialogue remains with the 
historical figures, while prefaces a la Aristotle allow Cicero to comment in his own voice 
on contemporary political conditions.197  Dyck counters that Cicero edited out parts of 
                                                
193 On the setting of Rep., see Zetzel (1995) 3-6. 
194 The fictionality of the scenario, an objection of Sallustius, does not seem to have bothered Cicero. 
195 Aristotelem denique, quae de re publica et praestanti viro scribat, ipsum loqui…. Nunc et id vitabo et 
loquar ipse tecum, et tamen illa, quae institueram, ad te, si Romam venero, mittam; puto enim te 
existimaturum a me illos libros non sine aliquo meo stomacho esse relictos (Q.fr. 3.6.1-2). On Cicero’s 
choice of models and the difference between Aristotle and Heraclides Ponticus as expressed in this letter, 
see the introduction. 
196 The offense to contemporaries is generally understood to refer to some political offense given to 
Pompey, Caesar, and/or Crassus. Schmidt (1969), however, believes the potential offensio that motivated 
Cicero to set the dialogue in the past is not political, but personal. That is, many of Cicero’s contemporaries 
sought inclusion as interlocutors within the dialogue, and would be offended by being excluded. For more, 
see n.97 below.  
197 Cicero’s aborted decision in Q.fr. 3.5 to change the speakers may have been prompted in part by a plea 
from Varro for inclusion within a dialogue (Att. 4.16.2). Cicero tells Atticus such inclusion is impossible 
with the historical setting, but that he can perhaps work Varro into a proem. A shift to the present could 
have accommodated Varro. Varro renews his requests for inclusion in the mid-40s, when another dialogue, 
the Academica, is edited to feature him prominently (Att. 13.12-25 passim). For more on the Academica 
and Varro, see below.   
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Rep. (the nine books mentioned in Q.fr. 3.5 to the six that survive in part) and 
contemporized them by including them in the companion Leg..198 
In the end, Laelius and Scipio reappear in Rep., where they are joined by Q. 
Tubero, L. Furius Philus, P. Rutilius Rufus, Sp. Mummius, C. Fannius, M’. Manilius 
and Scaevola again.199  The chain to Laelius and Scipio through Scaevola is already 
attested, but the pedigree is further circularized by Rutilius.  Cicero enlists Rutilius as his 
authoritative source, claiming to have heard the conversation directly from the junior 
participant.  He thereby casts Rutilius in the mediating role of Cotta.  Not by coincidence, 
Rutilius is also Cotta’s uncle, which again links Cicero to the action of Rep..  More than 
this, it suggests that the activity of De Orat. is the second generation of the same activity 
of Rep., enacted by the historically accurate second generation of participants.  Cicero 
seems to have no qualms about claiming to have heard the story from Rutilius fifty years 
after the original conversation took place.  Not only was a meeting between the two 
historically possible, but the multi-directional network Cicero has established through 
both De Orat. and Rep. already is beginning to blur the generational lines in favor of a 
multi-generational, transtemporal community.  Cicero knew Cotta, Cotta obviously knew 
Rutilius, Cotta knew Scaevola and Scaevola was there with Rutilius, and Cicero, for his 
part, knew Scaevola.  It is then no great leap to associate Cicero with Rutilius.  This 
blurring of lines, already a significant element of the characterization of the dialogues at 
this early stage, not only does not shy away from citing a fifty year-old source, but 
depends on it.  Memory is the medium by which the historical chain of characters 
                                                
198 Dyck (2004) 9-10. 
199 In both places in which Cicero makes reference to the characters of Rep. (Att. 4.16.2 and Q.fr. 3.5.1) he 
leaves Sp. Mummius out of the list. If Dyck’s argument of revision is correct, Sp. Mummius may have 
been an addition to the dialogue after the letter to Atticus in October of 54. 
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becomes a circle or network; it is the process of joining the new to the old without the 
intermediary historical figure.  It substitutes for Cotta, so to speak, in the chain 
RutiliusCottaCicero or for Scaevola in the chain 
Laelius/ScipioScaevolaCrassus.  This substitution, this use of memory, does not 
replace the historical chain, but reduplicates it, circularizes it. 
Once the story of the dialogue has reached the ears of Cicero via Rutilius, he takes 
the odd step of repeating it to Quintus.  This step is odd because, in the chain of events as 
Cicero had constructed it, Quintus had been present at Rutilius’ original narration of the 
dialogue.200  Again the scene somewhat recalls the Symposium, where Apollodorus 
repeated his tale to Glaucon after having only just narrated it to the unnamed friend, what 
we identified above as part of the fictionalizing process.  Here the situation is inverted: 
Quintus is not a double-teller, but a double-hearer of the story, and the goal is not to 
compromise the chain of sources, but to reiterate it.  Cicero himself accesses Rutilius’ 
narration through memoria (see n97).  Quintus, too, has this option in theory, but is 
required by the text to allow Cicero to play the intermediary role.201  So Cicero inserts 
himself for memory into Rutilius(memory)Quintus.   
Beyond Quintus, the circle extends only to the reader (discussed in detail below).  
But in the opening of book two, by way of introduction to his extensive discourse on the 
political history of Rome, Scipio makes reference to the example of Cato Maior (Cato 
senes as Cicero suggestively calls him; Rep. 2.1).  Scipio tells how he had committed 
                                                
200 Rep. 1.13: nec vero nostra quaedam est instituenda nova et a nobis inventa ratio, sed unius aetatis 
clarissimorum ac sapientissimorum nostrae civitatis virorum disputatio repetenda memoria est, quae mihi 
tibique quondam adulescentulo est a P. Rutilio Rufo, Smyrnae cum simul essemus compluris dies 
201 I read nostra and nobis as instances of the ‘royal we’, so common in Cicero and clear from the 
preceding context, and not as references to a cooperative effort of memory between Cicero and Quintus. 
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himself in his youth to spend as much time as possible learning at the feet of Cato.  
Scipio thus extends the circle backwards in time.  Not only so, but the lesson Scipio takes 
from Cato, aside from starting his discussion at the “origin,” is that Rome’s constitution 
derives its superiority from its organic development through the cooperation of many 
individuals over many generations.  This evolution stands in direct contrast with the 
products of the great lawgivers of Greece, but more importantly, it underscores the 
importance of the network Cicero is actively establishing.  The Roman constitution does 
what Cicero envisions for this circle: it achieves its superiority because it represents a 
single, communal, transtemporal bond produced through the multi-generational 
cooperation of Roman individuals.  The network as Cicero has it in Rep. now travels 
from Cato to Scipio [to Laelius] [to Scaevola to the characters of De Orat.] to Rutilius to 
Cicero [or to Cotta to Cicero] and Quintus [or from Cicero to Quintus].  
Before moving on to Leg., a note on the so-called “Scipionic circle” is in order.  
From the mid-nineteenth century to the late twentieth, the term was regularly accepted 
and applied to a group of Romans, centered around Scipio Aemilianus, who had 
particular interest in the adoption of Greek literature and thought into their aristocratic 
Roman milieu.202  The idea of the circle is built on the settings and characterizations of 
Rep. and Laelius, which are believed to depict interaction among and reference to various 
members of this circle.  Likewise, Cicero’s Catulus in De Orat. makes what seems to be a 
generally accepted recollection that Scipio, Laelius, and Furius were regularly in the 
                                                
202 The most ambitious evaluation of the circle comes in the dissertation of R.M. Brown, A Study of the 
Scipionic Circle, who not only accepts the historicity of the concept in the first place, but extends it across 
several generations of Roman political figures. Such an extension is untenable when restricted by political 
realities (which Cicero was not). 
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company of learned Greeks (and apparently each other).203  But often adduced as the knot 
tying all of these threads together, is the reference Laelius makes in Laelius 69 to a herd 
or flock (grex) in which he, Scipio, and others were involved.204  Forsythe has gone some 
way in undercutting the traditional understanding of grex as ‘circle.’205  He suggests 
instead that Cicero is building on the equine imagery immediately preceding (67-8), in 
which groups of friends are identified with groups of animals, old and new horses with 
old and new friends.  For him grex refers to the “common herd.”  Wilson has since shown 
that while Forsythe’s argument regarding the equine imagery is sound, he goes too far in 
broadening the group to the “common” herd.  Grex, as Wilson convincingly concludes, 
does mean circle in a general sense, but not in the technical sense so often understood.206 
His reading fits comfortably within the arguments of Astin and Zetzel, the first of 
whom accepts the possibility of a ‘circle’ so long as it is not understood to represent 
universal political and philosophical cohesion among its members, and the latter of whom 
views the ‘circle’(s) as a literary convenience for Cicero.207  The tightly unified circle of 
the early twentieth century has been largely replaced by these newer approaches.  Even 
these newer approaches, however, concern themselves deeply with who should be 
included in the circle, nebulous or literary thought it might be.  Of particular importance 
to both is the Greek Stoic philosopher Panaetius, who lived for some time with Scipio, 
and seems to have known intimately many of the cast of Rep..  In De Orat., Scaevola 
describes Panaetius’ role in his instruction (1.75).  In Fin., Cicero cites the philosopher’s 
                                                
203 De Orat. 2.154: P. Africano, C. Laelio, L. Furio, qui secum eruditissimos homines ex Graecia palam 
semper habuerunt. 
204 Saepe enim excellentiae quaedam sunt, qualis erat Scipionis in nostro, ut ita dicam, grege (Laelius 69). 
The OLD makes this usage of grex exemplary of the third definition, a restricted coterie. 
205 Forsythe (1991) 363-64. 
206 Cf. also Powell (1990) 11, who supports the idea of a circle in a generic, yet aristocratic sense. 
207 Astin (1968) 294-98 and Zetzel (1972). Cf. also Strasburger (1965) 41. 
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attachment not only to Scipio and Laelius, but to Tubero (4.23).  In Brutus, Cicero has 
Fannius learning from Panaetius and calls Rutilius a Panaeti auditor (101, 114).  And of 
course Scipio’s own close relationship with Panaetius comes under brief discussion in 
Rep. (1.34).  Whatever sort of historical circle existed, Panaetius seems to have been 
deeply involved in it.208   
Zetzel in fact sees two different circles, one in Rep. whose interests are more 
philosophical, and one in Laelius with a greater emphasis on political activity in the midst 
of civic strife.209  The former includes Panaetius, along with Polybius (Rep. 1.34, 4.3) and 
Plautus (4.11), the latter Terence (Laelius 89) and Pacuvius (24).  Zetzel’s criteria for 
inclusion within the circle are almost entirely references to friendship or regular 
(including instructional) association.  If the circle is entirely literary, such short 
references to friendship admittedly acquire greater significance.210  But the absences of 
Panaetius and Polybius, Plautus, Terence, and Pacuvius from any interlocutory roles in 
either dialogue highlights a certain otherness for them in relation to those who do speak.  
The absence of Panaetius particularly, whom Cicero explicitly links in various places to 
five of the nine interlocutors in Rep. and all of those in Laelius, suggests some unfitness 
for inclusion.  This unfitness, of course, arises from his Greekness.  Both he and Polybius 
cannot appear in Cicero, because Cicero’s project is entirely a Romanized one.  The poets 
are disallowed either because of their generally lower social status and/or foreignness, or, 
                                                
208 On Panaetius’ influence (or lack thereof) on the politics and philosophy of Scipio, see Astin (1968) 299-
306. He pays particular attention to the ideas of justice and humanitas as understood and enacted by Scipio. 
209 Zetzel (1972) rightly points to Cicero’s own changing political situation as the justification for the shift 
in emphasis. 
210 On the fictionality of the characters in the dialogues, see Jones (1939). 
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as Cicero discusses elsewhere (Att. 13.13.1), because of the unlikelihood of their having 
any expertise on the topics at hand (outside of quotations). 
For Brown, then, the Scipionic circle consists of over forty historical Romans 
from three generations; for Astin the number is unidentifiable and the terms of inclusion 
are less closely defined; for Zetzel the idea is entirely literary, so the circle shifts from 
one set of fictionalized historical figures to another.  But, if the evidence for the circle is 
almost entirely Ciceronian (fiction), it makes good sense to follow his lead in deciding 
who belongs and who does not.  For Cicero the circle is multi-generational, but not in 
Brown’s sense.  As Astin argues, it is not a single-minded entity; it is in fact dialogic.  
And Zetzel rightly makes it literary, but the circle has not changed from Rep. to Laelius, 
only narrowed.  The members of the circle are the members of the dialogue.211  Astin, 
Strasburger, Zetzel, and Forsythe have successfully deconstructed the historical Scipionic 
circle of the early twentieth century, but because of Cicero’s intricate interweaving of the 
figures into his dialogues, it is difficult to shed the idea entirely.  The corrective should 
not be to deny a circle, but to change the modifier: the circle is not Scipionic, it is 
Ciceronian.212 
                                                
211 The only non-interlocutor included in the list above is Cato. Unlike Panaetius, however, Cato does 
appear as an interlocutor elsewhere within the oeuvre. 
212 I do not intend to deny here that anything like a Scipionic circle existed historically. I only wish to shift 
the focus to a largely parallel, but more accessible construct. There is only one pair of figures whose role is 
unclear: Rupilius and Mummius, both mentioned in Laelius 69. Neither is necessarily an interlocutor in a 
dialogue (and thus in the Ciceronian circle), and yet both are theoretically qualified (in the Scipionic 
circle). I treat the question of qualification for inclusion in the Ciceronian circle more generally below, but 
this case perhaps needs not fall into the gray area. Mummius could be either L. Mummius the consular or 
Sp. Mummius. The context is not particularly helpful; it simply identifies Mummius, Rupilius, and Furius 
as inferiors of Scipio. Since such a designation applies to almost any contemporary Roman, it is of little 
help. If, as 101 suggests, it is Spurius Mummius in question, he is taken care of by his appearance in Rep.. 
This designation also fits him in nicely with Furius, also an interlocutor in Rep.. No Rupilius, however, 
appears in any of the dialogues. There is, though, as already discussed, P. Rutilius in Rep.. Both MSS P and 
M actually give Rutilius at 69. If these are right, the trio of Furius, Rutilius, and Sp. Mummius makes a 
good and readily understandable set of examples for Laelius, Scaevola, and Fannius, all of whom were 
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Cicero begins the full incorporation of himself into the circle with his next two, 
largely different dialogues, Leg. and Brutus.  Though the dating of Leg. is regularly 
debated, by all accounts it serves in some way as a companion piece to Rep..213  Since no 
known ancient texts make reference to it and since Cicero himself does not include it in 
his list of dialogues in the preface to Div., it is likely that Cicero never published Leg..214  
Nevertheless it marks an important stage in Cicero’s broader dialogue activity, especially 
in regards to form.  In Leg., for the first time, Cicero sets the dialogue in the present and 
introduces himself as a leading figure. 
The introduction of living figures would later come to pose some problem for 
Cicero, but it provided him with the previously unrealized opportunity to speak in his 
own persona.  In doing so he in part follows Aristotle, as he tells Atticus.215  Cicero’s 
truest inspiration here, though, is again Plato, whose own Laws had followed up on his 
Republic, and who uncharacteristically transferred this dialogue out of the past, removing 
the figure of Socrates from the scene in favor of the unnamed Athenian.  Leg. also 
                                                                                                                                            
present with those three for Rep.. The reading of Rupilius in Laelius 69 was perhaps prompted by the 
reappearance of Rupilius in Laelius 73. Here the context clearly dictates that Publius Rupilius and his 
brother Lucius are under consideration. And yet both P and M give Rutilius here as well. It is not unlikely 
that the first Rutilius (69) was replaced in most manuscripts to match (unnecessarily) the correct Rupilius in 
73. P and M perhaps applied the change the other way, assuming Rupilius in 73 should match the Rutilius 
of 69. Ironically Edmonds gives Rupilius in his translation at 69 and Rutilius at 73. The argument for 
Rutilius in 69 may be weakened by Laelius’ grouping in 101 of himself, Scipio, Furius, Rupilius, and 
Mummius, the last three given in the same order as at 69 (though Furius is called Philus in 69). Rutilius 
also appears in the list, but later since he is far younger than the others. The list Laelius gives is, in fact, 
generational. The grouping at 69 need not necessarily be. At their introduction in Rep. Laelius and 
Mummius arrive intergenerationally with Scaevola and Fannius. Likewise Laelius begins 101 with 
intergenerational friendships. In any case, whether it be Rupilius or Rutilius in 69, a coeval or a descendent, 
there is room to argue for inclusion within a strictly defined circle. 
213 As above, I follow Dyck (2004) in dating Leg. shortly after Rep., and find convincing his argument that 
the revision of Rep. opened up material for treatment in Leg.. Dyck, in turn, largely follows Schmidt 
(1969). For the idea that Leg. was begun in the 50s, but not completed until the late 40s, see Reitzenstein 
(1894). Robinson (1950), wishes to situate Leg. entirely in the opening months of 43. On the 
companionship of Leg. and Rep., see Dyck (2004) 9-10, and 10n44 for confirming opinions. 
214 Div. 2.1-4. 
215 Att. 13.19.4: quae autem his temporibus scripsi Aristoteleion morem habent in quo ita sermo inducitur 
ceterorum ut penes ipsum sit principatus. 
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regularly alludes to Plato’s Phaedrus, most notably in setting, right down to the detail of 
holding the conversation beneath a plane tree.216  The Platonic background again offers a 
comparandum for the Ciceronian process.  Plato’s elision of Socrates in the Laws 
destabilized the distance between author and interlocutor.  The introduction of the 
anonymous xenos of Athens generalizes the setting (as does the removal from Athens to 
Crete), decreasing the historic immediacy of the earlier dialogues.  The stranger’s 
anonymity is evocative: is he Socrates? is he Plato? is he (more plausibly) neither?217  
Plato’s new mask is less specific, but no more transparent than his Socratic one.  
Cicero, as usual, takes a somewhat less subtle approach than Plato to his shift out 
of the historic past.  In the place of the stranger he introduces himself.  The naming of the 
character “Cicero” does not eliminate those ambiguities generated by the author-
interlocutor relationship any more than the unnaming of the xenos – in many ways it only 
complicates them –, but it does alleviate the generalities engendered by anonymity.  By 
naming himself in a dialogue Cicero speaks himself into the company of the figures of 
his other dialogues.  At the same time, by creating an intimate setting at his home in 
Arpinum, Cicero is able to restrict the inclusion of contemporaries to his brother Quintus 
and friend/in-law Atticus.  The implied inclusion of Quintus and Cicero in Rep. is then 
reiterated explicitly in Leg., with the circle even extending slightly (yet still within the 
family) to include Atticus. 
After Leg., four years intervene before Cicero takes up his pen again, this time for 
Brutus.  The political scene has changed drastically.  The republic has faded, and with it 
                                                
216 For Cicero’s debt to Plato, see Dyck (2004) 20-23. 
217 On the identification of the xenos with Plato, see Halverson (1997) 99-101. 
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the relevance of Rep. and Leg..218  Like Leg. (and perhaps to fill the void created by the 
decision not to publish Leg.), Brutus features Cicero and two contemporaries, Atticus 
and Brutus, who replaces Quintus, perhaps a reflection of the strain in Cicero’s 
relationship with his brother.  What makes Brutus the more interesting in the construction 
of a Ciceronian circle is the subject matter, the tracing of oratory through a series of 
specific historical figures.  The rhetorical history of Brutus is regularly understood as 
taking a progressivist approach to Roman oratory, showing an evolution in oratorical skill 
culminating in Cicero as the telos.219  At the same time, the dialogue bears many 
resemblances to a laudatio funebris for Roman oratory.220  Dugan usefully synthesizes 
these two approaches: if Brutus is progressivist in an Aristotelian sense, depicting organic 
development from one generation of orators to the next, the implication inevitably 
obtains that any given telos can only be temporary.  Given the terminus of the death of 
oratory, however, Cicero’s account can truly be teleological, and the evolution of oratory 
can come to a climax and an end at the same moment in the same figure.221  According to 
Dugan’s reading, the complaints put in to Atticus’ mouth – namely, that Cicero the 
character spends too much effort describing inferior orators and gives too much credit 
even to the good ones222 – are intended to undercut Cicero’s praise, allowing Cicero to 
appear modest and Atticus critical.  Thus when Atticus criticizes Cicero’s approach at the 
                                                
218 See Dyck (2004) 10-11, who cites this extended collapse of the republic as a primary reason for Cicero 
not to complete and publish Leg. upon his return from Cilicia.  
219 See Goldberg (1995) 5-12 and Hinds (1998) 63-74. 
220 See Gowing (2000) 58f. and Narducci (1997) 97f. 
221 In general, see Dugan (2005) ch. 3. For an outline of his reading of Brutus, including the generic 
synthesis of teleological rhetorical history with dialogue and a laudatio funebris, see esp. 172ff. 
222 This criticism is implied passim (e.g., 137, 181, 244) and explicitly stated at 292ff. 
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dialogue’s conclusion and faults him for his use of irony, he says in essence that Cicero 
cannot seriously value the efforts of orators past in comparison with his own self.223 
This method of interpretation, while attractive, marks not only the history Cicero 
gives, but the dialogue form itself as teleological.  If Cicero is the telos of Roman oratory, 
then Atticus’ criticism and Cicero’s response in 292ff. must be the telos of the dialogue.  
All else is outmoded or simply ancillary.  For Dugan, these few paragraphs in effect 
invalidate the foregoing 300.224  Cicero himself does admit that he adduces so many 
examples in the course of the dialogue to emphasize the paucity of truly accomplished 
orators.225  More precisely, Cicero wants to demonstrate that very few are worthy of 
remembering (memoria quidem dignos perpaucos).226  Dugan wants these dignos 
perpaucos to be important solely for Atticus’ assertion of their inferiority to Cicero.227  
But, as we have been arguing, memoria is important to Cicero not as a backward-looking 
force, but as a contemporizing one, not for emphasizing the individual at the expense of 
the group, but for the edification of that group.  According to the teleological reading, 
two teloi occur simultaneously: the end of oratory (and by extension, the end of the 
                                                
223 Dugan (2005) 204-07, where he concludes that Atticus’ criticism alters the way the entire text should be 
read, and his persona as a critical historian supports the conclusion that “history itself refutes Cicero’s 
generous praise of other orators and it instead asserts that Cicero’s own greatness dwarfs all previous and 
contemporary rivals” (207). 
224 So: “The narrative that Cicero painstakingly established throughout the Brutus serves as an essential 
prelude to this moment of self-aggrandizing demolition” (Dugan [2005] 207). It should be noted that 
Dugan, in spite of his emphasis on Cicero as telos, does give a sensitive reading of the conclusion to Brutus 
(233ff., esp. 243-48). Nevertheless he maintains his emphasis on a teleological reading, and so invalidates 
the communal aspect that Cicero’s memoria seeks to establish both here and elsewhere (248-50). 
225 See §§137, 181, 244, and 299.   
226 §244. 
227 Dugan (2005) 206-07, building on Brutus 294, 295, and especially 296. Hinds (1998) likewise looks to 
Atticus’ criticism as the moment for determining oratory’s telos. According to him, Atticus makes Cicero 
the telos where Cicero had identified Crassus as the telos during the course of his speech, citing Brutus 143: 
equidem quamquam Antonio tantum tribuo quantum supra dixi, tamen Crasso nihil statuo fieri potuisse 
perfectius.  The perfect infinitive potuisse, however, indicates that Cicero, per his given methodology, 
viewed Crassus as perfect for his time (cf. §298). The implication is not that Cicero is the telos since he 
surpasses Crassus, but that as long as there is the flow of time in oratory, there is no telos. 
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republic) and the end of the dialogue.  But, in fact, the dialogue does not end with 
Atticus’ criticism, or even Cicero’s autobiography.  The dialogue ends with Cicero’s 
charge to Brutus to be an extraordinary orator even in the face of a failing republic, to 
bear the banner of oratory (and by extension, the republic) through the valley of Caesar’s 
rule.228  Likewise, Cicero, in spite of his concern over the degeneration of the republic, is 
not the end.  The textual epilogue mirrors the political one: as Brutus is the forward-
looking concluding subject of the dialogue, so too he is the forward-looking conclusion to 
oratory.229  And as none of the foregoing figures have been an end to oratory, Cicero 
hopes that neither he nor Brutus will be the end.230  The “worthy few” are not a foil for 
Cicero, but his peers, the company he hopes to keep in the minds of Brutus’ generation 
and the ones to follow.  They are the synchronic survivors of Cicero’s diachronic 
narrative.  Brutus appears as an interlocutor in his eponymous dialogue precisely so that 
Cicero does not have to be an end, so that the circle Cicero has depicted in the past may 
carry over into the future.231 
After the completion of Brutus, Cicero’s personal psychology and literary 
methodology undergo a shift in the wake of the death of Tullia.  Cicero first attempts to 
                                                
228 331ff. Of course the final words of the dialogue are missing, but it is clearly approaching its conclusion 
when the text breaks off. Flavio Bondo indicates duae chartae remained. But as Hendrickson (1906) says, 
“the words preserved point to the imminent conclusion of the epilogue” (293). 
229 Not surprisingly, Cicero’s exhortation to Brutus involves an appeal to memoria (tibi optamus eam rem 
publicam in qua duorum generum amplissumorum renovare memoriam atque augere possis; 331). 
230 Cicero’s charge to Brutus to emulate his ancestors (see n128 above) has been understood to be an 
implicit instruction to Brutus to kill Caesar (see Dugan [2005] 245 and citations, esp. the typically balanced 
and sound reading of Douglas [1966] ad 331).   
231 Because of the coincidence in the naming of the character, dedicatee, and dialogue, the concluding 
encouragement of and charge to the character Brutus can also be read as encouragement and a charge for 
the dialogue Brutus, which is of course Cicero’s own creation. By this reading Cicero remains the climax of 
his rhetorical history, or at least his own text does. Still, neither Cicero nor the dialogue functions quite as a 
telos, since Cicero’s text (as discussed in the section on Writing above) itself expects a reader and imitator, 
since it is a forward-looking text which, through its function as a memorial, enlists its readers as 
continuators of its trajectory.  
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cope with his tragedy through the writing of his Consolatio.  When he finds himself still 
in the grips of sorrow he undertakes his program of philosophical dialogues, beginning 
with the protreptic Hortensius, featuring Hortensius, Lucullus, Catulus, and Cicero 
himself.232  All three of Cicero’s new speakers are consulars playing new roles.  
Hortensius had been a reference point in Brutus, but here he speaks for the first time.  
Catulus had of course already appeared in De Orat., but his reappearance here further 
associates him with Cicero, who had not been present at that other discussion.  By 
including all three of these elder statesmen Cicero draws a specific connection between 
them and himself, and generates a further circularity between De Orat., Brutus, and this 
dialogue.  It is a circularity which also serves to link the rhetorical works of both Cicero’s 
first and second periods of writing with the philosophica, which begin with Hortensius. 
Though Hortensius does not survive, the same four interlocutors reappear in the 
two original books of Cicero’s Academica (Catulus and Lucullus), proof that Cicero did 
indeed originally conceive of these dialogues and the Hortensius as a program.233  But 
before he published the Academica, Cicero came to the conclusion that the program was 
not well-conceived.  As a result he shifted the words and ideas of Hortensius, Catulus, 
and Lucullus into the mouths of Atticus and Varro, the interlocutors in the final 
publication of the dialogue.234 
                                                
232 On the Hortensius in general, see Grilli’s edition and commentary (1969). 
233 At the very least, following his writing and publication of Hortensius Cicero decided on Lucullus and 
Catulus as follow-up pieces. In addition to the continuity of characters, the dialogues occur in generally the 
same time frame, each of Lucullus, Catulus, and Hortensius hosts a book at his own villa, and, as Hirzel II 
(506-08) points out, the characters of the interlocutors seem to remain consistent. See further Griffin (1989) 
3-4. 
234 The Academica vexingly comes down to us in a combination of fragments from the original and revised 
editions.  The Lucullus survives primarily in tact, which was the second book of the original edition (the 
first book, the Catulus, does not survive). It is alternately called the Academica Priora, Lucullus, or 
Academica 2.  Only elements of the four books of the second, published edition survive, consisting chiefly 
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Cicero gives two primary reasons in his letters for the shift in speakers.  In the 
first place Cicero decides that the philosophical arguments put into Lucullus’, 
Hortensius’, and Catulus’ mouths are too complex and philosophical for the historical 
figures to have given.235  Already worried about this inconsistency, Cicero had 
considered shifting the discussion to Brutus and Cato when he received word that Varro 
wished to be included somehow in Cicero’s writings (Att. 13.16.1).  This request provides 
Cicero with the second reason to shift speakers.  Atticus apparently suggested to Cicero 
that he make the conversation occur between Varro and Cotta (Att. 13.19), but in the end 
Cicero opts for Varro to speak with Atticus and himself.   
This choice of speakers gives a certain insight into Cicero’s process of character 
selection.236  Cicero justifies his self-inclusion on the model of Aristotle, who was, Cicero 
says, the chief speaker in his own dialogues (Att. 13.19).  Likewise, Cicero had, as noted, 
already set a precedent for himself in Brutus and Leg.  As he told Atticus, he could not 
reasonably exclude himself from any discussion featuring contemporary figures.  Though 
Cicero does not explicitly say why he must include himself, the implication is that his 
absence would suggest a certain ignorance of the opinions expressed or an unwillingness 
to express them in his own voice.237  The inevitable outcome of this plan is that Cicero is 
central to his own circle in a way that not even Atticus or Brutus are.  Though perhaps 
                                                                                                                                            
in a speech by Varro from the first book. This extended fragment is identified as either Academica 
Posteriora or Academica 1.  
235 See Att. 13.12.3, 13.16.1, and 13.19.3. 
236 The process has been revised some since the earlier dialogues and the method laid out in Att.12.12. At 
that time all of Cicero’s published dialogues had been set in the past, but as he felt an increased need for 
self-inclusion, this method no longer sufficed. 
237 This ignorance or unwillingness may likely have been attached to a certain social inferiority in a 
dialogue where Cotta was present. As Griffin (1989) points out, since Cotta died in 73, Cicero had not yet 
attained the consulship that was the backdrop for the dramatic dates of both his original and revised 
versions (10). He thus would have had to play an insignificant, bit role (kophon prosopon). 
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Cicero conceives of himself as central because of his own assessment of his self-worth, 
this letter would seem to suggest that his repeated self-inclusion depends more upon his 
function as author.  So while an Atticus or Varro must be written in to the circle, Cicero 
as author is in by default.  The marked action therefore would be a writing out of himself, 
an exclusion rather than an inclusion.  In the case of author, absence would more notably 
cripple a contemporary dialogue’s authenticity than presence validates it. 
The inclusion of Atticus meanwhile seems extraneous.  In the first place he is an 
Epicurean, and therefore ill-equipped to discourse on the technical distinctions between 
the different branches of Academic and Stoic philosophy.  And, in fact, in the reality of 
the dialogue (at least what survives), Atticus has very little to say.  Atticus’ presence 
seems to be little more than a reminder that, at this point, Cicero is unready to construct a 
dyadic dialogue.  A third figure communalizes the activity of dialogue, ensuring it does 
not collapse into simple argument.238 
The writing of the Academica coincides with the writing of another contemporary 
dialogue, Fin..  Cicero’s letters make it clear that the first two books of Fin. (called by 
Cicero the Torquatus) were completed before he had edited the Acad. to include Varro.239  
In fact, Fin. breaks down into three separate dialogues, with three different casts, and two 
                                                
238 In their discussion of patronage in Rome, Johnson and Dandeker (1990) differentiate between the 
patronage of a “social relationship” and of a “social system.” The first kind of patronage can involve only 
two figures and needs bear no reference to the broader social structure of a given society. The second kind 
of patronage depends on the ongoing exchange of actions and favors on several levels by several figures 
both horizontally and vertically in such a way that it the economy and polity of a given society are entirely 
dependent upon it. The society represented in Academica avoids the dyadic, terminal patronage system 
detailed by Johnson and Dandeker, but it also does not quite reflect the second kind of patronage. The 
vertical relations necessary for a patronage society are, after all, absent. But the presence of Atticus helps to 
ensure that what is represented conforms more to a community than to a personal relationship. 
239 Specifically, Att. 13.32.3, where Cicero tells Atticus that Torquatus is in Rome, even as he affixes new 
prefaces to his Catulus and Lucullus. It is possible that by Torquatus, Cicero only means the first book, 
though it seems unlikely on analogy with other dialogues. 
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very different temporal settings, the Torquatus being the first.  Each mise en scène offers 
its own specific contribution to Cicero’s enlarging circle. 
The first two books feature Cicero, L. Manlius Torquatus, and C. Valerius 
Triarus.  Triarus, like Atticus in the Acad., is little more than a name.  He hardly says a 
word, functioning instead as a potential mediating force, an inscribed reader who can 
choose from the arguments presented to form a synthesis.240  He is another reminder that 
dialogue does not consist only in one side defeating another.  But Triarus, by his own 
admission (Fin. 2.118), is biased against Torquatus (he is a Stoic).  His role as 
reader/judge turns out to be an ironic one.  As so often in Cicero, while all other ideas 
should receive critical evaluation and perhaps assent, Epicureanism proves to be entirely 
wrong.  Triarus as reader teaches the actual reader to assent fully to the argument of 
Cicero, and not to expect a dialogic synthesis.   
Besides his Stoic affinities, Triarus’ appearance may also signal a reference to 
Lucullus, the erstwhile interlocutor of the eponymous dialogue that was edited to become 
the Acad.  Triarus had served as legate under Lucullus in the war against Mithradates (RE 
363) and so perhaps offers a link between Fin. and Hortensius and the as yet unrevised 
Acad.  As Lucullus’s son’s Tusculan villa is the setting of Fin. 3-4, Triarus’ appearance 
may also serve as a link to that next section of this dialogue. 
Torquatus naturally plays a much larger role as the spokesperson for 
Epicureanism.  Despite the fact that his argument, as Epicurean, is doomed to fail, his 
                                                
240 Something like this is going on at the end of the Torquatus (Fin. 2.118), where Cicero offers to let him 
adjudicate the debate.  
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inclusion in the dialogue is meant by Cicero as kindness in memoriam.241  It would 
apparently not do to have Atticus, Cicero’s closest Epicurean friend present the argument.  
His role tends to be more that of friend, encourager, and, on occasion, the convinced.  For 
the dialogue, Cicero needed someone more enthusiastically dogmatic.  And his inclusion 
also paves the way for the frequent references to other Torquati within the dialogue, 
which serve to enlist not only Lucius (80), but his cousin and father as well within 
Cicero’s circle. 
The second dialogue of Fin. features, for the first time in any of Cicero’s 
dialogues, only two speakers: Cicero and M. Porcius Cato.  Cato was, of course, the 
Stoic par excellence of the end of the republic.  And like Torquatus, his name conjures up 
worthy ancestry, most notably Cato Maior, mentioned in Rep. and soon to feature in 
Cato.  He is an obvious choice for Cicero, both for the topic at hand and for the general 
project of defining his community.  The most notable characteristic of this part of the 
dialogue is the presence of only two speakers, the first time Cicero so limits a dialogue.  
Such an arrangement can offer only two results: an unresolved dichotomy or a clear 
winner and loser.  Though Cicero gives himself the privileged position as second speaker, 
the end of book 4 makes it clear that this conversation will have no winner.  The dialogue 
simply ends as night approaches, with both speakers unconvinced, and with the promise 
to resume the discussion at a later time.242  This indecisiveness is not quite aporetic, but is 
                                                
241 L. Manlius Torquatus (RE 80) died prematurely in 48, 2-3 years before the publication of Fin. Cf. 
Brutus 245. On the friendship between Cicero, Atticus, and Torquatus, see Horsfall’s edition of Nepos’ 
Lives. 
242 Fin. 4.79-80: verum hoc idem saepe faciamus. Nos vero, inquit ille; nam quid possumus facere melius? 
Et hanc quidem primam exigam a te operam, ut audias me quae a te dicta sunt refellentem. 
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certainly inconclusive.  It is a sort of sceptical indecision that suggests to the reader that 
he should be wary of certainty regarding the topics at hand.243   
This conclusion stands in ironic contrast to the end of book 2, where the presence 
of a third party suggested that a sort of compromise could be reached between Torquatus 
and Cicero.  Instead, the third party, Triarus, tipped the scales in favor of Cicero’s 
argument.  The presence of three defeats dialogue.  Meanwhile, in book 4, the absence of 
a third party suggests a dispute that cannot be resolved, and, in a sense this is what we 
get.  But there remains the hint of future discussion on the topic, and it would seem to 
imply that dialogue seems to work best with only two present.  The contrast, however, 
cannot be so simply put.  The implication of the Torquatus is not that dialogue does not 
work with three people (other dialogues prove the opposite), but that dialogue does not 
work with Epicureanism.  At the same time the inconclusiveness of the Cato (Fin. 3-4), 
the sort of intended result of skeptical dialogue, is not the product of just two figures, but 
of three.  The third, L. Lucullus the younger, is absent, but it is his villa that provides the 
venue for discussion.  The physical space triangulates the conversation. 
The usual convention of the Ciceronian dialogue is to have a younger figure come 
to the residence of an older one to learn at his feet.244  In Fin. 3-4, the two older figures 
come together at the villa of a younger one, and it is his very absence which gives the two 
speakers opportunity – i.e., a physical forum – for their discussion.  The end of their 
discussion coincides with their departure, and without the function performed by the 
                                                
243 In a sense such a conclusion supports the skeptical Academic method, and so delivers a sort of parting 
jab at Stoicism, even as Cicero tells Cato that it is he who has delivered the scrupulum abeunti. 
244 Cf. De Orat., Rep., Leg., Brutus, Nat. Deor., Cato, and Laelius. See also Griffin (1989) 18-19 on this 
convention and its potential implications for the setting and order of the Catulus. 
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absence of a Lucullus on a future occasion, the dialogue cannot continue.  So even in this 
first instance of a two-part dialogue there is a third party involved to facilitate. 
Fin. 5 occurs several years before either of the other discussions, in 79.  The 
primary dialogue, a debate over the Antiochean Old Academy and the New Academy of 
Carneades, Philo et al., occurs between Cicero and Marcus Pupius Piso Frugi 
Calpurnianus.  But unlike the other dialogues of Fin., this one features three other 
speaking figures: Quintus, Atticus, and Lucius Tullius Cicero, the cousin of Marcus and 
Quintus.  The combination of a distinct dramatic date, a unique physical setting (Athens), 
and the more pluralized dramatis personae make this third mise en scène the richest in 
Fin..   
While only Piso and Cicero participate in the meat of the discussion, each 
character appears in order to play a specific role as a representative of a certain interest.  
These interests are expressed in the prologue of Fin. 5 as the interlocutors take in the 
sights of Athens after a lecture of Antiochus (1-7).  The physical locations encourage in 
each of them memories of the people who had once been active in those very places, 
causing Piso to remark that “it is not without reason that the discipline of memoria 
depends upon physical places.”245  Piso recalls Speusippus, Xenocrates, and Polemo, 
heads of the Academy succeeding Plato.  These figures point to his affinity for the ‘Old 
Academy.’  Quintus, meanwhile, is inspired to recall Sophocles, and thus becomes a 
representative of drama.  Atticus naturally thinks of Epicurus.  Cicero himself, like Piso, 
remembers a head of the Academy, though this time it is a representative of the ‘New 
Academy,’ Carneades.  Finally Lucius thinks of politics and oratory, in the persons of 
                                                
245 Fin. 5.2: tanta vis admonitionis inest in locis; ut non sine causa ex iis memoriae ducta sit disciplina. The 
reference is to that type of memory justified by the Simonides episode from De Orat. quoted above. 
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Pericles and Demosthenes.246  This division recalls the division of labor in Plato’s 
Symposium, where rhetoricians, poets, and philosophers all have their turn to speak.  
Only here, the speech-giving is limited to two.  Still, the specter of the Symposium serves 
as reminder in this narrowly Academic discussion that one person, Plato, can assume all 
three roles (rhetorician, poet, philosopher) as author of a dialogue.  Cicero uses his 
characters to point to the great achievements of the Greeks, when all the while he is a 
singular Roman heir to all branches of Greek success; he is orator, dramatist (via the 
dialogues), and philosopher.  The interlocutors, since they have been caricaturized to be 
placeholders for these various fields of Ciceronian activity, are transparently Ciceronian 
themselves.  That is to say, each character represents a particular aspect of Cicero’s own 
appreciation of Greek culture, and their one-to-one identification with certain fields 
renders them as somehow one-dimensional and unreal, thus forcing the reader to look for 
the wizard behind the curtain.247  And when the reader does find Cicero there, s/he cannot 
help but recognize that Cicero the author is not identical to Cicero the character.  Cicero 
the character only embodies one aspect of Cicero the author, and Lucius, Quintus, and 
Piso all embody other parts.  The Pisonian arguments gain extra weight from such a 
realization, which essentially amounts to another recognition of the importance of the 
dialogue form, which insists on hearing all voices. 
                                                
246 Cicero elsewhere mentions Lucius in De Orat. 2.2, where he presents himself studying under Crassus 
alongside Lucius. Though the family connection easily explains this doubled appearance, it is yet another 
instance of the dialogues interrelationships. 
247 The one exception to the identification of the characters with aspects of Cicero the author is Atticus, the 
Epicurean. But Cicero (the author) takes specific steps to isolate this position. Not only is there repeated 
reference to Cicero mocking the position, but it is identified with Atticus, whom Cicero locates 
permanently in Athens. In a passage where place is of such significance, and when Cicero is marking out 
himself as a Roman embodiment of the Greek traditions, the permanent relegation of Atticus to Athens 
marginalizes him and his caricatured position of Epicureanism. Epicureanism has not been worthy enough 
to receive its place in Rome/Cicero; it is simply a Greek artifact. 
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In addition to the increase in players, the dramatic date put in relief against the 
later date of the first two dialogues calls attention to itself.  The nostalgia of the 
interlocutors lends a certain metatextual nostalgia to a dialogue set some 34 years in the 
past.  This shift to the past is important for the dialogue in three ways.  In the first place it 
locates the discussion in the temporal context of Antiochus, whom the quintet had just 
heard speak, making the arguments the more relevant and authoritative.  Secondly, it 
allows for the inclusion of Lucius, who died prematurely a decade later.  And thirdly, it 
makes a friendly conversation between Piso and Cicero more probable.  By the time of 
composition the two had fallen out, in large part because of Piso’s support of Clodius. 
The conspicuous dramatic date in the past does allow Piso to be a part of Cicero’s circle, 
but only as he was in 79, not in his pro-Clodius form of the 50s.  The move is akin to the 
one in De Orat., whose interlocutors would shortly go on to oppose one another 
politically.  Such discord is regularly on the horizon in the dialogues, a constant reminder 
of the enduring threats to the republic.  But the dramatic dates that predate the disasters 
afford snapshots of certain figures in their forms suitable for inclusion in Cicero’s circle.  
Such is the case with Piso here.  Again place plays an important role.  Piso himself is 
made to say that place inspires memory, and Cicero’s memory of Piso, the memory that 
creates community, is of him in a specific context, a context removed from the reality of 
the current political situation. 
In stark contrast to the elaborately-contrived Fin. 5 stands Cicero’s next dialogue, 
Tusc. Disp..  Alone among the dialogues, Tusc. Disp. gives no names to its 
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interlocutors.248  At the same time, the dialogue form itself begins to fade after the first 
few paragraphs, with the unnamed minor interlocutor requesting continuous speech from 
the primary speaker (Tusc. Disp. 1.16: continentem orationem audire malo).249  The 
combination of the anonymity and the soliloquizing makes Tusc. Disp. the least dialogic 
of the dialogues.  Not by chance this erosion of dialogue coincides with M.’s lament for 
the concurrent erosion of oratory and politics.  In Tusc. Disp. 2.5 M. views oratory as 
something dying (in contrast to Brutus), and in, e.g., 3.3 and 5.104, the rise of the 
democratic rabble causes M. regret.  There is a sort of pessimism regarding the republic 
here, a unique acceptance of its decline rather than a rebuttal of it.250  This political 
pessimism is mirrored by the formal pessimism that does not name the community’s 
members, and even depicts the devolution of the dialogue into monologue. 
But the pessimism is only temporary.  The true simultaneous failure of republic 
and form will not truly be realized until Off.  Shortly following Tusc. Disp., however, 
Cicero returns to the community constructing project of his other dialogues in Nat. Deor. 
Nat. Deor. contains no explicit reference to a date, or even to a contemporary event.  
Dyck, using Cicero’s insistence on historical accuracy as a starting point, has traced the 
careers, lives, and availability of the historical characters to conclude that the fictional 
setting is most likely 77/76.251  The scene does not contain some of the details that 
characterize many of the other dialogues.  Though it does not deteriorate into the non-
dramatic levels of Tusc. Disp., of Nat. Deor. we learn only that the dialogue was to have 
                                                
248 To distinguish between the two speakers they are often given the labels “M.” and “A.”, but these are 
modern interpolations. See Douglas (1994) 16 with n48. 
249 This request inverts the requirements of Socrates in the Protagoras, showing a self-awareness of the 
evanescence of the dialogue form. 
250 As Douglas (1994) has put it, “nowhere else does he make it so clear that he sees no hope of relief from 
the oppressiveness of Caesar’s rule” (17). 
251 Dyck (2003) 7. 
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taken place during the feriae Latinae at the home (which home we do not know) of Cotta.  
C. Aurelius Cotta plays host to Cicero himself, Q. Lucilius Balbus, and C. Velleius.252  
Cotta is the one we already know from De Orat., and he serves to create continuity 
between these two dialogues, separated in composition by 10 years.  Of Velleius and 
Balbus we know very little.  In fact, what we do know comes only from this dialogue or 
from De Orat. (3.78), where Crassus cites them as particular representatives of the 
viewpoints of their respective philosophical schools.  Nat. Deor. presents the 
philosophers in roughly the same way Crassus does: they are more to be associated with 
strict adherence and representation of a philosophical viewpoint than with any 
individualizing characteristics.253  Nat. Deor. does introduce Velleius as a senator (1.15), 
and also mentions that Balbus’ father was a senator (2.10), but takes us little farther into 
their personal lives.  They are philosophical caricatures, whose only prerequisites for 
inclusion in the dialogue are their strict adherence to their positions and their aristocratic 
pedigree.   
This pair of characteristics perhaps helps to explain one of the peculiar 
characteristics of the dialogue as a whole, Cicero’s virtual silence.254  In Att. 13.19, in a 
passage discussed above, Cicero tells Atticus that he does not wish to have Varro speak 
with Cotta in his revised Acad. because it would not do for him (Cicero) to remain silent.  
That dialogue, however, was set roughly in the present.  Nat. Deor. can accommodate a 
non-speaking Cicero because it is set in the past.  The question remains, though, why set 
                                                
252 This Balbus is not to be confused with L. Cornelius Balbus, the defendant of Cicero’s speech Pro Balbo. 
253 Dyck (2003) 5-6. In this sense the dialogue is more akin to Fin., though even there the physical settings 
are more particularly emphasized. 
254 Cicero the character (i.e., “Cicero”) identifies himself as an auditor at 1.17. For a list of reasons for his 
inclusion that complement mine to follow, see Dyck (2003) 7. 
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the dialogue in the past.  A De Orat. or Rep. gains a great deal by appealing to the 
auctoritas of the figures portrayed, but Nat. Deor. provides only relative unknowns.  It is 
perhaps precisely because of Balbus’ and Velleius’ combination of strict philosophical 
principles and aristocratic stature that they are featured in Nat. Deor..  With the reference 
in De Orat. to reinforce their characterization, Balbus and Velleius seem to be almost 
proverbially strict adherents to their schools.  Cicero certainly did not have a shortage of 
Epicurean or Stoic friends to choose from – one need look no farther than Fin. – but he 
apparently does not find the appropriate level of dogma and dogmatism among any 
contemporaries.  Velleius and Balbus as relatively anonymous figures of the past, require 
less of the fullness of characterization that might be expected of a contemporary.  At the 
same time, Velleius and Balbus further involve De Orat..  Not only are they the 
proverbial Stoic and Epicurean, respectively, to Crassus in De Orat., but Cotta himself 
acknowledges Crassus’ high esteem for Velleius in Nat. Deor. 1.58.  Combined with 
Cotta’s presence, this pair keeps De Orat. and Crassus in clear focus.  The connection is a 
bit unorthodox.  Nat. Deor. seems to continue the philosophical project or phase of 
Cicero’s dialogue career that began with Hortensius (and cf. Div. 2.1), but this link serves 
as reminder that the dialogues should not be categorized so discretely.  The rhetorical 
dialogues and philosophical dialogues are not independent of one another (didn’t Crassus 
warn us about this from the beginning?!). 
So then, if Cicero is a bit player, why does he inscribe himself at all into this 
dialogue?  As auditor, his role is similar to that of Triarus in Fin. 1-2: he performs the 
function of exemplary reader.  Cicero the skeptic is able to perform the skeptical method.  
He can listen to the presentations of three philosophical schools, including a skeptical 
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position, and then choose from among them what seems most probable (3.95).  For such 
an exercise to work appropriately he needed the dogmatism of a Velleius and a Balbus.  
And the fact that he opts for the Stoic position over the skeptical one is further 
justification of the method. 
In Cato Cicero returns to the dialogue style that had characterized his first period 
of writing in De Orat., Rep., and Leg..  Set in 150, the year before Cato’s death, Cato 
features Laelius and Scipio as disciples of Cato, who gives a discourse on old age.  It 
seems to indicate a shift in Cicero’s method, especially insofar as it hearkens back to his 
dialogues of the 50s.  In the first place, this is the first dialogue since Rep. set before 
Cicero’s birth.  Secondly, Cicero seems to wander a bit afield from the philosophical 
program that included Hortensius, Acad., Fin., Tusc. Disp., and Nat. Deor. with the 
ethical subject matter of Cato.255  But the dialogue most clearly reaches back to De Orat. 
and Rep. in its familiar dramatis personae.  Scipio and Laelius had of course both 
featured in Rep., and Cato pops up as an exemplum twice in De Orat..256  Most notably, 
though, the specific mise-en-scène of Cato had already been constructed at Rep. 2.1, 
where Scipio described learning at the feet of Cato in his (Scipio’s) youth.  Cato purports 
to give an instance of that very relationship.  In doing so it does not flesh out Cicero’s 
circle of individuals any further, but it does recalibrate the interrelationships among the 
dialogues themselves.  Cato, divided by a decade and five philosophical dialogues from 
Rep. suddenly acquires a chronological priority that both accords well with its subject and 
underscores the unity of the Ciceronian dialogues (and hence their characters). 
                                                
255 Cf. Div. 2.1ff. for Cicero’s classification of Cato as different from these others. 
256 1.171 and 3.135. 
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Cicero’s next two dialogues, Div. and De Fato., return to the philosophical 
program interrupted by Cato.  But since the publication of Nat. Deor. more than an 
ethical dialogue had intervened.  March of 44 witnessed a dramatic tear in the political 
fabric of Rome with the death of Caesar.  If, as we have been arguing, Cicero’s dialogues 
are largely a response to Caesar’s political ascension, we might expect a noticeable effect 
in Cicero’s writing.  Div. and De Fato do not disappoint.  Cicero suggests in the preface 
of Div. 2 that he had conceived of Div. and Fin. as supplements to Nat. Deor. shortly 
after that first dialogue’s composition.257  It is also clear that he had begun Div. before the 
Ides of March, but did not complete it until after Caesar’s assassination.258  When Caesar 
died, the character and relevance of the dialogues shifted, for they no longer seemed 
Cicero’s sole avenue for political engagement: 
For it was in those dialogues that I was giving forensic speeches and 
speaking before the senate; I thought philosophy had taken the place of 
political activity for me. Now, since I am starting to be sounded for advice 
regarding the republic, I must work for the state, or rather I must devote 
my entire thought and effort to it. I have only as much time for philosophy 
as is not needed for my political duties.259 
 
Because of his shift in priorities away from dialogue to more explicit political activity 
Cicero’s next two dialogues show less attention to the community-constructive 
significance of the earlier dialogues.  It seems almost as if the preface of Div. 2 is meant 
                                                
257 See Div. 2.3 and 2.4. 
258 Div. 2.4: ad reliqua alacri tendebamus animo sic parati, ut, nisi quae causa gravior obstitisset, nullum 
philosophiae locum esse pateremur, qui non Latinis litteris inlustratus pateret. Durand suggested in the 
1920s that Cicero had written most of Div. by the time of Caesar’s death, only editing and revising slightly 
afterwards in view of the event’s magnitude. Falconer (1923) prefers Cicero to have begun Div. before 
March 15 , but to have written much of book 1 and all of book 2 after Caesar’s death. Neither argument is 
wholly convincing, but it seems indubitable that the preface of book 2 is post mortem Caesaris. 
259 Div. 2.7: In libris enim sententiam dicebamus, contionabamur, philosophiam nobis pro rei publicae 
procuratione substitutam putabamus. Nunc quoniam de re publica consuli coepti sumus, tribuenda est 
opera rei publicae, vel omnis potius in ea cogitatio et cura ponenda; tantum huic studio relinquendum, 
quantum vacabit a publico officio et munere.  
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to apologize for the dialogue’s different standards, with Cicero’s description of his shift 
of priorities given by way of explanation.  Colored by this explanation, the list of 
dialogues he had given at the beginning of the preface, including Div. and the unwritten 
De Fato, seem to be for Cicero a complete list of what he has written and will write.  
With the political forum reopened he intends to put aside his pen.  Still, his desire for 
completeness is leading him to finish the program he has already laid out via this Div. 
and De Fato.  So he completes these two dialogues, but not with the same community 
orientation of his previous dialogues: the need for such a strategy seemed to have died 
with Caesar. 
 As a result, Div. features only two speakers, Quintus and Cicero.  The dialogue 
takes the pattern of Nat. Deor. (et al.), with Quintus first speaking in favor of divination 
and then Cicero refuting him.  But, since there is only one interlocutor, only one position 
is represented (that of the Stoics).  And after Quintus has given his position, he barely 
speaks again.  In the end, the dialogue concludes not precisely with indecision, but with a 
sort of victory of skepticism, a victory acknowledged by Quintus.  It is not that Cicero 
has presented any positive dogma, but that he has shown the success of his method, and 
Quintus cannot but acknowledge it.  Even the location, Cicero’s Tusculan villa cannot 
triangulate or complicate the interaction.  This dialogue seems interested only in laying 
out arguments, only in philosophy. 
 De Fato follows in a similar vein.  Like Div., there are but two speakers: Cicero 
and Aulus Hirtius.  Hirtius had been an associate of Caesar since the mid-50s, and was 
consul designate of 44, the setting of the dialogue.  He was a neighbor of Cicero’s in 
Puteoli (where the dialogue occurs), and a frequent correspondent.  After the death of 
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Caesar, Hirtius’ political allegiance had been up in the air.  And it is because of this 
situation that Fin. performs a function unique to it among the dialogues: it includes a 
character not because he is part of the circle, but in order to convince him to be a part of 
it.  Cicero includes him in De Fato as part of an effort to bring him away from Antony 
towards his own more traditional political stance.260  In this sense De Fato is, like the 
other dialogues, politically motivated, but it is a different type of motivation; it is only 
another weapon in a political arsenal, not the sole weapon. 
 Because of its different motives, the dialogue also has a different method.  
Following Nat. Deor. and Div., it would make sense for the dialogue to balance 
competing speeches, just as the other two had.  But, Cicero claims, a “certain situation” 
prevented this format.261  This “situation” goes unnamed, but Caesar’s assassination 
seems as likely an event as any.262  Instead the dialogue is to follow the pattern of Tusc. 
Disp. (De Fato 4), with Hirtius offering up a thesis and Cicero refuting it.  Tusc. Disp. 
was, as noted, the least dialogic of all of Cicero’s preceding dialogues.  The anonymous 
interlocutor of that dialogue virtually disappears, and his anonymity is rendered 
insignificant by his minimized role.  Though much of De Fato is missing, Cicero, 
through Hirtius himself, adumbrates a small role for Hirtius on the example of Tusc. 
Disp.  In these terms De Fato performs two functions.  Firstly it completes Cicero’s 
philosophical program, and secondly, it is a beneficium aiming at bringing Hirtius within 
the fold of Cicero’s traditional party.  Neither function requires more than two characters 
or an extended role for the interlocutor, as a community-building dialogue would.  Div. 
                                                
260 It is of course the third party, Octavian, that eventually takes the day. 
261 De Fato. 1: id in hac disputatione de fato casus quidam ne facerem inpedivit. 
262 It seems especially so because of this vague formulation casus quidam. 
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and De Fato, situated in the brief period of Cicero’s hope for political renascence, simply 
go through the motions of dialogue, foregoing the communal interest of those that 
preceded them. 
 After De Fato Cicero wrote a De Gloria, which does not survive, and of which 
we know very little.  The title perhaps suggests an affinity between it and the two works 
to follow, De Amicitia and De Officiis, wherein typical aristocratic ethics are treated.263  
In any case, very little can be said on the subject. 
 The next (and last) true dialogue is Laelius, of the autumn of 44.264  This date 
finds Laelius being composed concurrently with the first of Cicero’s Philippics, which 
testify to his political sentiments of the moment.  In the Philippics his post-exile political 
engagement reaches its zenith.  It is therefore somewhat surprising to find Cicero still 
engaged in the subtle political maneuvering that characterized his dialogues before Div.  
It seems evident from the titles of his last three works that he is still concerning himself 
in writing with the definition of the appropriate aristocratic character.  Perhaps he 
recognized that oratory was no longer his only vehicle for expression, or that the 
oratorical force he had once asserted had waned.  And no doubt the chaotic scramble for 
power of 44 could only confirm the value of his community-building program in the 
dialogues after all.  It seems most likely, though, that Laelius functions as a conclusion to 
a program of works that non longer bears continuation following Caesar’s assassination. 
For it is here in the Laelius that Cicero last revisits the dialogic character of his earlier 
dialogues, complete with extra metatextual conceit and thorough inscription into the 
Ciceronian circle. 
                                                
263 Habinek (1990) 166. 
264 The relevant references are Div. 2.3, Off. 2.31, and Att. 16.13, as collected by Falconer (1923) 103. 
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 The setting of Laelius is a mise-en-abyme.  It begins in the conventional way with 
Cicero remembering how he and some unnamed friends once gathered for a discussion at 
the home of Q. Mucius Scaevola, whom we already encountered in De Orat. (I call this 
the Scaevola dialogue).265  But no sooner has the dialogue gotten underway than Scaevola 
appeals to his prodigious powers of memoria to relate a dialogue in which he and his 
brother-in-law Fannius were the junior interlocutors and his father-in-law Laelius was the 
speaker (the Laelius dialogue).  The dialogue within a dialogue performs a similar 
function to the early date of Cato: it creates a continuity between this dialogue and the 
ones that long preceded it.  Again we do not meet any new characters.  After some 
interruption in his program Cicero re-forms his circle by linking dialogues, not 
individuals.  The connection of Cicero to Scaevola to Laelius (to Scipio) reiterates the 
connections outlined in De Orat., Rep., and even Cato.266  At the same time there is a 
metatextual concentration on a succession of dialogues as the agent giving rise to the 
connections, particularly a succession depending upon memoria. 
 The mise-en-abyme continues shortly into the Laelius dialogue when Laelius, like 
Scaevola and Cicero before him appeals to his own memory (memini) to recall a 
discussion in which he and Scipio had listened together to Cato (the Cato dialogue).267  
He is in fact making reference to the conversation “recorded” in Cicero’s own Cato in a 
not-so-subtle allusion.  In doing so he accomplishes three things: he connects one 
Ciceronian dialogue with another (and thus establishes a sort of unity), he confirms the 
general principle that dialogue gives birth to successive dialogue to form 
                                                
265 The emphasis on memoria and remembering will be important for the discussion that follows. 
266 Cicero also indicates in the preface a similarity in style and purpose between Cato and Laelius, both 
dedicated to Atticus. Cf. Powell (1988) 1-2. 
267 Laelius 11. 
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intergenerational community, and he emphasizes the importance of memoria in the 
process of succession.  In 14 Laelius repeats this set of events, this time by alluding to 
Rep. (the Republic dialogue).  And finally, after Laelius has been speaking for some 
while, he begins to quote Scipio at 33-35 in recollection of the conversations the two of 
them used to have on the topic of friendship (the Scipio dialogue).  This is the fifth 
dialogue to come into play in Laelius.   
Leach, though not exploring the effect of the mise-en-abyme, has identified the 
priority of absence in Laelius.268  Building off of a Derridean idea of friendship as being 
occasioned only through absence, she analyzes the significance of Laelius’ discourse 
coming shortly after Scipio’s death.  The proliferation of dialogues in Laelius reiterates 
this sense of absence that Leach has observed.  The repeated dispossession of the leading 
role by the successive interlocutors serves as a reminder that the circle of speakers cannot 
be completed within the context of this dialogue alone.  Here in Cicero’s last dialogue, 
this displacement of dialogue is a hermeneutical key requiring the reader to reevaluate the 
cohesion of the dialogues as a whole.  Just as Cicero’s characters are in dialogue with one 
another inside the dialogues, the dialogues themselves are in dialogue with one another.  
Accordingly, the characters can move outside of their dialogues and enter into others.  
The dialogue of dialogue creates an atemporal forum for the interdialogue interaction of 
the interlocutors.  And just as Laelius seeks to remedy the absence of Scipio via memory 
(as explicitly stated at the opening and closing of Laelius), it takes a series of 
remembered dialogues to fill the void, to satisfy the desire generated by the ‘absence’ of 
one dialogue as the final referent.  On a formal level, Laelius does not extend the 
                                                
268 Leach (1993). 
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Ciceronian circle as the other dialogues had done, but informs the reader that the circle is 
there.  And all the while Laelius lays out on the level of content the principles that are to 
structure true aristocratic relationships.269  Laelius is a radical synthesis of substance and 
form whose emphasis on aristocratic friendship and the importance of memory in erasing 
generational lines makes a final effort at reestablishing a maintainable aristocratic 
community through which the republic might survive.270 
In De Orat. Cicero shows how memory replicates personal interactions in 
defining social networks.  By linking the setting and speakers of Rep. with De Orat.  
Cicero begins to show that these networks can extend over several generations.  With 
Leg. Cicero involves himself personally in the specific authorizing network previously 
detailed, the ‘Ciceronian circle’.  Brutus suggests that the intergenerational network 
should not be understood teleologically.  Cicero was not willing to subordinate himself to 
the ancestors in oratorical prowess, but neither was he ready to concede the republic’s 
end.  It is a reminder that Cicero’s circle is not entirely backwards-looking.  Hortensius 
and the first edition of the Academica introduce a new style of Ciceronian dialogue, the 
philosophical kind, but they too are linked to the dialogues of De Orat. and Brutus 
through the figures of Catulus and Hortensius.  The revised Academica and the first four 
books of Fin. nearly devolve into dyadic dialogues, arguments instead of conversations, 
but in each case Cicero includes apparently unnecessary figures or spaces to bear the role 
of intermediary or exemplary reader.  In Fin. 5 Cicero again includes himself, but he also 
                                                
269 On the uniqueness of ideas of equality in the dialogue, see Habinek (1990) 170ff. and Leach (1993) 102-
3. 
270 Cf. Habinek (1990): “Cicero’s distinction throughout the Laelius between true friendships and vulgar 
friendships reinforces the elitist aspect of his program, and his presentation within the dialogue of 
friendship as the locus of acculturation for future generations to traditional values suggests that his 
ambitions reach beyond the narrowly political to the revitalization of the aristocracy per se” (182). 
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seeks to authorize the other voices of the dialogue, reaffirming the value of multiple 
perspectives in the community.  Cicero’s casting of the Nat. Deor. further associates him 
with Crassus, who would have apparently made the same selections had he been casting 
the dialogue.  De Fato and Div. show less of the literary conceit that marks the foregoing 
dialogues.  The coincidence of this devolution of the form and the death of Caesar 
suggests that the project of detailing and propagating the authorizing community of Rome 
became less immediate with Caesar’s assassination.  Finally, Laelius, with its layering of 
several dialogues and its explicit reference to other Ciceronian dialogues highlights the 
need to read all of the dialogues as a single group with a specific program and vividly 
depicts the interaction of several generations in one place. 
Altogether the dialogues appeal to memory to generate a sort of pedigree that 
defines the republic of the past and hopes to replicate it in the future.  To this end they 
idealize the former generations and foresee the replication of that ideal in the 
generation(s) to come.  What Cicero wants is continuity, or at least the illusion of such, 
and his interlocutors, centered around himself, give a “physical” representation of it 
simply by coming on stage.  Dugan et al. have long since observed the pattern of filiation 
that emerges from the dialogues, especially from De Orat., Rep., Cato, and Laelius.271  
But Cicero does more than filiate, and he is interested in more than his own personal 
intellectual heritage.  The dialogues hint strongly at a direct line of descent from Cato to 
Scipio to Crassus to Cicero, but what they portray is a more complex network in which 
individuals and relationships interweave (often through the faculty of memory) so 
intricately that their network becomes transtemporal and, in theory, indissoluble.  While 
                                                
271 Besides Dugan (2005) passim in his chapter on De Oratore, especially on 150f., see also Gunderson 
(2000) ch. 6. 
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Cicero certainly represents himself as a cornerstone of his structure, he is not the 
keystone added to the construction as its culmination. 
In selecting his interlocutors, Cicero demonstrates two strategies of 
exemplification.  In the first place, as he did so often in his oratory, he adduces individual 
exempla.  These undeniably include the ideal Scipios and Crassuses, but they also include 
the Atticuses, the Cottas, and even the Torquatuses.  That is to say, Cicero selects 
interlocutors from all sorts of Romans, with varying levels of political involvement and 
differing philosophical allegiances.  In no case, however, does he involve a Caesar or, 
god forbid, a Clodius.  He does not view his dialogues as tools for rehabilitation or the 
expression of an alternate reality.  Instead, while choosing from those who do a variety of 
things, he selects those who do what they do with an eye to virtue and community.  Even 
a Hirtius or Torquatus with Epicurean or Caesarian affiliations can appear, so long as he 
has not shown himself to despise one of these two criteria.  As individuals, all of the 
interlocutors help to reveal what sort of citizen is acceptable in the republic, even as they 
continue to populate it in a transtemporal sense. 
In addition to using these exemplary individuals, Cicero likewise uses their 
interrelationships as examples.  Each interlocutor joins together with at least two others, 
and in many cases even more.  Where there are only two interlocutors the relationships 
must reach back into the past through discussions of ancestry (e.g., Torquatus), and 
sometimes the relationships are exemplified over multiple dialogues (e.g., Cotta).  The 
world of the dialogues is a world of cooperation, in which a Cicero needs a Cotta to 
encounter a Crassus, a Scaevola needs a Laelius to encounter a Scipio, and a Cato Minor 
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 The Cicero of most of the 50s and 40s is a Cicero in otium.  To cope with his 
enforced political inactivity Cicero attempts to use his writings to redefine it.  In Laelius 
he makes it clear that these writings are not to be taken as individual; they are united by a 
common method and goal.  The goal is the revitalization of the republican aristocracy, 
and the method is memory.   
So while otium tends to be a time of withdrawal and isolation, Cicero, seeing the 
republic fragment into isolated individuals, yearns for just the opposite.  Since he cannot 
combat the isolation through the political involvement he had known earlier in his career 
he seeks instead the company of the great Romans of the past.  To do this he must appeal 
to memoria.  By accessing both his own memory and assuming the memory of others by 
donning their imagines, Cicero is able to create a pedigree through which he can filiate 
himself to a Cato, a Scipio, or a Crassus.  But Cicero does more than this.  He chooses to 
remember the figures of the past during holidays or at country villas, where they too are 
enjoying otium.  Though theirs is voluntary, the identification of his own otium with that 
of the great Romans reshapes the meaning of the idea.  Instead of being a physical state it 
becomes a timeless one, a transtemporal, ideal world that Cicero can share with the 
heroes of the republic. 
But he does not stop there.  Cicero also incorporates his circle within the reality 
and immediacy of the present, inviting into his otiose circle a handful of contemporaries.  
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The contemporaries offer the potential for the continuation of the circle beyond Cicero 
himself.  Not only is it possible for the historical figures to outlive him, but by inscribing 
them, that is, by literally writing them into the circle, Cicero hopes to enlist the 
communal memory of writing to identify the present generation with that of those of the 
past.  Through the processes of remembering and memorializing Cicero puts the figures 
of the past and present onto equal ground.  In so doing he hopes to present a picture of a 
republic so firmly established and so presently entrenched as to be irrefutable to the 
would-be supporters of Caesar.  Decades later Augustus would try something similar in 
his Forum with one notable difference.  One could not join the community of the statues 




Chapter 4 - Gratia 
 
 In Cicero’s dialogues, the methods of imitation and remembrance both function 
for the most part intergenerationally.  The fundamental Roman aristocratic concept of 
mos maiorum inheres in both, granting the imitators and rememberers present identity 
and validation through specific access to a non-specific past.  Imitatio and memoria are 
therefore particularly suited to buttress and fortify a crumbling aristocratic ethic.  But the 
circle Cicero aims to create, the aristocratic society he hopes to secure, does not depend 
solely on the abstract of mos maiorum, but on the specific maiores he has used to 
populate it.  At the same time the reconstructed community he aims to preserve cannot 
limit its outlook to the past, but must orient itself to the present and self-preservation.  To 
this end it must reiterate in the present the aristocratic standards of the past, the standards 
which distinguish it from the populist ideology which Cicero associates with Caesar.  In 
his effort to rearticulate these standards and to ensure their perseverance in the generation 
to follow Cicero concentrates heavily in his dialogues on one of the seminal concepts 
governing interaction and social positioning among the Roman elite: gratia, and its 
semantic relatives, beneficium, officium, and amicitia.  Ideally the definition and use of 
gratia in the dialogues will allow Cicero to form the same type of attachments with his 
contemporaries as imitatio and memoria allowed him to form with his antecedents. 
 Gratia, and its cognate gratus, are notoriously difficult to render in English due to 
their broad semantic ranges.  Gratia can be translated according to context as favor, 
political influence, popularity, friendship, or simply gratitude.272  Much of the difficulty 
in pinpointing the term’s definition arises from its unique ability to be deployed from 
                                                
272 For examinations of the meanings of gratia, in addition to the OLD and TLL, see Hellegouarc’h 202-08, 
Wistrand 10-13, and Saller (1982) 21-2. 
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several perspectives.  As ‘influence’ or ‘favor’, gratia takes as its focalizer the giver of 
the gift or favor.  That is, the socially-advantaged partner in a relationship confers 
gratia.273  On the other hand, when meaning ‘gratitude’ gratia takes the perspective of 
someone who has received a gift or favor, and is the appropriate response of the socially-
disadvantaged partner in the relationship.274  And, to confuse the matter further, gratia 
occasionally has passive force, where neither partner in a relationship functions as agent, 
but the two are by some means brought or returned into a relationship of gratia.275   
In all of these senses gratia comes very close to the meanings of beneficium, 
officium, and amicitia, which in their turns often overlap with each other.  Richard Saller, 
in his influential study, locates all of these terms under the umbrella of patronage.  These 
are, for Saller, terms regularly employed to describe the activities and attitudes of patrons 
and clients, even when the patrons and clients are not specifically named as such.276  In 
Saller’s schema, beneficium, gratia, officum, meritum, and amicitia all represent ideas of 
reciprocal exchange and occur within ongoing personal relationships.  When these 
relationships involve social inequality (which is quite often for Saller), the relationship is 
                                                
273 Cf. OLD ad loc. 1, 5. By either of these definitions gratia largely overlaps with the traditional 
understanding of beneficium, where a gift given is a beneficium and a gift returned is gratia. Saller (1998) 
using Hellegouarc’h has conclusively demonstrated however that the traditional understandings are 
fabrications of a modern age (15-22). This is not to say such a balance is always false (cf. TLL ad loc., Pars 
Prima IA1b, in retributione beneficii), but simply that it is incomplete.  
  By socially- advantaged or disadvantaged, I refer only to the temporary social disparity engendered by the 
use of gratia. Throughout this discussion I imply that the relationships defined by the terms in question 
occur between two individuals, but I do so simply for the sake of convenience. I do not intend to reject the 
arguments of Johnson and Dandeker, who insist that they need not operate dyadically, but can also function 
in social networks.  
274 Cf. OLD ad loc. 4. The distinction is one between what Cicero at Off. 1.47 calls gratia ineunda (the 
previous definition) and gratia referenda (this definition).  
275 Cf. OLD ad loc. 2. In this sense it is somewhat akin to amicitia, though without the same implied level 
of affection. 
276 As Griffin (2003) 95 points out, Saller does not rely on the actual terms patronus and cliens to make his 
case, neither of which regularly occur in classical Latin in the senses that he is understanding. 
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one of patronage.277  Suzanne Dixon takes the valuable step of dispensing with Saller’s 
qualification of social inequality, exploring instead the deployment of gratia, beneficium 
et al among the socially elite.  When both parties are aristocratic, the relationship is not 
one of patronage, but of “friendship.”278  Miriam Griffin, noting the power of beneficium 
to generate a relationship rather than to respond to the terms of pre-existing friendship, 
relocates the concepts within the field of gift-exchange.279  In these terms, all of the ethics 
under discussion are operating among social equals, and can function either within an 
existing relationship or as generative forces for new relationships.  In this chapter I refer 
to these ethics of gift-exchange – beneficium, officium, gratia, meritum, amicitia – 
collectively as “communal virtues.”  They are all sub-virtues under the heading of justice, 
and their functions are universally realized in community.   
Saller, in his study on personal patronage in the republic, generally accepts the 
overlap between these terms, especially beneficium and officium.  He distinguishes gratia 
from all of them, however, saying, “Gratia differs from the above synonyms (beneficium 
and officium) in that it represents an attitude rather than an action, and basically means 
‘goodwill’”.280  But for Cicero in the dialogues even a distinction as small as this is not 
fully accurate.   
                                                
277 CAH XI2 838. 
278 “This study concentrates on the meaning of gifts and loans, particularly within the upper echelons of 
society based in the city of Rome, an exchange expressed by the participants in terms of friendship rather 
than the frankly unequal language of patronage” (451). 
279 Griffin (2003) 98, 99-102. 
280 Saller (1982) 21. Herein he seems to agree with Hellegouarc’h, who says “La différence réside avant 
tout dans le fait qu’officium désigne, conformément à son sens premier, une activité commandée par 
certaines règles qui régissent les rapports sociaux; la gratia est d’abord une disposition de l’esprit créée par 
la beneficium et qui conduit à se comporter d’une certaine manière” (205). Though neither Hellegouarc’h 
nor Saller draws the connection explicitly, the designation of gratia as attitude seems to stem at least 
partially from its regular association with memoria (e.g., DInv 2.66., 2.161, Planc. 81).  Notwithstanding 
the component of action in memoria, this definition of gratia, while partially accurate, does not express the 
fullness of the term’s uses.  
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At Leg. 1.49, an instance rife with the vocabulary of community, Cicero uses the 
adjectives beneficus and gratus in parallel to describe the attitudes of individuals.  The 
context and parallelism of this comparison imply that the respective corresponding 
concepts of beneficium and gratia are the corresponding actions of those demonstrating 
the attitudes.  The passage seems to be balancing the two concepts of beneficium and 
gratia by assigning them values relative to one another.  Even as he effects this balance, 
Cicero inserts the idea of amicitia into his discussion, implicating it in the same semantic 
nexus as the other two ideas.281  As he concludes the first book of Leg., Cicero has moved 
on to a discussion of acting virtuously for virtue’s sake.  Not surprisingly he emphasizes 
the communal virtue of justice, and then a set of more specific virtues which ought to 
characterize people acting in community.   
 
Ubi enim beneficus, si nemo alterius causa benigne facit? Ubi gratus, si 
non eum respiciunt grati, cui referunt gratiam? Ubi illa sancta amicitia, si 
non ipse amicus per se amatur toto pectore, ut dicitur.282 
 
Where is the generous man, if no one acts generously for another’s sake? 
Where is the grateful man, if the ‘grateful’ do not show gratitude to the 
one they are thanking? Where is that sacred friendship, if a friend is not 
himself loved for his own sake wholeheartedly, as they say? 
 
Reading the text diachronically, the exchange equation outlined here looks thus: 
the act of giving is accomplished by the beneficus, the one who receives must show 
himself gratus, and the resulting relationship is one of amicitia, i.e., beneficium + gratia 
                                                
281 On the overlap between amicitia and gratia see Hellegouarc’h: “[Gratia] finit, elle aussi, par 
s’identifier, en une sorte de métonymie, à l’amicitia elle-même” (205). He, however, goes on to introduce 
the analogy amicus:amicitia::cliens:gratia, an analogy that does not hold true when considering Cicero’s 
theories of gratia in the dialogues. 
282 The text dealing with gratia is corrupt. The manuscript reads Ubi gratus, si non eum ipsi cernunt 
grati,cui referunt gratiam. I have followed Powell. For a discussion of the proposed emendations, see Dyck 
(2004) ad loc. 
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= amicitia.283  This equation is, based on Saller’s study, one of many possible equations 
involving these terms, but contra Saller, it balances beneficium with gratia. Beneficium 
and gratia are both attitude and action when accomplished correctly insofar as they are 
themselves virtues, subsets of the chief communal virtue of justice.284  They ought to be 
performed, and performed sua sponte, per se.  So while the distinctions between them 
regularly dissolve, as a group, beneficium, gratia, amicitia, and, to a certain extent, 
officium should be understood as Roman communal virtues, in a very specific sense.285  
They are, in their purest form, good actions, performed with the right attitude, for the 
sake of virtue alone, which operate together only in the context of community.286  At 
which point these ideas are deployed selfishly, they become compromised, and the 
community itself begins to fail.287   
The role of officium bears some clarification.288  The very fact that Cicero wrote a 
treatise on officium suggests that it will be defined more specifically and more fully than 
the other communal virtues.  Cicero even proposes to give a definition of officium as the 
starting point for his treatise, in good Academic style (Off. 1.7).  And yet, Cicero does not 
so much define in Off. as he does delineate, giving classifications for officium rather than 
                                                
283 Cf. Leg. 1.32: Quae autem natio non comitatem, non benignitatem, non gratum animum et beneficii 
memorem diligit? The three are again grouped, though not in an explicit equation. 
284 Cf. also Inv 2.66: appellant… gratiam, quae in memoria et remuneratione officiorum et honoris et 
amicitiarum observantiam teneat. Both attitude (memoria) and action (remuneratione) are here indicated 
by Cicero as component parts of gratia, though the definition, coming from Inv should not be understood to 
indicate his mature understanding of the concept. 
285 Communal virtues, though akin to civic virtues, are different insofar as the result from interpersonal 
obligations, and not from obligations to an abstract civitas. 
286 Terms such as liberalitas, fides, benignitas, bonitas and meritum also fall into this category, and will be 
of some importance in the discussion to follow. 
287 See, e.g., Off. 1.42ff., esp. 43. 
288 On officium, see Hellegouarc’h (1972) 152-63 and Saller (1982) 15-17. 
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offering a positive exposition of its meaning.289  He practices a sort of rhetorical 
legerdemain here which points to the chief difference between officium and the other 
communal virtues.  Officium, Cicero’s rendering of the Greek kathekon, not only has a 
variety of meanings within the realm of communal virtue, but extends well beyond into 
all activities of life.290  It is regularly translated as ‘obligation’ or ‘duty’, and this 
obligation can be to one’s friends, family, state, gods, or even self, depending on the 
circumstances.  Dyck uses ‘appropriate action’ to translate officium, which helpfully asks 
the implicit question of ‘to whom or for what the action is appropriate’.291  Officium has 
such a broad semantic range that it requires further specification of appropriateness just 
to understand its full meaning in context.  In Off., Cicero identifies four cardinal virtues, 
which essentially correspond to wisdom, justice, courage, and self-control (Off. 1.15).  
Each of these, as Cicero says, is a source of officia, a definer of appropriateness.  Gratia 
and beneficium, while often officia themselves, are limited to the realm of interpersonal 
activity, under the sub-heading of justice.  Officium on the other hand applies to all four 
virtues.292 
In this chapter I will look at Cicero’s ideas and ideals of the communal virtues, 
particularly gratia, as expressed in the dialogues.293  The fundamental premise guiding 
                                                
289 The only definition Cicero gives comes at 1.14: Quibus ex rebus conflatur et efficitur id, quod 
quaerimus, honestum, quod etiamsi nobilitatum non sit, tamen honestum sit, quodque vere dicimus, etiamsi 
a nullo laudetur, natura esse laudabile. 
290 Off. 1.4: Nulla enim vitae pars neque publicis neque privatis neque forensibus neque domesticis in 
rebus, neque si tecum agas quid, neque si cum altero contrahas, vacare officio potest in eoque et colendo 
sita vitae est honestas omnis et neglegendo turpitudo. 
291 Dyck (1996) 8 et passim. 
292 As Cicero himself admits, the four virtues are not discrete. They are, in fact, colligita and implicata with 
one another, which means that officia arising from, e.g., temperance, are also informed by justice, and so 
perhaps have a communal aspect. 




Cicero’s dialogic expressions of gratia is that there are two distinct social ethics of gratia 
that are shaping the practices of interaction among the Romans of the 50s and 40s, one 
good and one bad.294  I will begin this chapter by looking at Cicero’s representation of 
traditional definitions of aristocratic gratia.  I will then explore Cicero’s strategy for 
expressing his ideas of right gratia against the foil of wrong gratia, looking particularly 
at his association of the latter with the Epicureans.  In general, as I will argue, the 
distinction between right and wrong gratia hinges on the distinction between traditional 
and commercial social activity.  I will then explore the methods by which the primary 
interlocutors of individual dialogues seek to employ true gratia in the face of the 
commercialized, commodified gratia – the gratia typical of the Epicureans – as exhibited 
by junior interlocutors.    In the final section of the chapter I will turn to Cicero’s own 
displays of gratia as the author and dedicator of texts, concluding that these displays 
closely resemble the theories of right gratia laid out in the texts themselves. 
 
Traditional Gratia: Gratia as Virtue, Gratia amongst the Good 
Cicero’s most extended discussion of the theory of the communal virtues comes 
for good reason in Laelius.  The nominal topic of Laelius is, of course, amicitia, but 
scholars have long debated what precisely that means.  Ronald Syme defined it as “a 
weapon of politics, not a sentiment based upon congeniality.”  Lily Ross Taylor, while 
avoiding the martial metaphor of Syme, viewed amicitia chiefly as a medium for political 
                                                
294 Cicero’s opinions in the dialogues are to be distinguished from Cicero’s own theorizing on or practice of 
the communal virtues in his political career, oratory, and letters.  In those arenas Cicero has different 
priorities and different approaches. E.g., in a letter of September 59 to Atticus (Att. 2.25.1), Cicero outlines 
a process wherein he praises Varro to Atticus in the hopes that Atticus will pass on the praise to Varro, and 
so oblige Varro to respond in kind to Cicero. 
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alliance.295  P.A. Brunt, on the other hand, found in Cicero’s dialogue a sincere 
expression of an ideal more virtuous than the political expediency of do ut des.  All three 
scholars, so important in the evolution of twentieth century understandings of the end of 
the republic, made their arguments within broader programs in support of or against the 
idea of factions and party politics.  The fundamental point of contention stems from a 
difference of opinion on the private vs. public character of amicitia.  Cicero, both in his 
own voice and in Laelius’, emphasizes the unequalled value of friendship in the political 
arena.  Syme and Taylor take this to mean, despite Cicero’s idealistic claims to the 
contrary, that friendship is a means to an end.  Brunt accepts Cicero’s claim that 
advantage is not a motive for friendship, but a product of it.296  Habinek brings a certain 
nuance to the subject, appealing to the form of the dialogue, the depiction of the 
interaction among the characters, and the historical record of elite interaction in 
Ciceronian Rome as a means of undercutting the idealistic statements paraded forth by 
Laelius.297  Leach in turn emphasizes the indelible point that for Cicero, private can never 
be divorced from public.298  Despite these differences of interpretation, the common 
theme running throughout is an amicitia that functions both privately and publicly, that 
must negotiate practically with the activity of politics.299  There is an inevitable public 
quality of friendship which enforces certain restrictions on whom one should have as a 
friend.   
                                                
295 Both Syme and Taylor are quoted by Brunt (1988) 361. See also Leach (1993) 8n16. 
296 Laelius passim. E.g., 31 or 51: Non igitur utilitatem amicitia, sed utilitas amicitiam secuta est. 
297 Habinek (1990) 170. For instance, the giving of advice, so praised by Laelius, was impossible among 
social equals. 
298 Leach (1993) 9-10. 
299 The ancients themselves wrestled with this problem. So Sallust in BJ 31: Sed haec inter bonos amicitia, 




 In Laelius, Cicero offers a short list of qualities which characterize true friends, 
friends whose private character will not lead to public embarassment.  It looks something 
like this: friendship exists only between two or a few individuals (19); their friendship 
demands sincerity and love, which arise from virtue (20, 26); their virtue requires them to 
be boni and sapientes (passim);300 they are friends not because of mutually sought 
advantage, but because of mutual appreciation of one another’s moral goodness (26-7, 
31-2); a true friend is an alter idem, wherefore he must be an equal in the truest sense 
(e.g., 50); and true friends are mature (74).  Nowhere does Cicero demand public 
engagement or political activity, but his repeated emphases on equality and self-
reduplication imply a need for commensurate power in some sense, if not in a purely 
political one.301  In Cicero’s judgment, only a good man (bonus) can practice friendship, 
and a good man will only select as a friend another good man.  Once one bonus finds 
another the friends, bound by their similar natures, will act entirely in accord with nature 
and virtue, seeking to confer rather than receive favor, and never reckoning relative social 
standing through cold calculation of beneficia and gratia.  Likewise their friendship will 
endure, just as nature and virtue themselves will endure. 
 As presented in Laelius, friendship is rare, insofar as the truly virtuous are rare.  
And Cicero limits true friendship to a pair of individuals, with the occasional addition of 
a third (19).  Such limitations threaten the broad value of the dialogue as a whole.  If only 
a few boni can be found and bound, the republic has little chance of survival, and indeed 
the dialogue form, the locus for the exhibition of communal interaction, itself threatens to 
                                                
300 Cf. Sallust, BJ 31 quoted supra. 
301 Leach (1993) questions whether Atticus can actually fulfill the requirements outlined by Cicero in 
Laelius, even though he is the addressee (17-18). Because of his refusal to engage politically Atticus does 
not have political equality with Cicero in the same sense demonstrated by Laelius and Cicero.  
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fade into insignificance.  These threats to the republic and dialogue form mirror Cicero’s 
more general theme in Laelius of the instability of amicitia.  When virtue disappears, true 
friends do, and in fact, so does the analogous social bond that maintains the viability of 
the state, concordia.302   
 The view in Laelius is rather bleak.  The decline of the peace of the traditional 
republic (concordia) is taken as a symbol of the generalized decline in friendship 
(amicitia), which decline is itself predicated on a depreciation of virtue as a guiding 
principle of action.  The dialogue focuses chiefly on the select few whose extinction 
seems imminent.  Cicero’s other dialogues do not exhibit the same kind of fatalism; they 
too locate the origins of friendship in virtue, but they see the communal virtues at work in 
a larger, viably-functioning community of the boni.  In the chapter on imitation I dealt 
briefly with the “natural” quality of virtue, noting that Cicero expresses the attainment of 
virtue in terms of the imitation of nature.  There too it was observed that nature is most 
perfectly exemplified through community.  In the pre-Laelius dialogues Cicero situates 
his idea of the communal virtues and gratia firmly within this nexus of virtue, nature, and 
community.   
In Leg. Cicero outlines his theory of the interconnectedness between nature, 
virtue, and community in his discourse on justice (1.16ff.).  For his basic premise, that of 
natural law, he returns to the Stoic principle that virtue imitates nature, in response to the 
type of utilitarian arguments of justice voiced by Thrasymachus in Plato’s Republic 1.  If 
                                                
302 See Laelius 23, Cicero explicitly equates amicitia and concordia, drawing parallels between the 
harmony of nature, the concord of a state, and the friendship among individuals.  The amicitia of the 
dialogue proves to be a microcosm of the theoretical harmonious community envisioned in Cicero’s larger 




states create justice through laws, Cicero argues, then those laws will be altered in self-
interest, and justice will become subservient to the prerogative of the governing class 
which controls the laws.  True justice, on the other hand, cannot be changed, and thus 
must take its origin from nature.  To these familiar arguments Cicero adds the subdivided 
qualities of justice: liberalitas, caritas, pietas, and the interchange of meritum and gratia 
(1.43).  As subdivisions of the cardinal virtue of justice, these communal virtues take on 
the quality of their parent virtue: they become worthy for their own sake (1.48-9; cf. 
1.37).  One might say Cicero is advocating a sort of gratia gratia gratiae.303  Or to be 
more specific, he advocates gratia gratia gratiae et meriti, for gratia, unlike the other 
virtues of 1.43, requires participation on two ends.  In Cicero’s representation of these 
subdivided qualities of justice, liberalitas is, by definition, directed irreciprocally; caritas 
as here represented takes the state as its object; and pietas, the consummate Roman virtue 
common to all, is a response to static entities and imagines no return.  As Cicero 
reiterates in 1.49 (quoted above), gratia and its counterparts are unique.  Alone of the 
justice virtues, these generate a paradox: they explicitly entail benefit to both parties, but 
must be enacted for the sake of only the other party.  Gratia must be acquired, offered, or 
wielded via multilateral interpersonal activity.  Unlike the other generally approved 
Roman qualities listed here, gratia cannot originate and conclude in the activity of one 
figure; it requires exchange.  So while ideas like liberalitas or caritas can refer to 
generous giving alone and do not inscribe the reaction of the gifted, gratia requires a sort 
of appreciation, a reaction to another’s action.  And yet, as a constituent part of justice, 
gratia must be performed for the sake of the virtuous action alone.  Thus, though it is 
                                                
303 Cf. Off. 3.118. 
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inherently proleptic, diachronic, and reciprocal it must be enacted as if it is final, 
synchronic, and unilateral.  By this calculation, while gratia and its sister concepts are 
advantageous to any number of people, they are in their truest sense the strict province of 
the good, who alone perform virtuous actions for their own sake, whether or not benefit is 
entailed.  As a result, gratia et al. can form community among everyone by forcing 
reciprocity, but they generate the best community among the good, who ignore 
reciprocity and focus on the origin of virtue in nature.  In the idealism of Leg. and the 
tempered expectations of Laelius, Cicero maintains the principle that gratia is itself a 
virtue and hence the province of the virtuous. 
 Cicero’s most dogmatic expression of his association of the communal virtues 
with the boni predictably appears in Off., his treatise on the regulation of social 
interaction.  It is dogmatic in the sense that it offers the most extended explicit discussion 
of the subject in Cicero’s theoretical works.  At the same time, the ideology expressed in 
Off. differs somewhat from the consistent ideology represented in the dialogues.  The 
shift in ideology is itself perhaps predicated in the shift in form.  The treatise does not 
exhibit the explicitly communal characteristics of the dialogue, and the Stoic inspiration 
of Off. (Panaetius) represents a methodological shift away from the skeptical approach of 
the Academics.  The decommunalization of the form manifests itself by a compromised 
view of Cicero’s ideal community.  Off. provides a slightly different alternative for the 
use and acquisition of gratia, one less dpendent on virtue.  As discussed in a previous 
chapter, Cicero identifies the imitation of nature as the foundation for the establishment 
of community at Off. 1.22.  Cicero also asserts the priority of the mutatio officiorum and 
giving and receiving (dando accipiendo) in society-building.  The (conventional) 
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asyndeton of dando accipiendo here reinforces the idea of mutatio: community is built on 
bi-/multilateral relationships, on the cooperation of multiple parties.  But it is later in the 
treatise, in the midst of his discussion of justice, that Cicero gives a fuller explanation of 
the communal virtues, by laying out specific principles for their employment.  He 
prescribes that they must: cause harm to no one, be within the giver’s means, and be in 
accordance with the dignitas of the recipient.304  Cicero’s language here in Off. shows 
him to have moved from the theoretical principles of the dialogues into practical 
principles.  The giver must also take into consideration the benevolentia shown towards 
him by the recipient of his gift, what things are deserved through requital, and what sort 
of attitude the recipient has previously demonstrated in his own giving (1.47ff.).  The 
introduction of practical principles here as elsewhere in Off. seeks to combat the 
impossibility of maintaining ideal virtue in a Rome at the end of the 40s, but the use of 
such principles simultaneously threatens to annul the theory over which Cicero has 
previously labored.  Cicero even goes so far in his treatise on officia to say that no 
officium is more important than returning gratia (nullum enim officium referenda gratia 
magis necessarium est).305  These practical principles represent a shift to an exchange-
driven model of the communal virtues whereby Cicero seems to adopt something akin to 
a commercialized understanding of gratia, where it is a commodity to be bartered.  It 
appears as if Cicero is moderating his stance because he sees some flaw in its practical 
application.  In his compromised model, it is no longer the virtuous who participate in the 
community, but anyone who has even a shadow of virtue (in quibus praeclare agitur, si 
                                                
304 Off. 1.42: Videndum est enim, primum ne obsit benignitas et iis ipsis, quibus benigne videbitur fieri, et 
ceteris, deinde ne maior benignitas sit, quam facultates, tum ut pro dignitate cuique tribuatur. 
305 Off. 1.47. 
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sunt simulacra virtutis), in whom there is any hint of virtue (in quo aliqua significatio 
virtutis appareat).306   
The language here is particularly loaded.  The simulacra virtutis Cicero demands 
as the reduced prerequisite for inclusion in societas conjures the specter of the 
Epicureans.  Not only does it call to mind Lucretius’ canonization of the term simulacrum 
in De Rerum Natura, but, more specifically, it recalls Cicero’s own use of the phrase in 
his rebuttal of Torquatus in Fin., where it is the animals who have simulacra virtutum 
(2.110).  It is these simulacra which raise the animals above mere slavery to pleasure, 
which is in turn the province assigned by Cicero to the Epicureans.  These are, in fact, the 
same animals who imitate nature and demonstrate memory, which helps them form into 
things resembling societies (2.109-10).307  When Cicero involves those who have 
simulacra virtutis in his society he is lowering the standard prescribed in the dialogues; 
still it is not so low as to include the Epicureans.308  Certainly Cicero does not envision 
the inclusion of animals in his society at this point.  He is rather drawing simulacra 
virtutis as a baseline which the Epicureans with their emphasis on pleasure still cannot 
attain.309  In Off. Cicero’s vision for his society, just as his dialogue form, collapses into a 
still restrictive, but less-ideal form. 
 
                                                
306 Off. 1.46. The full passage reads: Quoniam autem vivitur non cum perfectis hominibus planeque 
sapientibus, sed cum iis, in quibus praeclare agitur, si sunt simulacra virtutis, etiam hoc intellegendum 
puto, neminem omnino esse neglegendum, in quo aliqua significatio virtutis appareat, colendum autem esse 
ita quemque maxime, ut quisque maxime virtutibus his lenioribus erit ornatus, modestia, temperantia, hac 
ipsa, de qua multa iam dicta sunt, iustitia. 
307 See also ch. 2 above. 
308 In Fin. 5.42-3, the possessors of virtutum simulacra are uneducated children, who, like animals, begin to 
form into community by natural inclination. 
309 Cicero’s anti-Epicureanism is well known and important to his portrayal of gratia in the dialogues. It 
will be treated in more detail below. 
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There is undoubtedly a difference between the gratia Cicero represents in his 
earliest dialogue, De Orat., and Off.  It is evident not only in the devolution from its 
association with the practitioners of virtus in the dialogue to those with simulacra virtutis 
in the treatise, but in Cicero’s representation of the social value of the orator.  In De Orat. 
3, Crassus undertakes his most extensive discussion of the qualities of the ideal orator.  
He begins by trying to mend the division of labor established by Antonius in 2.120ff.  
There Antonius had agreed to discuss how an orator ought to deal with a speech’s 
content, if Crassus would deal with the selection and employment of words (primum 
quid, deinde quo modo dicamus).  Crassus objected to this division on the spot, but 
Catulus and the other interlocutors, taking Crassus’ objection as a demonstration of 
humility and humanitas, successfully voiced their support for Antonius’ proposal.  This 
division of labor then carried the day, with the remainder of book 2 bearing it out.  So, 
when Crassus finally speaks in book 3, he wants first to reestablish the unity between 
words and content. 
Crassus predicates his idea rhetorical unity on the principle of cosmic unity, and 
then, failing that argument, the principle of the unity of the arts.  In general this unity 
argument also applies metatextually to the dialogue form, in which a single text 
harmonizes disparate positions.  Crassus’ concern, though, lies with the orator.  If the 
noble, liberal arts (ingenuae et humanae artes) are all essentially the same, not to be 
divided or isolated, so too are the individual arts of the orator (developing words and 
content).  To buttress his position, Crassus cites Plato as his source for the unity of arts 
argument.  In fact, the claim for a bond between the arts comes from the pseudo-Platonic 
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Epinomis, and refers not to all the liberal arts, but only to the mathematical ones.310  May 
and Wisse suggest that the misattribution of this theory to Plato had become 
commonplace in first century Rome, and that the unity of the all of the liberal arts had 
become proverbial.  For Crassus, whether Plato had said it or not, the unity of the arts 
provides an extension of the unity of the cosmos, and allows him to require the orator to 
be skilled in all artes.  By way of example he adduces the figure of Cato. 
Cato, Crassus recalls towards the conclusion of his speech, combined both halves 
of forensic knowledge: he was eloquent and he had a knowledge of civil law.  He was 
both senator and general.  And he used the gratia he had earned in private affairs to 
inform his political involvement.  Such a figure stands in stark contrast to the politicians 
of Crassus’ day whose political activity is not built on a foundation of knowledge, and 
insofar as they have any knowledge, exhibit and concentrate it on only one of the 
qualities important in the public arena (3.136).  These new politicians are inferior because 
“they have no knowledge of the societas and kinship of all the noble arts and even of the 
virtues themselves.”311  In sum, if the orator wants to possess one skill or virtue, he must 
possess them all.  And once he has assembled all of the virtues in the (comm)unity of his 
own private affairs they must translate into the public sphere.  The intermediary for Cato 
and for Crassus’ ideal orator, the bridge that gives the private passage to the public, is 
gratia.  It is the outcome of virtue communalized and the origin of virtuous political 
activity. 
                                                
310 May and Wisse (2001) 230n30-31. 




Legal knowledge and eloquence are subsumed in equal parts under the umbrella 
of the artes Crassus identifies as generative of gratia.  Being able to advocate and offer 
counsel equips one to benefit the community, and thereby to earn gratia.  Gratia itself, as 
expressed by Scipio in Rep., is the product of the use of virtue in society.  So the 
activities that earn gratia are the communal expressions of virtue, and the equipment of 
the fit leader of the state.  And they are the very ones Cicero knows so well: eloquence, 
legal expertise, and counsel. 
These qualities of the orator reappear as sources for gratia regularly in the 
dialogues.312  In Off. Cicero again indicates a slight shift in his terminology.  When 
Cicero turns to the topic of beneficence in the second book of Off. he regularly uses the 
word gratia in hendiadys with opes.313  The pairing is somewhat unexpected, especially 
given the contrast drawn between the two ideas at Off. 2.51.314  Generally speaking, both 
ideas can express influence, but ops carries with it an implication of wealth that gratia 
does not.  The former is influence through possession of physical goods, the latter is 
influence through non-physical qualities.  Even so, the two coincide in two of the areas in 
which Cicero suggests doing good deeds: hospitality and the giving out of legal advice.  
The favorable prospect of increasing opes through legal advice stands in stark contrast to 
what Crassus says in De Orat. 1.198, where it is a matter of honor, gratia, and dignitas, 
where, unlike with the Greeks for who it is a matter of mercedula, it is the province of the 
amplissimi and the clarissimi.  Cicero gives his reasoning for his shift in perspective in 
                                                
312 On eloquence: De Orat. 1.15; on legal expertise: De Orat. 1.198, Brut. 113 and 155, Leg. 1.10; on 
counsel: Brut. 86, 97, and 209.  
313 Off. 2.64 and 65. Cf. De Orat. 1.15. 
314 Maxime autem et gloria paritur et gratia defensionibus, eoque maior, si quando accidit, ut ei 
subveniatur, qui potentis alicuius opibus circumveniri urgerique videatur, ut nos et saepe alias et 
adulescentes contra L. Sullae dominantis opes pro Sex. Roscio Amerino fecimus, quae, ut scis, extat oratio. 
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Off. by responding directly to these terms of Crassus: nunc, ut honores, ut omnes 
dignitatis gradus, sic huius scientiae (legal knowledge) splendor deletus est (2.65).  
When the ideals of honor and dignitas fail, so does ideal gratia; influence instead 
becomes tied to wealth.    
As was the case in book 1, Cicero responds to the decadence of traditional 
republican values with a compromised idea of interaction.  Here that interaction shows a 
merging of traditional gratia with commodities, with opes.  Cicero’s implied acceptance, 
or at least partial acceptance, of the commodification of gratia here in Off. stands in 
direct contrast with Cicero’s fundamental arguments regarding gratia in the dialogues.  In 
the dialogues and traditional Roman social ethics, as noted above, gratia is a virtuous act 
by a good man, ideally not contingent upon an exchange of favors.  Once favors become 
objects of exchange, gratia itself becomes a product of exchange.  In this scenario the 
prerogative of acquiring gratia shifts from the virtuous man to the man who is in the best 
position to be a creditor, the wealthy man. 
 
 
Right Gratia, Wrong Gratia, and the Epicureans 
The devaluation of gratia pictured in Off. represents a substantial diversion from 
Cicero’s efforts in the dialogues, wherein gratia is a matter not only of theory, but also of 
practice.  The dialogue form uniquely allows Cicero to construct gratia relationships 
because of its inherently communal form.  While Cicero of the 40s can no longer deliver 
a politically relevant speech on behalf of a friend, he can include a friend or a friend’s 
ancestor as an interlocutor in a dialogue.  And though his political influence may not be 
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the same on behalf of Brutus as it would have been in the 60s, he regularly dedicates his 
texts to Brutus, and so marks him as an oratorical, political, and philosophical heir to the 
tradition of Ciceronian statesmanship.   
The only major obstacle to Cicero’s acquisition of gratia through the writing of 
dialogue is a devaluation of the sort exhibited in Off.  Gratia, with its multiplicity of 
meanings, is especially prone to just such a devaluation.  Because it is in the first instance 
a product of exchange it stands dangerously close to the precipice of commercial 
exchange. 315  That is to say, gratia, a traditional Roman ethic that had long served as a 
source of authority for aristocrats, because of its dependence on exchange, very closely 
resembles the economics of the marketplace, a resemblance emphasized by the pairing of 
gratia with opes.  And far from authorizing the person of the aristocrat, the market 
privileged the product.  It opened up ‘influence’ and ‘favor’ to a broader, less traditional 
audience.316 
Matthew Roller, building on a traditional anthropological division, usefully 
distinguishes between three types of exchange present in Rome: gift-exchange, 
subdivided into amicable and hostile exchange, and commodity-exchange.317  These 
terms function well in a Roman context especially insofar as they replace traditional 
                                                
315 Though it will be explored further below, on the relationship between gift-exchange and commerce in 
general, cf. Griffin (2003) 100. The chief difference she adduces is the absence of legal sanction in the case 
of an unequal gift-exchange. 
316 T. Habinek, The Politics of Latin Literature (1998) explores the phenomenon of the marketplace and its 
potential to negatively affect the aristocracy in his chapter on writing. As he explains, “once literature is 
freed from … limited paths of circulation” (i.e., paths controlled by the aristocracy) “and becomes part of 
the market, then its potential as an independent source of authorization may be activated” (104). The 
market is, for Habinek, the location for the disembedding of conventional avenues for aristocratic authority; 
it is the place where the masses gain access to what the aristocrats once controlled. 
317 M. Roller (2001) 132-4. It should be noted that Roller’s emphasis is first-century imperial Rome, though 
his distinction between the types of exchange is methodologically independent of his subject matter. 
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understandings of Roman patronage, which privileges one transactor in an exchange and 
operates chiefly between social unequals. 
 In gift-exchange, the giving of a gift participates in the construction or 
reinforcement of a personal relationship between the one who gives and the one who 
receives.  Specifically, according to the anthropological model, the receiver incurs a 
“gift-debt” according to which he must remain in a socially subordinate position to the 
giver until he requites the gift in kind or with a greater gift.  This type of exchange can 
operate under friendly conditions (amicable exchange), in which the giver already has a 
positive relationship with the receiver or gives with a view to mutual benefit, or 
unfriendly ones (hostile exchange), wherein the giver intends for the gift to produce an 
unwanted or antagonistic social effect. 
 By contrast, commodity-exchange requires no personal relationship between its 
transactors.  The exchange of commodities enacts no social distinction per se, but seeks 
to satisfy two parties through mutual benefit.  It is the equivalent of purchase, by which 
goods are exchanged for the sake of the goods.  Roller succinctly encapsulates the 
distinction between gift-exchange and commodity-exchange: “Objects, not their 
transactors, are placed into a relationship by commodity exchange, while gift exchange 
places the transactors and not the objects into a relationship.”318 
 Cicero himself had in his youth introduced an almost commercial metaphor in his 
definition of gratia in his De Inventione (2.66), calling it the “repayment of a good deed” 
(remuneratio officiorum).319  But this kind of gratia is both open to all social classes and 
inherently self-oriented.  As such it threatens not only Cicero’s privileged place within 
                                                
318 Roller (2001) 133. 
319 Cicero would later essentially disavow the Inv. (De Orat. 1.5). 
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the boni, but even the very existence of such a group.  Commercialized gratia allows for 
the ascendancy of the one who best takes care of himself, and not for the one who best 
takes care of others.  Such an individual has no respect for the communal virtues and is 
accordingly a threat, not an asset, to the state.  To combat the encroachment of an 
alternative, commercial means of acquiring gratia Cicero goes to great lengths to 
communicate publicly in his dialogues his general distrust for gratia-through-commodity.   
It is here that the Epicureans re-enter the picture for Cicero.  When Cicero wants 
to deride commercialized gratia in favor of his own kind of gratia he regularly assigns 
the former to his traditional nemesis, the one group manifestly in the wrong, the 
Epicureans.  The Epicureans appear regularly in Cicero’s dialogues as the straw man, the 
obvious wrong choice designed to unite all others behind his own opinion.  To Cicero’s 
way of thinking their wrongness is already established as a result of their emphasis on 
pleasure (i.e., selfish pleasure); Cicero now need only assign to them any practice or idea 
he finds unsavory in order to color that idea as virtue-less.  For this reason, whether in a 
philosophical work focusing largely on the Epicureans, such as Fin. or Nat. Deor., or in 
an explicitly political work like Leg., Cicero forces the Epicureans to bear the 
dangerously-populist mantle of commercial gratia. 
 
I should clarify before moving on what exactly I, or rather Cicero, means by 
“Epicurean.”  Cicero himself interacted with several figures with Epicurean sentiments, 
including Atticus, Caesar, Torquatus, L. Calpurnius Piso, and Cassius the liberator.  He 
was also acquainted with Philodemus, or at least his writings, as he makes clear at the 
conclusion of Fin. 2 (119).  It is very likely that Epicureanism meant slightly different 
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things to each of them.320  Atticus, who had spent much of his life educating himself on 
philosophy in Athens, proclaimed himself to be an Epicurean, but what we know of his 
actions and attitudes does not necessarily resemble a devoted ideologue.321  Julius 
Caesar’s conversion may have included an element of political expediency.322  
Torquatus’ Epicureanism is hard to pinpoint, primarily colored as it is by Fin.  Piso’s 
Epicureanism too is colored by Cicero’s polemic in In Pisonem.  Cassius’ Epicureanism, 
which Cicero addresses regularly in his correspondence with the liberator, must be set in 
relief against his very deep political involvement.323  And Philodemus is an Epicurean 
authority unto himself.  Recent scholarship on Philodemus has all but done away with the 
traditional misconception that Epicurus and the Epicureans were unilaterally opposed to 
political activity.324  What emerges instead, especially from Philodemus’ On Rhetoric and 
On the Good King according to Homer, is an understanding that there are situations for 
                                                
320 This list is, of course, just a beginning. Not only did Cicero know many more Epicureans, but he knew 
others who were active in politics. Y. Benferhat, Cives Epicurei, les Épicuriens à Rome et en Italie de Sylla 
à Octave (2005) goes into some detail about L. Saufeius and L. Papirius Paetus, who were both Epicurean 
and politically engaged (169-172).  Castner (1991) shows a general cynicism about the sincerity of many 
Roman Epicureans, including several of those listed here. 
321 The general consensus on Atticus’ lack of political involvement, based on Nepos’ “Life of Atticus” and 
Cicero’s letters to him, is that it stems from an unwillingness to get his hands dirty. Horsfall (1989), in his 
edition of the Nepos’ Lives, takes a cynical view of Atticus’ Epicureanism.  Both Welch (1996) 450-71, 
and Benfehrat (2005) still find Atticus to be politically engaged, just not as an office holder, an ascender of 
the cursus honorum. At the same time, Nepos’ biography has led to the regular description of Atticus as 
one of the Optimates. For further information on Atticus, see Rawson’s discussion in The Intellectual Life 
of the Late Roman Republic (1985). 
322 At the very least Caesar’s Epicureanism arose from “extraordinary circumstances” (D. Armstrong, 
forthcoming, Epicurus and the Epicurean Tradition). 
323 E.g., Att. 15.16-18. On the back and forth of Cicero and Cassius’ correspondence, see Armstrong, 
Epicurus. The Epicureanism that Cassius discusses does not resemble the Epicureanism that Cicero 
discusses in his dialogues (and pawns off onto a Catius in his letter to Cassius).  Cassius even seems to 
believe that Cicero’s pleasure-only, anti-virtue caricature of the Epicureans is a willful misrepresentation, a 
sort of joke. 
324 See especially the chapters of Armstrong and Fish in Epicurus and the Epicurean Tradition 
(forthcoming). Cf. also Momigliano (1941) 149-57. 
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certain individuals in which more pleasure can be achieved through political involvement 
than through its avoidance.325 
When discussing Epicureanism in his dialogues, Cicero tends to take very little 
account of the nuances of these different positions.  He regularly deals with a very 
particular understanding of Epicureanism that considers Epicureanism explicitly 
wrong.326  Cicero’s perspective will brook no contradiction.  So, when arguing against 
Torquatus in Fin. 2, Cicero insists that he must argue against the spirit of Epicureanism, 
and not merely the words.  The words can be changed, but he only gives heed to those 
which are consistent with “true” Epicureanism (or what he supposes that to be).327  And 
when C. Vibius Pansa, the Epicurean senator and consul of 43, receives virorum bonorum 
benevolentia, Cicero does not take it as a sign that an Epicurean has earned good will 
through his virtue, but that Pansa is not in fact a true Epicurean (i.e., he has disproved the 
Epicurean position on virtue).328  I will not be exploring here Cicero’s attacks on the 
sophisticated and nuanced Epicureanism of a Cassius or a Philodemus, and in some 
senses not even the Epicureanism of Torquatus, in spite of his major role in Fin.  Instead 
I will look at how Cicero sets up a stereotypically pleasure-oriented, apolitical 
                                                
325 See Armstrong’s discussion of Rhet. 3 in Epicurus. The underlying supposition behind Philodemus’ On 
the Good King is that Piso, the addressee, is born into a position where political activity is unavoidable. See 
Jeff Fish, Epicurus. Roskam (1997) 123-25 likewise finds no contradiction between On the Good King and 
Epicurean philosophy. Cicero seems to address this inevitability of political service for some Epicureans in 
his ‘necessity’ argument in Rep. 1.10-11, wherein he refutes the merits of Epicurus’ counsel to engage in 
politics when necessary. There, however, he does not understand the position as broadly as Philodemus 
does. 
326 The most explicit extended expression of Cicero’s distaste for hedonism (and the Epicureanism it 
represents) comes in the opening of Rep. 1, where he uses the foil of Cato. 
327 Fin. 2.84. Cf. Off. 3.117: Quamvis enim multis locis dicat Epicurus, sicuti dicit, satis fortiter de dolore, 
tamen non id spectandum est, quid dicat, sed quid consentaneum sit ei dicere, qui bona voluptate 
terminaverit, mala dolore. See further on this method of argumentation below. 
328 Fam. 15.16. 
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Epicureanism as his whipping boy in the dialogues, regardless of how sincerely he 
believed it to be an accurate representation of contemporary Epicurean philosophy.329  
 
Cicero first postures his arguments for gratia against Epicureanism somewhat 
inconspicuously, in a dialogue that never mentions the Epicureans by name (De Legibus).  
In terms of chronology, Cicero’s composition of Leg. immediately succeeds that of 
Rep.330  The pairing of the two is a reminder that these dialogues stand in the tradition of 
Plato, who composed dialogues of the same names.  But unlike with Plato, these two 
dialogues stand at the beginning of Cicero’s theoretical works.  At this point in time 
Cicero is still a political theorist rather than a philosophical one.  Even so, before he can 
construct his ideal laws for his republic he first undertakes to lay a theoretical foundation.  
He accordingly turns in book 1 of Leg., as we have seen, to natural law, justice, and the 
virtues.  Once he has sufficiently made the claim for the existence of natural law in 
sections 16-35, Cicero turns to the inherent and natural value of justice for much of the 
remainder of book 1 (36-51).  As his fundamental premise on justice and the virtues 
Cicero claims that everything good is praiseworthy for its own sake.331 
                                                
329 As usual, Cicero’s methods have been quite effective. His stereotyped Epicureanism has held sway in 
the minds of his readers for thousands of years.  
330 There is in fact some reason to believe that Leg. itself was initially conceived of as part of Rep.  Dyck 
(2004) makes this argument based on a letter of Cicero to his brother (Q. Fr. 3.5) wherein he discusses his 
reservations about setting Rep. in the past. In the letter Cicero makes mention of nine books of Rep., when 
in fact only six are known. Dyck suggests that Leg. itself (or at least the material discussed in Leg.) was 
excised from Rep. and taken up soon after Rep.’s completion (9-10). Since Leg. is set in the present, this 
splitting of the dialogues also answers to Cicero’s concern about the past setting of Rep., also expressed in 
the letter to Quintus. He can both appeal to the authority of the ancestors (Rep.) and include himself in a 
dialogue (Leg.). 
331 Nihil omnino in bonis numerandum nisi quod per se ipsum laudabile esset, aut certe nullum habendum 
magnum bonum, nisi quod uere laudari sua sponte posset (Leg. 1.39). Though compare Armstrong’s 
analysis of Cassius’ letter to Cicero: “This gives us a hint of a deeper note in Cassius’ Epicureanism, a 
theory that one should do good to all men, not just to secure their benevolence, but their affection, and (to 
the extent Epicurean friendship is altruistic) for its own sake” (Epicurus).    
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It is here that he comes face to face with the Epicureans.  In Cicero’s 
understanding, the Epicureans would insist on the value of justice because it leads to 
pleasure, and not because of its own inherent goodness.  Such a position is so manifestly 
untenable to Cicero that, rather than take up an argument against the Epicureans, he 
seems to find a way to leave them out of the discussion altogether: since they are 
uninterested in politics, their opinions need have no bearing on the political topic at hand 
(1.39).  So complete is his intended avoidance of the Epicureans that he leaves them 
unnamed.332  The reference to the Epicureans is nevertheless unambiguous, for he creates 
a sort of shorthand by which to identify them. 
Sibi autem indulgentes et corpori deservientes atque omnia quae 
sequantur in vita quaeque fugiant voluptatibus et doloribus ponderantes, 
etiam si vera dicant—nihil enim opus est hoc loco litibus—, in hortulis 
suis iubeamus dicere, atque etiam ab omni societate rei publicae, cuius 
partem nec norunt ullam neque umquam nosse voluerunt, paulisper 
facessant rogemus. 
 
And regarding those who indulge themselves and are slaves to their 
bodies, and measure on a scale of pleasure and pain all the things they 
should do or flee from in life; even if these should speak the truth – there 
is no need here to be legalistic about it – let us beseech them to do their 
talking in their little gardens, and let’s ask them to retire a little from the 
society of the republic, about which they neither know anything nor want 
to know anything. 
 
The shorthand is threefold: a). the Epicureans are self-indulgent, b). they “measure” on a 
calculus of pleasure, and c). they are ignorant of and uninterested in political affairs.  The 
first trait justifies Cicero’s distaste for the philosophy and the final trait justifies his 
proposed exclusion of the philosophy from the discussion at hand. 
                                                
332 On the anonymity of the Epicureans, see Dyck (2004) 172. In addition to the rhetorical strategy of tacito 
nomine he postulates Cicero is showing sensitivity to the feelings of Atticus, who is of course both present 
for the discussion and an Epicurean. 
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 Nevertheless, in spite of this dismissal of the Epicureans here in 1.39, the same 
group seems to reappear just a few paragraphs later (1.42), again unnamed but identified 
by the same sort of shorthand.  Cicero has moved on to arguing that all nations, 
regardless of their individual laws, should govern their conduct by the true, universal law.  
Without universal law, an individual will not necessarily feel himself bound by the 
written laws.  Specifically, Cicero speaks of the sort of individual (idem) who claims that 
“everything is to be measured by self-interest” and who will “ignore and break the laws 
when he can, if he thinks it will be to his own advantage.”333   
The idea of the manipulation of justice for advantage is by no means limited to 
the Epicureans.334  Even so, the threefold characterization of the group mirrors that of the 
Epicureans in 1.39.  In the first place, Cicero’s general premise is that the individual 
under discussion is one that puts his own interests above the interests of the community 
(i.e., the interests which the law aims to protect).  This individual is accordingly not 
civically-minded (point c).  In the second place this individual “measures” (metienda) his 
decisions by his own self-interest (point b).  And finally he seeks his own benefit 
(sibi…rem fructuosam) (point a).   
The shorthand closely resembles that of 1.39, only substituting benefit for 
pleasure.  The object of his polemic seems to be the very group he had claimed he would 
not argue against.335  At the very least Cicero is certainly not using his threefold 
characterization to adumbrate the position of the New Academy, whom he had identified 
in 1.39 as his specific audience for this part of the discussion.  It rather seems that for 
                                                
333 Si, ut idem dicunt, utilitate omnia metienda sunt, negleget leges easque perrumpet, si poterit, is qui sibi 
eam rem fructuosam putabit fore (Leg. 1.42). Trans. by Rudd (1998). 
334 Thrasymachus in Plato’s Rep. 1 again comes to mind. 
335 On the identification the idem in 1.42 as the Epicureans, cf. Dyck (2004) 185-86 ad loc. 
 
 170 
Cicero to make his point, the surest strategy is to not to nuance his position against that of 
the New Academy, but to draw a dichotomy between the virtue-oriented and the self-
oriented.  The self-oriented remain unnamed in 1.42 as they had in 1.39, but their positive 
identification in 1.39 leads inevitably to reading them into 1.42.  The self-indulgent, 
calculating, anti-political Epicurean is the one who cannot perceive the innate value of 
justice and the other virtues, and values them only insofar as they advance his own 
pleasure. 
This foil is so valuable to proving Cicero’s thesis that he repeats it one more time, 
at the climax to his argument in 1.49-50: Atque etiam si emolumentis, non sua sponte 
virtus expetitur, una erit virtus quae malitia rectissime dicetur.  Virtue sought for the 
sake of advantage (emolumentis) is in fact its opposite, vice (malitia).  Those, therefore, 
who seek advantage stand in direct contrast to those who value virtue for its own sake.  
Naturally this group is to be identified with the same self-indulgent group of 1.39 and 42.  
To ensure this identification Cicero returns to his shorthand: Qui virtutem praemio 
metiuntur, nullam virtutem nisi malitiam putant.  Again this group’s aversion to politics 
is assumed by its inclusion as a target in this argument (point c).  Added to this aversion 
are malitia, i.e., the seeking of advantage (point a), and measurement (here of reward) 
(point b).  Even though the Epicureans are not specifically named here or in 1.42, the 
persistent use of this threefold shorthand clearly identifies those in question at 1.42 and 
49 as the same group in question in 1.39, which is positively the Epicureans.  They are by 
definition self-indulgent; because of this self-indulgence they shun political involvement; 
instead they seek their own advantage by using an almost mathematical method of 
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calculation, measuring and quantifying the virtues in order to decide how best to indulge 
themselves. 
Such a set of ideals, Cicero goes on in 1.49, jeopardizes the very existence of 
justice and its sub-virtues, beneficium, gratia, and amicitia.336  Put another way, the use 
of an advantage or pleasure calculus in the valuation and quantification of the virtues 
renders those virtues meaningless.  The virtue-oriented individual values law and hence 
community, the self-oriented one offers a threat to that society. 
Gratia itself is only a subset of justice in Cicero’s argument in Leg., listed with 
beneficium and amicitia as a component ethic governing just action.  It is not the only 
ideal in question.  Even so, its role is the same as the other virtues here listed.  True 
gratia should not be precisely measured and it should not be sought for one’s own gain.  
If it is measured and sought for gain it is a false gratia that belongs to the self-indulgent, 
viz. the Epicureans. 
 
Cicero of course never published his Leg.  He nevertheless persists in employing 
some of the theoretical foundations laid therein in the increasingly philosophical and 
ethical dialogues of the 40s.  Among the ideas he maintains and reiterates is this 
dichotomization of the virtues between the self-oriented Epicurean and the virtue-
oriented Academic (or Stoic or Peripatetic…).  This tendency towards the binary would 
seem to emerge largely from his skeptical method.  Rather than give a purely positive 
definition for a virtue Cicero seeks to define his virtues based on what they are not.  
                                                
336 Ubi enim beneficus, si nemo alterius causa benigne facit? Ubi gratus, si non tum ipsi cernuntur grati, 




Nowhere does this hold more true than in the case of gratia.  Beginning with the 
vocabulary of measurement in Leg., Cicero proceeds to develop in his theoretical works 
an idea of gratia that is readily quantifiable.  Because of its dependence on exchange, 
gratia lends itself to such quantification, to being understood as a commodity to buy, sell, 
or trade.  This commodification of gratia is precisely what Cicero wants to say is not true 
gratia.  This is the gratia that threatens to undercut the traditional aristocracy.  And so, as 
in Leg., he continues to assign this quantified understanding of gratia to the Epicureans, 
the group whose patent wrongness is borne out by their self-indulgence. 
Cicero first revisits this strategy in Fin. 2, in his response to Torquatus’ arguments 
in favor of Epicureanism from book 1.  On three occasions Cicero broaches the 
Epicurean positions on gratia and its sister concepts of amicitia and beneficium.  The first 
instance (2.72) is the most straight-forward and closely recalls the arguments of Leg.  
Cicero adduces for Torquatus the example of his uncle, Aulus Torquatus, who had 
assisted Cicero during his consulship in 63.337  In response to the younger Torquatus’ 
claims that one could value friendship because of the value he himself receives from it 
Cicero assures him that Aulus was only a friend (amicus) insofar as he was not acting in 
his own self-interest (sua causa).338  Specifically, Cicero insists that his own gratia, 
which was an inspired response to Aulus’ amicitia, could only be true insofar as the 
                                                
337 There are, in fact, many Auli in the Torquatus family, just as there are many Lucii. The Aulus in 
question in Fin. 2.72 is actually Torquatus’ first cousin twice-removed, praetor of 70 and rough 
contemporary of Torquatus’ father (also nomine L. Manlius Torquatus). This same Aulus is apparently also 
the addressee of several of Cicero’s letters of 45 (Fam. 6.1-4). Both the Lucius of Fin. and his father had 
died by that time. On the Torquatus family, see J.F. Mitchell (1966) 23-31. 
338 Torquatus’ position, based on Epicurus, is summarized by Cicero in Fin. 2.82: amicitiam a voluptate 
non posse divelli ob eamque rem colendam esse, quod, sine ea tuto et sine metu vivi non posset. 
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friendship was true, and a self-interested amicitia would not have inspired his gratia.339  
Since Cicero was truly grateful, Aulus must have been a true friend, and must therefore 
not have been acting in his own interest.  As in Leg. 1.39-50, self-interest is the enemy of 
genuine gratia, which can only fully exist when appreciated and employed for its own 
sake. 
Cicero also returns to his shorthand, though with an omission.  The villains, the 
Epicureans, are still marked by their self-indulgence (a).  Likewise Cicero takes his 
exemplum of friendship and true gratia from the sphere of politics (c).  The example is 
thus doubly apt in that it not only censures self-interest, but also removes true gratia from 
the grasp of the Epicureans by transferring it to a sphere in which they have no part.  It is 
true both that an Epicurean would not show true friendship because of his self-orientation 
and that he could not do so even should he want to because he does not have the 
opportunity afforded him by the society of political involvement.  All that is missing 
form the shorthand in Fin. 2.72 is a reference to measuring and quantification (b).  This 
final element he introduces shortly after his appeal to Aulus Torquatus, at Fin. 2.83. 
 Having dispensed with Torquatus’ first point, that friendship must be sought for 
pleasure’s sake, Cicero turns to Torquatus’ somewhat modified argument, that certain 
wise Epicureans (sapientis) make a pact (foedus) to behave towards their friends as they 
behave towards themselves (2.83).   
At first glance, and certainly to Torquatus’ way of thinking, this new type of 
friendship cuts right to the heart of Cicero’s arguments against Epicureanism.  By this 
                                                
339 Fin. 2.72: et hercule mihi vir optimus nostrique amantissimus, Aulus Torquatus, versatur ante oculos, 
cuius quantum studium et quam insigne fuerit erga me temporibus illis, quae nota sunt omnibus, scire 
necesse est utrumque vestrum. quae mihi ipsi, qui volo et esse et haberi gratus, grata non essent, nisi eum 
perspicerem mea causa mihi amicum fuisse, non sua, nisi hoc dicis sua, quod interest omnium recte facere. 
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argument an Epicurean who is self-indulgent must also be indulgent towards his friends, 
and so he shows himself to be more than self-interested.  For Cicero, though, such an 
argument is nonsensical.  As he sees it, Epicureans are by nature only self-interested; he 
who is not only self-interested is quite simply not an Epicurean.340  As he says, he is 
arguing not merely against the words of Epicurus, which can be perverted and 
decontextualized, but against those words which are consistent with his system of thought 
(quid convenienter possit rationi et sententiae suae dicere).  Accordingly Cicero 
reinterprets Torquatus’ new definition of friendship through the lens of his first 
definition, namely that friendship is valued utilitatis causa (2.84). 
To reprove Torquatus Cicero seizes on Torquatus’ own language, citing the 
foedus that the wise Epicureans make to treat one another as they treat themselves.  
Torquatus had himself called the agreement of the sapientes a foedus in 1.70.341  By 
definition foedus tends to refer to formal agreements, especially treaties and contracts.342  
From the tone of Torquatus’ argument it is highly unlikely that he intended a formal 
understanding of foedus to describe friendship.  He seems to have in mind something 
more like a bond or a pledge.  Cicero, however, uses foedus to open the door to the 
vocabulary of commodity and exchange to describe the Epicurean understanding of 
friendship.  This commodity language allows him to develop a binary opposition similar 
to that of Leg. 1.49.  As in Leg., those who value virtues for the sake of virtues stand on 
                                                
340 Again compare the example of C. Vibius Pansa, whose altruism and popularity are signs for Cicero that, 
far from upholding the tenets of Epicurus, he has argued against them by his actions (Fam. 15.16). 
341 Naturally Cicero had put that word into Torquatus’ mouth in book 1 so that Cicero the interlocutor could 
respond to it here. 
342 Asmis (2008) 141-57, has recently looked at the meaning of foedus in an Epicurean context, in 
Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura. She looks specifically at the phrase foedus naturae (or foedera naturai) and 
the relationship between treaties and the physical world. Cicero may be building here off foedus as an 
Epicurean watchword, but, with his emphasis on commodities here, he has clearly appealed to something 
different than the limits of the natural universe discussed by Lucretius. 
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one side; on the other side stand the Epicureans.  In Leg., the Epicureans were 
characterized by their self-indulgence, here they are characterized by the language of 
commodity.  
Posuisti etiam dicere alios foedus quoddam inter se facere sapientis, ut, 
quem ad modum sint in se ipsos animati, eodem modo sint erga amicos; id 
et fieri posse et saepe esse factum et ad voluptates percipiendas maxime 
pertinere. hoc foedus facere si potuerunt, faciant etiam illud, ut 
aequitatem, modestiam, virtutes omnes per se ipsas gratis diligant. an 
vero, si fructibus et emolumentis et utilitatibus amicitias colemus, si nulla 
caritas erit, quae faciat amicitiam ipsam sua sponte, vi sua, ex se et 
propter se expetendam, dubium est, quin fundos et insulas amicis 
anteponamus? 
 
You even proposed that some (Epicureans) say that wise men make some 
sort of pact amongst themselves so that they might be disposed towards 
their friends just as they are disposed towards themselves. And you 
claimed that this could happen and has in fact often happened, and that it 
pertains directly to achieving pleasure. If they were able to make such a 
pact, they should also make one wherein they value aequitas, modestia, 
and all the other virtues for their own sake, gratis. But if we cultivate 
friendships for their benefits and gains and utility, if there is no caritas, 
which produces friendship of its own accord, by its own force, sought 
from and for its own sake, it is unclear whether we ought not prefer 
acquiring property to acquiring friends. 
 
On the side of friendship built on virtue Cicero marshals modestia and aequitas, 
along with virtutes.  He even uses the contracted ablative plural of gratia, gratis.  As an 
adverbial gratis generally functions to mean, as the OLD has it, ‘for thanks alone,’ which 
means ‘for no price,’ and, by extension, ‘for free.’  This final definition extends from a 
conception of gratitude as something that is not a commodity.  An action performed ‘for 
free’ does not require return.  In the context of Fin. 2, the use of gratis helps locate true 
friendship outside of the realm of any kind of exchange; it is the true meaning of gratia, 
the one that seeks no reciprocity.   
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After he has lined up these virtues, Cicero introduces his Epicurean foil.  
Friendship that takes personal gain into account falls into the same semantic and 
conceptual range as the buying and selling of commodities.343  Self-seeking (i.e., 
Epicurean) friendship is associated with ideas such as fundi and insulae, principles from 
the outset of the argument based on a foedus.  Cicero suggests that if friendship is a 
matter of contract, then it is a matter of commodity, and if it is a matter of commodity, it 
is a matter of personal gain.  A foedus friendship (as defined in Epicurean terms) is a self-
serving one. 
 To describe personal gain Cicero uses a vocabulary which directly echoes his 
description of the Epicureans in Leg. 1.42 (fructibus and utilitatibus) and 1.49 
(emolumentis).  The commodity vocabulary also provides an echo of Leg.  In the Laws, 
Cicero associates the Epicureans with measurement, a precise weighing of the value of 
the communal virtues of beneficium, gratia, and amicitia.  The contract and property 
vocabulary of Fin. conforms to this critique.  The self-indulgence typical of the 
Epicureans can be identified by the treatment of these communal virtues as commodities.  
At the same time, by Cicero’s baseline definition of the Epicureans presented both in Leg. 
and the preface to Rep., the Epicureans are uninterested in political involvement. Taking 
the Epicureans as our intermediary and example, we can therefore conclude that those 
who treat these virtues as commodities show themselves in fact to be disinterested in the 
running of the state.  Cicero has constructed an equation wherein not merely does self-
indulgence (point a) + commodified gratia (point b) + absence of genuine civic concern 
                                                
343 For personal gain Cicero uses a vocabulary which directly echoes his description of the Epicureans in 
Leg. 1.42 (fructibus and utilitatibus) and 1.49 (emolumentis). 
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(point c) = Epicureanism, but one wherein self-indulgence (point a) = commodified 
gratia (point b) = absence of genuine civic concern (point c) = Epicureanism. 
The pattern recurs once more in Cicero’s rebuttal of Torquatus (2.117).  The 
Epicureans are again in the wrong because their emphasis on pleasure nullifies virtue and 
is antithetical to the interests of the community.  So in DF 2.117 he says, 
ergo in iis adolescentibus bonam spem esse dicemus et magnam indolem, 
quos suis commodis inservituros et quicquid ipsis expediat facturos 
arbitrabimur? nonne videmus quanta perturbatio rerum omnium 
consequatur, quanta confusio? tollitur beneficium, tollitur gratia, quae 
sunt vincla concordiae. nec enim, cum tua causa cui commodes, 
beneficium illud habendum est, sed faeneratio, nec gratia deberi videtur 
ei, qui sua causa commodaverit. 
 
Will we therefore claim that there is good hope for and great promise in 
our youth, the youth we will judge to be eager to serve their own benefit 
and to do whatever is best for themselves? Do we not see how great a 
disturbance, how great a disorder would come as a result of all these 
things? Beneficium is destroyed, gratia is destroyed, the bonds of concord. 
For it should not be considered beneficium when you make an outlay for 
your own sake; it should be considered usury. And gratia can hardly be 
owed to him who has made an outlay for his own sake. 
 
On one side of the aisle stand the communal virtues of gratia and beneficium, the 
foundations of concordia; on the other is profit.  Forms of commodum/commodo appear 
three times in direct contrast to the ideal selflessness of the communal virtues.  This idea 
of commodum, of profit, is in turn identified with money-lending (faeneratio).  As in Leg. 
and Fin. 2.83, the Epicureans are painted as self-indulgent, and their estimation of virtue 
is portrayed as based on the calculus of the marketplace, weights and measures.  This 
posturing against a commodity idea of gratia limits who can practice it in its true form.  It 
is not, like commerce, the province of anyone who wants to participate; it is restricted to 




 In Leg. Cicero’s argument against the Epicureans, falling as it does into his 
argument in favor of the self-worth of virtue, marks the climax of the first book.  In Fin. 
2, Cicero again makes the true communal virtues the climax of his argument (2.117).  
The most compelling argument he has against Epicureanism, the sine qua non of his 
rebuttal with which he leaves Torquatus, is that a philosophy is unworthy insofar as it 
cheapens and de-emphasizes the virtues that build true community.  The location of this 
argument here at the end of book 2 is even more notable when Torquatus’ own argument 
is taken into account.  For Torquatus, the idea of finding utilitas in friendship had come 
towards the middle of his speech (1.70).  Cicero dealt with Torquatus’ argument at the 
appropriate place in his own rebuttal (2.83), but returns to it here not only because of his 
unwavering confidence in its truth, but because it effectively responds to his baseline 
criticism of the Epicureans, their self-indulgence.  
In Nat. Deor., the content of the arguments greatly differs from those of Leg. and 
Fin.  It is telling that in spite of these differences Cicero returns yet again to the same 
binary of commodity and gratia as the culmination of his anti-Epicurean position.  The 
focus has, of course, moved upward in Nat. Deor.; it is now the principles of the gods’ 
actions that are under investigation.  And because the date of the action of the dialogue is 
somewhat earlier than that of Leg. or Fin., Cicero must give the rebuttal of the Epicurean 
argument of Velleius to the Academic Cotta.344  Cotta shows a basic contempt for the 
                                                
344 The action of Fin. 1-2 slightly precedes the premature death of Torquatus in 48. The date of the action of 
Leg. is as uncertain as the date of its composition (on which see Dyck (2004) 9-10; Schmidt (1969); 
Reitzenstein (1894); Robinson (1950)). However the composition is dated (between 52 and 43), the action 
appears to be roughly contemporary. Nat. Deor., on the other hand, presents a quiet and deferent Cicero in 
the company of his elders in 77/6. On this date see Dyck (2003) 7.   
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idea that the Epicureans actually believe in the gods at all, but as book 1 comes to an end, 
he fully explains why the belief in the gods they do profess is unsatisfactory.345  Cotta’s 
chief objection to Velleius’ stance on the disinterested existence of the gods is the claim 
that the gods show no gratia (negat idem esse in deo gratiam).346  The fallout of such a 
stance, Cotta continues, is that the gods love and esteem no one (neminem ab eo amari, 
neminem diligi vultis).  The Stoics, on the other hand, uphold that even men, provided 
they are wise, even if they be strangers, are friends because of their mutual appreciation 
for virtue.   
Cotta himself is neither Epicurean nor Stoic, but he here sets them up as foils to 
represent the dichotomy Cicero has already used in two other dialogues.  With the 
introduction of the Stoics Cicero’s Cotta has picked up on the now-familiar argument of 
the valuing of the communal virtues for their own sake.  It is what good men do, and it 
leads to true friendship, the bedrock of community. 
The correlative to this position is familiar, too: quam si ad fructum nostrum 
referemus, non ad illius commoda, quem diligemus, non erit ista amicitia, sed mercatura 
quaedam utilitatum suarum (1.122).  Friendship that seeks to benefit the self is but 
commerce (mercatura), and it marks friends as the equivalents of prata et arva et 
pecudum greges.347  Cotta ends his argument on this note: even the existence of the gods, 
it turns out, is contingent upon a right understanding of et gratia et caritas.348 
                                                                                                                                            
Cotta had first been introduced as a Ciceronian interlocutor in De Orat. His positive characterization there 
gives a background for his primacy in Nat. Deor. 
345 This issue is treated substantially in both Diels (1916) and Obbink (1996). 
346 Nat. Deor. 1.121. He later conflates gratia with bonitas and beneficentia. 
347 Cf. the fundi and insulae of Fin. 2.83 above. The association of animals and herds with Epicureans goes 
back to Epicurus himself (DL 10.137), who points to the natural impulse of pigs and babies towards 
pleasure. The comparison to animals and babies is not meant to inspire Epicureans to imitate them, but to 
justify the innate quality of a desire for pleasure. Cf. Lucretius 5.932-59. See also J. Warren (2002), Ch. 5, 
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Cicero’s final use of the gratia binary comes in the most community-interested of 
all the dialogues, Laelius de Amicitia.  Because Laelius is concerned primarily in his 
eponymous dialogue with his own friendship with Scipio and Scipio’s amicitia in 
general, Epicureanism plays a small role in the dialogue.  But when Laelius has come to 
the point of defending his motives for friendship, he too appeals to the familiar 
dichotomy. 
   
Ut enim benefici liberalesque sumus, non ut exigamus gratiam (neque 
enim beneficium faeneramur sed natura propensi ad liberalitatem sumus), 
sic amicitiam non spe mercedis adducti sed quod omnis eius fructus in 
ipso amore inest, expetendam putamus.  Ab his qui pecudum ritu ad 
voluptatem omnia referunt longe dissentiunt. 
 
For just as we do not do good and show generosity so that we may extract 
gratia (for we do not lend good deeds at interest, but are by nature prone 
to generosity), so too we think friendship should be sought not because of 
a hope for the profit it will bring, but because its every benefit is contained 
in the very idea of love. They disagree sharply with those who, in the 
manner of cattle, base all their decisions on pleasure. 
 
On one side stand the benefici liberalesque, who value friendship for its nature (for the 
amor in amicitia); on the other are those who have a spes mercedis.  Like Leg., and 
unlike Fin. and Nat. Deor., the theories of the Epicureans are not one of Cicero’s primary 
targets in the Laelius.  As a result, as he had in Leg., Cicero leaves them unnamed.  His 
shorthand, though, leaves no doubt about their identification.  They are first introduced 
by their hope for commercial profit (mercedis) and they are shortly characterized by their 
                                                                                                                                            
on the Epicurean origin of the pig comparison. Horace (Ep. 1.4.16) picks up on this self-identification with 
animals when he claims to be from the grex of the Epicureans. Cicero’s reference to friends as greges 
pecudum picks up on this traditional Epicurean symbol, but not in the same sense. Cicero’s interest is 
clearly the context of commodity, and he is more than ready to censure the use of animals as examples in 
any context. Cf. n46 below. 
348 These are the final words of Nat. Deor. 1. 
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animal-like referral of all things to pleasure.349  Even in a dialogue largely unconcerned 
with Epicureans, the mention of true gratia conjures up its rival, the commercial gratia.  
And this gratia leads inevitably to the evocation of the Epicureans. 
Over nearly a decade and the span of several theoretical topics, Cicero regularly 
locates the Epicureans in a semantic grouping that includes self-interest, political 
aversion, and commercialized, commodified ideas of gratia.350  The equation of these 
four ideas allows Cicero to use them interchangeably, and to introduce one into a 
discussion in which another appears.  In Leg., a discussion of politics turns to a 
discussion of the communal virtues, and the Epicureans become a natural foil.  In Fin. 
and Nat. Deor., the Epicureans as target leads to the introduction of self-interest and 
commodified gratia as targets.  And in Laelius, it is the discussion of friendship and 
gratia that leads to a critique of the self-indulgence of the Epicureans. 
The grouping of these four qualities also results in a grouping of their opposites.  
Interest in politics and community reflects a belief in a true gratia which values virtue for 
its own sake.  It is the way of the Academics, Stoics, and Peripatetics alike.  In Cicero’s 
equation, the philosophical theorist who values virtue for its own sake is naturally 
engaged in community with others who do the same.  It is an engagement regularly 
                                                
349 Cicero elsewhere in his dialogues makes similar comparisons of Epicureans to animals. E.g., in Fin. 
2.110 Cicero further maligns the Epicurean position by claiming that even the animals demonstrate 
simulacra virtutum (2.110).  It is these simulacra which raise the animals above mere slavery to pleasure, 
which is in turn the province assigned by Cicero to the Epicureans. In Fin., not only are the Epicureans like 
animals, they are worse than animals. Cicero’s use of simulacra here is a clear reference to Epicureanism, 
if not to Lucretius’ poem in particular. Cf. n44 above. 
350 While my focus here has been Cicero’s dialogues, Off. makes use of a similar shorthand for the 
Epicureans and draws many similar conclusions to those outlined here. For instance at 1.5 we find the 
pleasure calculus associated with measuring profit and the inability to demonstrate true friendship (Nam qui 
summum bonum sic instituit, ut nihil habeat cum virtute coniunctum, idque suis commodis, non honestate 
metitur, hic, si sibi ipse consentiat et non interdum naturae bonitate vincatur, neque amicitiam colere 
possit). See also 1.24. Off., though, with its Stoic backdrop and the absence of the dialogue form, presents a 
less idealized version of community than the dialogues do (cf. the application of measurement vocabulary 
to virtue by implication here and at 1.59). 
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exhibited in the dialogues by the interlocutors (including Cicero himself on several 
occasions) and manifested by Cicero in his dedication of the texts of the dialogues to 
others.  Cicero the interlocutor engages with Atticus, Brutus, Torquatus, Cato, Quintus, 
Hirtius, Cotta, Velleius, Balbus, Piso, and others.  As dedicator, Cicero participates in 
gratia relationships with Atticus, Brutus, and Hirtius.     
This social engagement is very specifically an engagement with the boni, those 
who value virtue and do not condescend to construct relationships based on commerce 
and exchange.351  It is only these boni, who are true practitioners of gratia, who truly 
manifest the appropriate political concern and involvement.  This model stands in direct 
contrast not only to the Epicureans, but also to the positions of a popularis like Caesar.  
On the surface Cicero’s texts are philosophical, and so the targets are too.  But the 
Epicureans become a sort of philosophical placeholder for the target of Cicero’s broader 
polemics.352  They stand in for the self-indulgent, who are the practitioners of false 
gratia, and therefore are ill-equipped for political engagement.  In the political sphere 
their counterpart is those who sacrifice traditional social imbalances to the principles of 
equal and quantifiable exchange.  Such ideas are akin to commerce: they erase social 
distinctions, distinctions to Cicero’s mind that are based on virtue and its 
intergenerational embodiment as mos maiorum.  The example of the Epicureans serves to 
show that such exchange is self-interested and unsuited to politics.  When Cicero makes 
his repeated critique of the Epicureans with reference to their commodification of gratia, 
                                                
351 It is again worth noting that some of these figures (Atticus, Torquatus, and Hirtius) have Epicurean 
sympathies. To Cicero’s way of thinking, though, their methods of living are inconsistent with the ideas of 
Epicurus as he understands them. 
352 And of course in the dialogues in question here that are not specifically philosophical (Leg. and Laelius), 
the specter of the Epicureans is conjured anonymously. Even though it is clear who is meant in each 
dialogue, the absence of the name “Epicurean” leaves the shorthand description to be applied more broadly. 
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self-indulgence, and unsuitability for political involvement he is in fact criticizing an 
entire system of social activity that was rapidly moving the social climate of Rome away 
from the traditional system with which Cicero identified.   
 
The Conflict of Right and Wrong Gratia amongst the Interlocutors 
 Cicero’s aversion to commodified gratia is reiterated through the social 
interactions of his interlocutors, who regularly practice both right and wrong gratia.   
Perhaps the best articulation of social interaction in all the dialogues is that of De Orat.  
In it, the first of the dialogues, Cicero gives particular attention to dramatization and 
discussion.  It is an attention that makes De Orat. the most readable of all the dialogues, 
and gives the clearest representation of Cicero’s original dialogic ideal of unity from 
polyphony.  More than any of the dialogues it affects to offer a snapshot of true 
aristocratic life in the Roman republic.  How accurate Cicero’s representation of a 
historical event matters far less than the ideological framework to which Cicero appeals 
to make the scene legible and comprehensible to his aristocratic audeince. 
 Jon Hall has usefully explored what he calls “social evasion and aristocratic 
manners” within the De Oratore.353  Implicit to Hall’s analysis, and indeed the dialogue 
as a whole, is that the manners and actions exhibited both in De Oratore and elsewhere 
are performed by Roman aristocrats in the company of other aristocrats.  So, when the 
interlocutors lay out theories of the communal virtues, they are constructing their 
principles according to their aristocratic audience.  They have no need to emphasize the 
gratia of the plebs when plebeians are neither present as characters or readers.  In the 
                                                
353 Hall (1996), in the title of his article. 
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same way, the modes of interaction demonstrated by the characters in the dialogues are 
not universally representative of Roman social interaction, but only of the interaction of 
the aristocracy.  However, since the theorizing and the interacting occur within the same 
groups of figures, it is not unreasonable to expect them to line up.  And this agreement 
between theory and practice is first underscored by this very restriction of audience: the 
theoretical principle that the true exhibition of the communal virtues occurs between the 
boni finds practical confirmation in the makeup of the dramatis personae of the 
dialogues. 
 Keeping this restriction in mind, let us return to Hall and his evaluation of the 
social ethics of De Orat.  Hall takes as his subject matter the moments in the dialogue 
when various interlocutors try to persuade Crassus to speak on a topic and his 
corresponding refusals.  Noting that, “[o]n repeated occasions L. Crassus is depicted as 
trying to sidestep the suggestion that he take part in a disputatio on the subject of 
oratory,” Hall examines the social methods Crassus uses to avoid incurring the 
obligations other interlocutors attempt to place on him.354  He then turns to Cicero’s 
correspondence to find reiteration of the same methods of social interaction, which serve 
as convincing reaffirmation of his reading of De Orat.  Even so, Hall never fully answers 
the question of why Crassus should wish to evade the social obligations his companions 
want to impose upon him.355  The answer, as I will argue, seems to lie not with Crassus’ 
refusal, but with the way the interlocutors seek to oblige him.  Just as they hear from 
                                                
354 Hall (1996) 95. 
355 He comes closest in pp. 96-7, where he says that the Crassus’ reluctance to speak helps to dissociate him 
from the untrustworthy, “tongue-wagging” Greeks. And, he says, the evasion helps to structure the 
dialogue as a whole. Then, in his concluding arguments Hall reaffirms that Cicero intends to give an 
accurate depiction of Roman aristocratic manners and interaction (e.g., 117-18). While all of these reasons 
do seem to contribute to Crassus’ evasion, they do not seem to explain the repeated emphasis on the subject 
that Hall is both accurately noting and explaining. 
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Crassus an idealized picture of the orator, they see in him a demonstration of the 
idealized mode of social interaction.  While they attempt to barter with the Roman 
communal virtues, treating them like commodities, using gratia et al. to define the terms 
of fair trades and reciprocal responsibilities, Crassus refuses to inscribe himself in their 
method, preferring instead an ideal of gratia according to which each individual offers it 
freely, motivated in equal parts by his own goodness and the goodness of others. 
 Forcing the wise interlocutor to speak has its precedent in the dialogues of Plato.  
The most ominous of all such moments, and indeed one of the most threatening moments 
of all the Platonic dialogues, comes at the end of the Charmides, after Socrates has 
“failed” to lead Charmides and Critias to an accurate definition of sophrosune.  
Charmides and his elder kinsman and future member of the Thirty, Critias, concoct a plan 
for Socrates to charm Charmides through his philosophical discussion for as long as it 
takes to make him temperate.  But they do not allow Socrates a say.  Charmides claims to 
have his “orders” from Critias, and indicates he will use “force” on Socrates if necessary, 
not even allowing him a “hearing” (176c).  The scene as a whole anticipates the violence 
of the Thirty to come.  The irony is, of course, that such a demonstration of force is the 
last way to show progress towards self-control.  It is, in fact, other-control, a method sure 
to fail in extracting wisdom from Socrates. 
 The scene in De Orat. is naturally much more amicable than the one in the 
Charmides, notwithstanding the fact that civil unrest and violent oligarchic rule will 
characterize the Rome of the early 80s as it did the Athens of the late 400s.  The 
interlocutors of De Orat. do not threaten Crassus in the same sense Charmides does 
Socrates.  They are, as Hall and others have rightly pointed out, intended as models of 
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Roman humanitas, after all.356  But, like Charmides, the interlocutors must be prepared to 
fail because they attempt to use the wrong methods to encourage Crassus to speak.  They 
may not be crassly violent, but they run the risk of being overly commercial. 
 There are ten scenes of evasion in De Orat. and a full half of them (5) – including 
all of the lengthiest and most substantial – make mention of gratia.357  The first scene 
(1.96-107) involves a request from Sulpicius for Crassus to speak on the ars of oratory.  
Crassus has already participated in the discussion of book 1, but Sulpicius at this point 
wants Crassus to speak de omni genere dicendi.  Recognizing he is in no social position 
to demand such a discussion, Sulpicius assures Crassus that he will be rewarded with 
magna gratia for speaking.  Specifically Sulpicius claims he will rank (anteponam) 
Crassus’ villa above the Academy and Lyceum of Athens (1.98-99).  He has thus set the 
stage for Crassus to acquire gratia by simply giving his own taxonomy of correct 
rhetorical practice.  Crassus’ first reaction, one Hall describes as characterized by “urbane 
modesty,” is to deflect the request, by pleading ignorance and attempting to substitute 
Antonius in his place.358  The claim of ignorance of oratory, though, would hint strongly 
of disingenuousness, and the modesty would be accordingly empty, if Crassus did not 
tailor his refusal to Sulpicius’ specific request.  According to Crassus he cannot speak 
specifically because he is not equipped to discuss oratory as an ars.359   
                                                
356 On humanitas and similar words, see Hall (1996) 101-02, along with the bibliography listed in 102n17. 
357 The scenes are 1.96-107, 1.133-34, 1.160-65, 1.205-07, 2.13-27, 2.121-28, 2.233-34, 2.350-51, 2.361-
67, and 3.18. This list is amended from the one given by Hall (96) with the addition of the scene from book 
3. 
358 Hall (1996) 105. 
359 De Orat. 1.99 (Crassus speaking): quod ego non superbia neque inhumanitate faciebam neque quod tuo 
studio rectissimo atque optimo non obsequi vellem, praesertim cum te unum ex omnibus ad dicendum 
maxime natum aptumque cognossem, sed me hercule istius disputationis insolentia atque earum rerum, 
quae quasi in arte traduntur? inscitia. 
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The identification of oratory as an ars is the key to Crassus’ refusal.  An ars 
generally, and the ars rhetorica specifically, conjures all sorts of problems for the Roman 
aristocratic theorist.  In the case of rhetoric, the development of a taxonomy for practice 
is notoriously daunting.  Connolly, using Barthes, describes the “art” of rhetoric as an 
attempt “to master the unmasterable in [the] attempt to freeze language, a necessarily 
dynamic system.”360  It is a complication that comes in for direct censure in the Gorgias, 
and one that implicitly provokes Cicero’s writing of De Orat. to replace Inv.  The 
complication assumes a prominent place in the first book of De Orat. when Crassus 
examines the split between rhetoric and philosophy.  Narducci, among others, has found 
in the discussion of the split in book one a Ciceronian emphasis on the figure of the 
orator, rather than on the art of oratory.  Cicero obviates the theoretical problems 
engendered by the split of the philosophy and rhetoric into two disciplines by 
concentrating on the quintessentially Roman orator, who is politically, ethically, and 
socially engaged.  He is more than a practitioner of an ars. 
Many biases underlie the aversion to rhetoric as an art.  Implicit in the conflict of 
philosophy and rhetoric is a conflict between Greekness and Romanness.  The Greek ars 
(techne) of rhetoric traditionally stood in conflict with philosophy, but the Roman orator 
supercedes and in a way coopts both of these individual disciplines.  Lurking too is the 
issue of gender.  As Connolly explains, the practice of an ars, artificium, entails aspects 
of performance and pretense which ascribe to oratory a potentially dangerous 
inauthenticity, a traditionally effeminate quality.361  Because of these associations, the 
                                                
360 Connolly (2008) 198. She is drawing on Barthes, “The old rhetoric.” 




appeal to ars foregrounds several threats to Romanness, manhood, and the survival of the 
state, all chief concerns of Cicero in his dialogues. 
But the problem with ars runs deeper still than this.  The very nature of an ars 
suggests that oratory or any other discipline should be subject to a systematic 
classification of the rules, and therefore quantifiable in the same way as a commodity.  
That is to say, an ars, like the exchange of commodities, assigns specific and quantifiable 
values to every element in question.  It purports to contain all that is necessary for the 
performance of a skill, which would then make that skill (e.g., oratory) available to any 
reader, just as commerce makes available any object to the one who has enough money.  
Both moves are populist in nature.  They seek to disembed their objects from the 
traditional aristocratic systems.  Commerce makes exchange available to a broader group, 
an ars makes a given discipline more available.  According to Crassus’ extended refusal 
to speak in the first book of De Orat. (1.102-109), the systematizing of oratory into an 
ars restricts its scope and leaves out some of the most important factors for the eloquent 
man.  In this context his refusal is not so much a matter of “self-effacement”, as Hall calls 
it, as it is a critique of the type of request Sulpicius has made.362  Sulpicius has not only 
asked for an ars, he has evoked ideas of Greekness and effeminacy that have no place in 
the ideal orator.  More than this, he has conjured up the mathematical constructs of 
classification and commodification in his request.  He has asked Crassus to perform the 
task of a textbook, an act which would educate Sulpicius but would elide Crassus as an 
individual, and the auctoritas that accompanied his personal knowledge, experience, 
ancestry, and political involvement.  He asks Crassus to explain not the unique quality of 
                                                
362 Hall (1996) 105. 
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his knowledge, but the common quality.   In framing his request in this way Sulpicius 
does offer Crassus gratia, but it is gratia at the expense of auctoritas.  Crassus rejects 
Sulpicius’ request in large part because he has no desire for this kind of gratia, and 
indeed would not find it useful for his ideal orator.  Sulpicius’ gratia is too commercial, 
too common. 
Crassus eventually accedes to the request to speak only after Antonius modifies it 
at 1.110: Sed existimo, inquit, gratum te his, Crasse, facturum, si ista eueris quae putas 
ad dicendum plus quam ipsam artem posse prodesse.  Two factors have changed in this 
altered request.363  In the first place, Antonius asks Crassus to speak on topics of oratory 
that extend beyond ars.  He thereby excises classification from the request.  Secondly, the 
gratia Antonius promises is coupled with the verb existimo.  Though existimare has its 
etymological roots in the exchange of goods and money, it undergoes a semantic shift 
beginning as early as Cato the Elder in his De Agricultura.364  From Cato onward 
existimare assumes a meaning of establishing worth based on a non-pecuniary standard.  
It is therefore possible for Cicero to draw the contrast in Pro Roscio that pecunia 
levissima, existimatio sanctissima.365  So, when Antonius alters Sulpicius’ request in De 
Orat. to include a gratia conditional upon existimatio, he moves towards an 
uncommodified idea of gratia, a gratia embedded in the social interaction of the 
aristocracy.  Combined with the de-emphasis on classification created by disavowing 
oratory as ars, this new request succeeds in loosing Crassus’ tongue.  Crassus, it turns 
                                                
363 There is, in fact, also a third factor; the maker of the request. It is no longer a junior member of the 
discussion, but Crassus’ peer Antonius who asks him to speak. Hall (1996) touches on this distinction in his 
own discussion of gratia (98f.). I do not include this distinction because much of the effect of this 
distinction is manifested in the other two. I.e., Antonius knows how to phrase his request correctly because 
of his increased wisdom, experience, and familiarity with Crassus. 
364 For the full argument, see Habinek (1998) 45-49. 
365 Pro Roscio Amerino 15, as quoted in Habinek (1998) 49. 
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out, has only refused Sulpicius because Sulpicius had asked in the wrong terms.  He 
asked in the terms of classification, which is the tool of commercialization, and leads to 
the general devaluing of the boni.  It therefore comes as no surprise when Crassus opens 
the speech he finally does give with a discussion of the importance of natura (De Orat. 
1.113).366 
The next coincidence of gratia and Crassus’ evasion comes in 1.205, when 
Crassus has finally finished the speech he began at 1.113.  Again it is Sulpicius who 
speaks, first to express his gratitude (Nobis vero, inquit, Sulpicius ista sunt pergrata 
perque iucunda; sed pauca etiam requirimus in primisque ea, quae valde breviter a te, 
Crasse, de ipsa arte percursa sunt).  But, in spite of this thanks, he nevertheless asks 
Crassus to return to the topic of oratory as an ars.  The admission of thanks is Sulpicius’ 
duty, incurred through his promise of gratia at 1.98.  So he dutifully discharges it.  Even 
so, by cursorily following his admission of gratia with sed, by repeating his plea for a 
discussion of the ars of oratory, Sulpicius shows that he has fully misunderstood the 
implications of the altered request given by Antonius.  As soon as Crassus has finished 
speaking Sulpicius returns to a commodified gratia and a classified oratory.  Needless to 
say, he does not convince Crassus to speak further.  The discussion, as it had threatened 
to at the moment of Sulpicius’ first request, now passes to Antonius. 
Antonius actually bears the baton once passed through the rest of book 1 and all 
through book 2, leading the discussion according to his terms and those of the requesters.  
His subject matter is the very ars of oratory Sulpicius was so interested in, the type of 
                                                
366 Natura here as elsewhere in the dialogues indicates that nature which supercedes culture and is to be 
identified with the traditional character of the Roman republic. 
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material that characterizes the rhetorical handbooks of the day (though the dialogue form 
introduces an elegant variatio to the traditional treatise).   
Antonius’ discussion also includes a division of labor; he will provide an ars of 
oratory, but he relegates to Crassus the topic of how an orator should express the content 
he has collected (quo modo dicamus).367  The division as Antonius describes it is, in 
essence, one of words and content.  Antonius will teach what to say, and Crassus how to 
say it.  Crassus, of course, wants his orator to be a unified whole, unable to be divided 
into these types of portions.  He says so immediately following Antonius’ proposal and 
must eventually grapple with how to rejoin these two halves in book 3.  But Antonius’ 
plan carries the day, and he leads the discussion for the remainder of book 2.  Antonius 
does not again make reference to this role of Crassus until 2.350-51, as he prepares to 
speak on his final topic, memory.  Here he pronounces that he will conclude with this 
topic, leaving to Crassus only the job of “adorning” the orator (exornentur), another 
reference to Crassus’ divided half of the labor.  In fact, despite the disapproval Crassus 
will show at the beginning of book 3 of the technical division Antonius has made, 
Antonius has done Crassus a great favor.  He first rephrased Sulpicius so as to make his 
method of request palatable to Crassus, and then, when Sulpicius did not relent, Antonius 
acceded to the request in Crassus’ place.  Crassus, fully aware of his friend’s assistance, 
uses the moment before Antonius concludes his speech to give him thanks. 
Perge vero, inquit Crassus, libenter enim te cognitum iam artificem 
aliquandoque evolutum illis integumentis dissimulationis tuae nudatumque 
perspicio; et quod mihi nihil aut non multum relinquis, percommode facis 
estque mihi gratum. 
       (De Orat. 2.350) 
 
                                                
367 De Orat. 2.120. See supra. 
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Go ahead, says Crassus, for I freely observe that you are recognizable as a 
master of the ars once you have been unveiled and stripped of the covers 
of your dissimulation; and by leaving to me nothing (or at least not much), 
you do very well and I give you gratia.  
 
Crassus’ gratitude arises not from his own unwillingness to speak, but from the fact that 
Antonius has assumed the specific responsibility of discussing oratory as an ars.  
Antonius and Crassus have no explicit discussion about Antonius assuming this role, but 
Crassus recognizes the aid of his friend and responds as good men do, by an expression 
of gratia.   
To press the issue a bit further, it is perhaps worth noting that Crassus even thanks 
Antonius because “facis percommode”, no doubt best translated as something like “you 
do very well,” but it may also contain a pun on the word commodus, which has a natural 
meaning of “profit.”  “You are taking care of the commodity business”, Crassus says, and 
for that I thank you.   
Regardless of the pun, once he has received Crassus’ gratitude, Antonius goes on 
to assure (or warn?) his friend that he has done all he can.  It is up to Crassus, Antonius 
says, to figure out how to deal with any further requests of the interlocutors.  Only then, 
after these two have come to their mutual understanding, does Antonius move on to his 
concluding discussion of memory. 
 The themes of evasion and gratitude return shortly to the fore, when Antonius 
reaches the end of his discussion at 2.360.  Having gone on for so long, he concludes with 
an apology for his loquacity.  Catulus reassures him that, not only has he not been too 
talkative, but that he is deserving of the interlocutors’ thanks (te diligimus magnamque 
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tibi habemus gratiam).368  This is the gratia that Sulpicius had promised to Crassus in 
1.98, the gratia he had qualified with a sed at 1.205, here given fully to Antonius.  It is 
the specific completion of a specific promise for the performance of a specific task.  It is 
the gratia which had not interested Crassus.   
The other interlocutors may well have left the discussion at this point, but 
Antonius himself forces the discussion forward by admitting an ulterior motive for his 
agreeing to speak.  When pressed by Catulus to reveal this motive, Antonius admits, “I 
wanted to take away Crassus’ every excuse” (adimere, inquit, omnem recusationem 
Crasso volui).  Antonius makes it clear that there is more left for Crassus to discuss.  He 
himself has answered to the inappropriately framed request of the interlocutors, and now 
it is up to Crassus to fill in, or more accurately, to expand as he sees fit. 
 When it appears Crassus will refuse yet again, the others take the bait.  Sulpicius 
recalls Antonius’ division of labor.  Crassus refuses to be implicated.  Cotta insists on 
Crassus’ participation.  Crassus demurs.  Caesar seeks to oblige him either because 
Crassus’ opinion is either of great value or great ease to express.  Catulus invokes an 
(exaggerated) pledge of Crassus’ from 2.27, citing mores and fides.  Cotta elevates 
Crassus’ obligation to the level of religio.  Finally, faced with such a mass of requests, 
Crassus cannot but accede.  He agrees to speak in the afternoon discussion.  But when he 
does, it will be on his own terms, and he will begin by scrapping the restrictive and ars-
centric division of labor proposed in book 2. 
 The action of book 3 opens with Caesar reminding Crassus of his promise to 
speak.  There is no talk of gratia per se, but Crassus responds to Caesar in familiar terms: 
                                                
368 De Orat. 2.362. 
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an me tam impudentem esse existimatis, ut vobis hoc praesertim munus putem me diutius 
posse debere?  In asking this question Crassus acknowledges two aspects of his 
relationship with the interlocutors.  On the one hand, he appeals to their existimatio of 
him; on the other, he cites his debt, using the commodity vocabulary of munus and 
debere.  In fact, the dialogue has come to the point where, if Crassus insists on his 
idealized concept of gratia, his failure to satisfy the interlocutors’ idea of gratia will 
affect his own gratia.  It has reached the point where Crassus must explain his ideal so as 
not to violate that of his friends.   
It should be noted, he does not capitulate.  He does not accept the interlocutors’ 
idea of gratia over his own.  Instead, in order to maintain a favorable existimatio among 
his peers, in order to ensure that this community does not devolve and disappear, Crassus 
recognizes the need not to respond to a request, but to confer a beneficium.  The specific 
munus that Crassus acknowledges is to speak on ornatus or quo modo dicas, according to 
Antonius’ division.  But, as mentioned above, Crassus begins his discourse by 
eliminating this distinction.  He instead appeals to the concept of the unified orator, and 
predicates it upon the unity of the liberal arts (an idea he attributes to Plato), and 
eventually the very unity and harmony of the cosmos.  So, by speaking, Crassus seems to 
provide the understood munus, but by shifting the paradigm of the conversation, he is in 
fact achieving a positive existimatio while avoiding the specific exchange terms the other 
interlocutors have used to define the relationship.  The subject of book 3, Crassus’ 
speech, seeks then to move the orator into the sphere of the bonus.  If he can convince his 
listeners of his position on the orator, he has educated them not only as to how to become 
eloquent, but as to how to be virtuous.  The interlocutors, once virtuous, can then move 
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beyond the exchange model of gratia to the virtue-oriented one, the one Crassus has 
sought to demonstrate through his regular evasion throughout the dialogue. 
 
 While none of the other dialogues put the same quantitative emphasis on the role 
of aristocratic manners, gratia still appears in several places as a fundamental tool for 
determining who speaks and when.  Scipio, the primary interlocutor of Rep., does not 
have nearly the same compunction when he is first asked to speak as does Crassus in De 
Orat., despite his own apparent self-effacement at Rep. 1.34-7.  But in fact, Scipio need 
go no farther towards refusing to speak than showing some urbane modesty because the 
request given to him comes not from a misguided Sulpicius, but from his close friend 
Laelius.  Laelius makes his appeal to Scipio on three levels, citing three qualities of 
Scipio that make him a suitable speaker on the topic of government (1.34).  In the first 
place, Scipio is an excellent statesman himself (potissimum principem); secondly, he is 
acquainted with the Greek theories on governance through Panaetius and Polybius;369 and 
finally he supports the political legacy of his ancestors (quem maiores nostri nobis 
reliquissent).  If Scipio should speak from these qualifications, Laelius assures him, he 
would receive the gratia of all present (nobis gratum omnibus). 
 Laelius’ mode of request immediately distinguishes itself from Sulpicius’.  
Laelius recognizes both Scipio’s political authority, itself dependent upon gratia, and his 
felicity to the ideas of his ancestors.  There is a certain sense in which Scipio can bring 
the wisdom of his ancestors to bear on the conversation, and so the gratia of those 
gathered will be offered to Scipio cum maioribus.  In any sense, Laelius’ request appeals 
                                                
369 Laelius also points to Scipio’s discussions with them as experiences that have further qualified him to 
participate in yet another discussion of the subject. 
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to Scipio’s precise area of expertise.  As Scipio himself admits, his knowledge derives 
from a combination of skill, study, ancestry, and experience, and so Laelius’ request is by 
and large amenable to Scipio, but Scipio does determine to reject one element of his 
friends’ proposal: he does not wish to speak on Greek theory.  Unlike Crassus, who 
claims an ignorance of the ars of oratory, Scipio admits to a familiarity with the ars of 
government.  He even identifies politics as the maxima ars, telling the others gathered 
that it would be shameful for the practitioners of the lesser crafts to attain mastery of their 
humble skills, if he should not also demonstrate a mastery of the ars of politics.    But 
Scipio goes on to say that he does not want to speak only on the topics of the Greek 
handbooks: “I am not content with the things that the best and wisest Greeks have written 
on the topic, but neither do I want to privilege my own opinions” (sed neque iis contentus 
sum quae de ista consultatione scripta nobis summi ex Graecia sapientissimique homines 
reliquerunt, neque ea quae mihi videntur anteferre illis audeo).370  Like Crassus, Scipio 
does not want to limit his discussion to an ars, and his refusal to do so largely shapes his 
response, and hence the course of the dialogue.  Instead of proceeding with an exposition 
of the Greek theories of politics, the received wisdom that defined the “political art,” 
Scipio reaffirms the validity of the other parts of Laelius’ request: his ancestry, his 
Romanness, and his experience.  As the two friends eventually agree, it is these traits, and 
not a knowledge of an ars that make Scipio worthy of gratia. 
                                                
370 The full passage runs thus at Rep. 1.35-6: ego cum mihi sit unum opus hoc a parentibus maioribusque 
meis relictum, procuratio atque administratio rei publicae, non me inertiorem esse confitear quam opificem 
quemquam, si minus in maxima arte quam illi in minimis operae consumpserim? (36) sed neque iis 
contentus sum quae de ista consultatione scripta nobis summi ex Graecia sapientissimique homines 
reliquerunt, neque ea quae mihi videntur anteferre illis audeo. quam ob rem peto a vobis ut me sic 
audiatis: neque ut omnino expertem Graecarum rerum, neque ut eas nostris in hoc praesertim genere 
anteponentem, sed ut unum e togatis patris diligentia non inliberaliter institutum, studioque discendi a 
pueritia incensum, usu tamen et domesticis praeceptis multo magis eruditum quam litteris. 
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 Scipio’s response to Laelius in 1.35-36, in which he acknowledges his familiarity 
of an ars, but refuses to detail one, contains a verbal echo of the somewhat similar 
request that Sulpicius had made to Crassus in De Orat. 1.98.  Sulpicius had told Crassus 
that, should Crassus speak on the ars of oratory, he (Sulpicius) would surely rank 
(anteponam) Crassus’ Tusculan villa above the Academy and the Lyceum of Athens.  
Scipio, a whole dialogue later, in his dismissal of the ars-centric type of discussion, 
responds to Sulpicius’ type of request in similar terms.  He claims, when it comes to 
politics, he is neither unfamiliar with Greek theory, nor does he rank it (anteponentem) 
above Roman theory.371  At the same time, Scipio says he will not dare to rank his own 
opinions over those of the Greeks (by which he almost certainly means Plato and 
Aristotle).  In direct contrast to Sulpicius, who had offered gratia to Crassus for the 
discussion of an ars, a gratia that would take the form of the ranking of Roman things 
above Greek things, Scipio explicitly eschews the ranking of Greek and Roman traits that 
had been at the center of Sulpicius’ offer.  Like the unresponsive Crassus, Scipio 
preferred to locate the source of his topic outside of the handbook.  There is not a 
question of comparing theories side by side; Scipio and Crassus’ opinions are inevitably 
embedded in the pedigree and character of the speakers themselves.   Crassus refuses to 
allow his opinions to be assigned to a school of thought like an Academy or Lyceum, and 
Scipio wishes to build not on Greek theories, but on an ancestral inheritance.  The verbal 
echo of the ranking of Greek and Roman ideas underscores the similarity between 
Crassus’ and Scipio’s approaches, even as Scipio puts up a much shorter fight. 
                                                
371 For the full passage, see preceding note. 
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 After Scipio has responded, a third interlocutor, L. Furius Philus, reiterates the 
company’s desire to hear from Scipio as an authoritative source.  He encourages Scipio to 
speak in accordance with the position Scipio had just laid out for himself.  He does give 
voice to the limiting language of ars, but he puts a twist on it, locating Scipio’s authority 
in his familiarity with what he calls the ratio et quasi ars of politics (1.37).   
The introduction of ratio into the request effectively rehabilitates the asker’s 
position.  In direct contrast to ars, which conjured for Crassus and Scipio ideas of 
exchange and unregulated social interaction, ratio evokes the closely related ideas of 
natura and virtue.  Cicero explores the relationship between the ideas of nature, 
goodness, society and ratio in his own voice in his excursus on natural law which serves 
as the opening of the discussion in Leg.  From 1.22-45 he says: 
“When ratio has matured and been perfected it is rightly called ‘wisdom’.” 
quom [ratio] adolevit atque perfecta est, nominatur rite sapientia. (1.22) 
 
“For virtue is nothing but nature perfected and brought to its best point.” 
Est autem virtus nihil aliud, nisi perfecta et ad summum perducta natura. 
(1.25) 
 
“And many skills have been discovered through nature’s teaching. And 
ratio, having imitated nature, has accomplished in its skillful way the 
things necessary for life.” 
Artes vero innumerabiles repertae sunt, docente natura, quam imitata 
ratio res ad vitam necessarias sollerter consecuta est. (1.26) 
 
“And to those to whom nature gave ratio she also gave ‘right ratio’; and 
therefore nature has also given these law, which is ‘right ratio’ in 
arranging and forbidding; and if she gave them law, she has also given 
them justice; and nature has given ratio to everyone. Therefore nature has 
given justice to everyone.” 
Quibus enim ratio a natura data est, isdem etiam recta ratio data est; ergo 
et lex, quae est recta ratio in iubendo et vetando; si lex, ius quoque; et 




“For virtue is the perfected ratio of some good individual, which is surely 
present in nature.” 
Est enim virtus boni alicuius perfecta ratio, quod certe in natura est. 
(1.45) 
 
Cicero returns regularly to ratio throughout his explanation of natural law because 
it is the fundamental endowment of nature upon all humans.  It is what makes humans 
humans.  It is the bond they share which dictates that they should live together in 
community through justice.  But Cicero also identifies degrees of ratio: all humans have 
ratio but in some cases ratio can be ‘perfected’ and it can be ‘right’.  Right ratio leads to 
laws and justice; perfected ratio is wisdom.  Later, in a way suggesting his belief in the 
unity of the virtues, Cicero identifies the perfected ratio of the good man, not only as 
wisdom, but as virtue itself.372  All men have ratio by nature; virtuous, good men have a 
developed kind of ratio.  Nature gives ratio to humans, who must then realize it in its 
fullness (recta or perfecta ratio) through their own actions. 
This kind of description of ratio helps to explain why Cicero can simultaneously 
describe virtue as perfected ratio (perfecta ratio) and perfected nature (perfecta natura).  
Perfect ratio refers to an individual’s perfect understanding of the workings of nature, 
nature in its fullness, which is itself embodied in the idea of virtue.  Once a man 
comprehends virtue (via ratio) he is virtuous. 
When Philus calls Scipio’s knowledge a ratio he is suggesting that it is something 
natural, a rational method that leads towards virtue.  An ars need not lack virtue; good 
men practice and even create artes.  But an ars exists outside of the semantic field of 
nature, virtue and reason.  When someone like Sulpicius privileges ars over ratio the 
                                                
372 Compare also the association of ratio with ius in Leg. 1.33. 
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benefits of the former are erased.  Philus does not elide ratio.  On the contrary he sees 
that ars, when combined with ratio only further qualifies Scipio to speak on government.  
Scipio will speak well not because he refuses the idea of ars, but because ars rests on the 
natural foundation of ratio.373   
Interestingly, Philus does not offer gratia to Scipio during the course of his 
request, but to Laelius, in gratitude for the request that Laelius had made to Scipio (habeo 
maximam gratiam Laelio).374  This gratia again stands in contrast to Sulpicius.  Sulpicius 
had hoped to exchange gratia for knowledge; Philus receives nothing from Laelius but 
the virtuous selection of a speaker.  Unlike a commodity model of gratitude, Philus’ offer 
of gratia to Laelius shows that true gratia, inspired by virtue and other examples of 
gratia, need not operate dyadically.  True gratia involves all who appreciate and 
demonstrate virtue. 
 
 Laelius is again in the position of making a request in Cato Maior de Senectute, 
but this time he is partnered with Scipio in asking Cato to speak.  This is now the third 
dialogue in which the first request to speak has been made by two different individuals 
(Sulpicius and Antonius in De Orat.; Laelius and Philus in Rep.).  In the other dialogues, 
one requester knew how to make the request, while the other either did not or almost did 
not.  The pairing of requests here, as in the previous dialogues, ensures that the request 
will be made in the appropriate terms, that a communal request will prevail where an 
individual request might not.  It is actually Scipio who first asks for Cato to speak on old 
                                                
373 Crassus clearly has a knowledge of what could be called an ars of oratory as well. Antonius as much as 
says so in De Orat. 2.350-1. But, like Scipio, Crassus merely lets it inform, and not constitute, his speech. 
374 Rep. 1.37. 
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age.  His motivation, in his own words, is Cato’s perfecta sapientia, which has enabled 
him to bear old age better than all others (4).  Cato of course responds modestly, but 
follows the thread of Scipio’s request by emphasizing being wise and living in accord 
with nature as the keys for a person of any age.  This response is intriguing, but 
insufficient for Laelius, who, his appetite once whetted, wishes to hear more.  The 
danger, as shown in De Orat. and Rep. is that Laelius will offer gratia to Cato in 
exchange for a discussion of an ars of growing old.  What Laelius says instead is this: 
Atqui, Cato, gratissimum nobis, ut etiam pro Scipione pollicear, feceris, si, 
quoniam speramus, volumus quidem certe senes fieri, multo ante a te 
didicerimus, quibus facillime rationibus ingravescentem aetatem ferre 
possimus.375   
 
And Cato, we would give you the utmost gratia – if I may speak on 
Scipio’s behalf – if, as we hope and wish to become old men, we will have 
learned from you much earlier by what rationes we might most easily be 
able to bear the increasing burden of age. 
  
Where Sulpicius would have said ars and Philus ratio et quasi ars, Laelius limits himself 
to rationes.  The appeal for a ratio rather than an ars of growing old demonstrates 
Laelius’ understanding of the wisdom-motivated request of Scipio.  The language of ratio 
is the language of nature, of wisdom, and of virtue. 
 In Laelius de Amicitia, it is the lot of the pair of Scaevola and Fannius to turn the 
tables and to ask Laelius for his ideas on friendship.  The request is again two-headed, 
and again requires repeating before it is accepted.  At the moment of first request (16), 
Scaevola and Fannius offer Laelius gratia three times.  Their request, specifically, is for 
Laelius to tell them what he thinks about friendship, how he evaluates it, and what 
praecepta he would give (quid sentias, qualem existimes, quae praecepta des).  Laelius, 
                                                
375 Laelius 6. 
 
 202 
like Crassus, Scipio, and Cato before him, demurs with a modest claim of ignorance.  
Still, as Cato had done in Cato, Laelius does offer a short summary of his position, 
speaking briefly on the interdependence of virtue and friendship.  But he quickly 
concludes at 24 by telling his sons-in-law that he has expressed all he can, namely what 
he thinks (quid sentirem).  In fact, by giving his short discourse on virtue, Laelius has 
only satisfied the first part of the request (to tell quid sentias).  It still remains to say 
qualem existimes, quae praecepta des. 
 The first part of what remains again invokes existimatio, and appeals to a non-
commodified idea of friendship.  The request for precepts, on the other hand, is nothing 
more than a request for an ars of amicitia.  Both sides of the issue remain untouched, and 
so Scaevola and Fannius must speak again.  This time they use methods reminiscent of 
those employed by the several interlocutors at the end of De Orat. 2 (361-67).  They 
resort to flattery, insisting on the ease with which Laelius should speak on the topic, since 
he is such an expert.  The move is not the right one.  As it had to Crassus in the De Orat. 
this type of insistence requires Laelius to respond.  But he describes this method of 
request in no uncertain terms: vim hoc quidem est adferre (26).  Fannius’ and Scaevola’s 
request is a blunt instrument of gratia-guilt, intended to trap their father-in-law.   
In a Crassan response, Laelius parlays this misconstrual of gratia into a 
discussion of true friendship.  He opens his inevitable discussion by juxtaposing two 
definitions of friendship.  The first is characterized by mutual benefit, by the commodity-
oriented methods of exchange (dandis recipiendisque).376  He has, in fact, been reminded 
of this type of gratia by the way in which Fannius and Scaevola have sought to force him 
                                                
376 Laelius 26. 
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to speak.  The second type of amicitia is the one based on virtue, the one built on amor.  
It is antiquior et pulchrior et magis a natura ipsa profecta.  It is finally at this point that 
Laelius begins to address another part of the original request, passing over the 
praecepta/commodity request of Fannius and Scaevola and instead turning to a non-
commodified assessment of friendship.  That is, he answers the question qualem 
existimes.  He uses the inappropriate form of gratia employed by his sons-in-law as a foil 
for the reorientation of his discussion towards the vocabulary of true gratia: natura, 
existimatio, the maiores, and virtue. 
 Altogether the interlocutors of the dialogues present an understanding of gratia 
through their actions that is largely consistent with the theories they lay out in their 
speech.  By default, gratia is limited to a restricted group of aristocrats.  It defines itself 
through existimatio, and not through classification.  It can be dyadic, but it also regularly 
involves three or more people.  And, as implied by Laelius in Laelius 26 and Rep. 1.34, it 
benefits by reference to that which is antiquior, the maiores.  Most significantly, a 
Crassus, Scipio, or other exemplary interlocutor must avoid the kind of gratia that 
depends on, or is a tool of, exchange.  This kind of gratia closely adheres to the concept 
of ars in the social exchanges of the dialogues.  The right kind of gratia prefers ratio to 
ars.  Ratio is a product of nature, and closely related to virtue.  It is an appropriate 
inspiration for gratia that a quantified ars can never be. 
 
Cicero’s Practice of Gratia 
 The picture becomes a little more complicated when Cicero himself enters the 
frame.  For, besides being a character in his dialogues, Cicero is also author, and his 
 
 204 
dialogues are themselves tools in his own negotiation with society.  Cicero carries out his 
negotiations in two ways.  In the first place he can flatter, offend, compliment, or censure 
certain individuals by the inclusion and characterization of living and historical figures 
within the dialogues.  Secondly, and perhaps more significantly, he can use the texts 
themselves as gifts which can physically manifest the giving or receiving of gratia.  The 
treatment of the text itself acquires a new significance in its role as gift.  By using his 
texts in specific ways Cicero can either undercut or reaffirm the theories of gratia which 
he expresses in the words and actions of the characters. 
The first immediate threat to Cicero’s theory is the very treatment of the texts as 
things.  We looked earlier at the distinction between gift-exchange and commodity-
exchange as explained by Matthew Roller.  Integral to the distinction is the emphasis 
placed on objects in commodity-exchange.  “Things” are often nothing more than 
commodities.  In the theory and practice of the interlocutors we have seen that Cicero 
regularly disavows the use of commodoties and precise measurements in his expressions 
of ideal gratia.  So when Cicero uses his texts as things, he must avoid treating them as 
fundamental to the processes of social interaction.  He does so primarily through 
employing instead the processes of gift-exchange, a specific and tangible subset of the 
broader ethic of gratia. 
 Though he never describes his idealized construction of gratia in these terms, 
Cicero, as we have seen, essentially argues for gift-exchange against commodity-
exchange.  The former involves things in relationships, the latter privileges only things.  
The former in general concentrates on the generation and extension of social ties, while 
the latter only uses society as a backdrop from which to operate.  But Cicero’s theory and 
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the interlocutors’ practice agrees with the model of gift-exchange only through a tightly 
defined understanding of “gift-debt.”  For Cicero the gift-debt and subsequent relative 
lowering of social position are in fact something more like ‘virtue-debts.’  That is, the 
receiver of a gift does not owe a gift back to the giver so much as he will, if he is a good 
man, recognize the example of virtue that the giver has set.  This demonstration of virtue 
by the giver highlights for the receiver his own comparative lack of virtue, and inspires 
him to perform a virtuous act in imitation of the giver.  This second act of virtue usually 
redounds to the benefit of the original giver, but, as in the case of Scipio, Laelius, and 
Philus in Rep., it can also be ‘paid forward,’ so to speak.  That is, the first receiver can 
perform a virtuous act not only in the requital of a gift, but in the giving of a gift to 
another.   
The “virtue-debt” as I am describing it deemphasizes exchange even relative to 
the typical gift-exchange model. The dedication and gifting of texts defines and regulates 
the pre-commercial literary market of republican Rome.  Joy Connolly explores the terms 
of a literary, gift-exchange friendship which only slightly predates Cicero’s dialogues, the 
relationship between Catullus and Mallius as exhibited in Catullus 68.  Connolly 
particularly notes that the friendship between the two men is embedded in a literary 
relationship, and that Mallius has called upon Catullus to write something in response to 
a letter that Mallius himself has written to Catullus.  As Connolly explains, “Mallius calls 
on Catullus to take his turn in the obligatory exchange of amicable duties that the poet 
calls officium, and in doing so he casts amicitia explicitly as a social economy governed 
by a law, a law that has to do with sentiment, to be sure, but that is a law all the same.”377 
                                                
377 Connolly (2008) 177. 
 
 206 
The “virtue-debt” process described above, wherein virtue is the only motivation for 
exchange, does not attain to this same level of “economy” and legality which Connolly 
has observed in Catullus 68.  As a rough contemporary of Catullus, Cicero was certainly 
acting under similar social constraints, similar officia to the ones governing the exchange 
in 68, but his ideal of social interaction in the dialogues even abjures the laws of text-for-
text.  The story is different for Off.  There Cicero explicitly approves of methods of gift-
exchange which insulate and benefit the aristocracy.  The “virtue-debt” model maintains 
many of the functions of this kind of gift-exchange, but in the end depends upon a shared 
appreciation of virtue rather than, for example, similar political goals or “shared literary 
values.”378  Failure to observe either a gift debt or a virtue debt can lead to the dissolution 
of social bonds and the fracturing of the social apparatus, but the virtue debt does not, 
like the gift debt, grant a social superiority to a specific creditor if it goes unpaid.  A 
virtue debt is a debt which takes the society more generally as a creditor.  As such it’s 
socially generative force depends in large part on the natural (and hence virtuous) quality 
of community.  In the following section I will analyze Cicero’s strategies of exchange 
within the dialogues.  I will attempt to demonstrate that these strategies more closely 
resemble gift-exchange than commodity-exchange, and that they even aspire to the sort 
of virtue-exchange that privileges the abstract of community over the one-to-one 
relationships of gift-exchange. 
 First we may turn again to Catullus, to observe strategies of exchange presnt in a 
contemporary of Cicero.  In carmen 1, Catullus balances his own libellus with the 
antiquarian histories of Nepos.  The textual tradition makes it impossible to identify with 
                                                




certainty which of Catullus’ poems actually belonged in the libellus, but it is very likely 
that the carmina docta, including 68, did not.  The exchange of 1 reflects a principle 
similar to the one observed by Connolly in 68, an exchange showing the social viability 
of a one-for-one exchange of texts.   
Carmen 14 memorably inverts the idea of text exchange when Catullus receives a 
book of bad poetry from Calvus.  His response is to show his “thanks” by repaying 
Calvus in kind.  The relationship is an ironic mirror of the relationship of carmen 1.  But 
in the midst of the Calvus-Catullus exchange, Catullus sandwiches a comment on Calvus’ 
cliens.  He (again jokingly) concludes that Calvus’ gifted book of poems is so bad that it 
must itself be a gift from a cliens showing his gratia.  Here Catullus highlights a second 
type of exchange (text for service), suggesting that texts need not be exchanged only for 
texts, though here the giver and receiver are of different social status.   
In carmen 42, the exchange value of a text is upset when a moecha turpis steals 
and refuses to return some of Catullus’ poems.  The unpermitted, free circulation of 
Catullus’ poetry threatens to undermine not only those poems, but any other gift of 
poems he should give.379   
Finally, in carmen 49, Catullus offers a poem to Cicero himself.  Here he both 
gives thanks (gratias) to Cicero and creates a contrast between Cicero and himself.  
According to the famous conclusion of the poem, Catullus is a pessimus poeta, Cicero is 
the optimus patronus omnium (49.5-7).  By a literal reading the poem seems to instantiate 
                                                
379 Cf. the situation of Cicero in relation to the In Curionem. As addressed in Att. 3.12, the promulgation of 
the text without Cicero’s permission worried him, but he hoped the speech’s lack of finish would allow him 
to pass it off as a forgery. Cf. also Att. 13.21a, where Cicero criticizes Atticus for giving Balbus a copy of 




or at least acknowledge a great social divide between Catullus and Cicero, but an ironic 
reading of the poem is in many ways more tempting.  D.F. Thomson hypothesizes that 
Catullus’ short poem is in response to the text of a poem from Cicero.380  Whether or not 
he is right, Catullus’ entire description of Cicero makes no mention of Cicero as a poet.  
So, either Catullus is balancing his little poem against a large one of Cicero, or he is at 
the very least excluding Cicero from the designation poet.  In these terms the poem is by 
no means grateful, and the very size of the poem belies Catullus’ claim to give Cicero 
maximas gratias (49.4). 
 Catullus’ poetry in general seems to aim largely at the least at a reevaluation of 
traditional principles.381  His ideas of text exchange are no exception.382  He balances 
short and personal with long and national in carmen 1; he inverts typical motives for 
exchange in carmen 14 and mocks the failed efforts of a cliens; and, in carmen 49 he 
undermines a gift he has received even as he claims to give gratia for it.  His techniques 
show him to critique traditional text exchange even as he practices it.  Traditional 
exchange creates a network of writers; Catullus inscribes himself into that network and 
then ridicules several of the permutations by which it is sometimes practiced.383  Cicero 
in the dialogues inscribes himself into a similar network, but tries more actively to 
preserve that network at all costs in the face of a republican government that was 
                                                
380 Thomson (1967) 225-30. 
381 Though cf. Connolly (2008) 176 (and much of her fourth chapter). She makes a strong claim that 
Catullus’ poetry, instead of attempting to overthrow traditional morality, relies on it as the condition for the 
“legibility” of his poetry. I tend to agree with this approach. So while I discuss here Catullus’ new twists on 
old ideas, I do not necessarily observe therein Catullus’ rejection of the old ideas. 
382 Catullus, of course, also describes other types of exchange and giving in his poems, but it is only the 
specific characteristics of text exchange that interest me here. 
383 I do not wish to comment on Catullus’ motives, only to describe his methods. 
 
 209 
becoming increasingly individualized, where power was increasingly concentrated in the 
hands of single persons. 
 Cicero makes use of the dynamics of textual exchange in several different genres.  
Among his speeches, none is more concerned with these dynamics than Pro Archia, 
where a finely crafted epideictic text means to inspire a reciprocal text from the 
defendant.384  But it is Cicero’s letters and dialogues that exploit these dynamics most 
thoroughly.  He sets his precedent in the proem to the first dialogue, De Orat., when he 
frames the situation for his writing.  He commits the text to his brother, and claims to 
write it in response to Quintus’ explicit request (1.4-5).  According to Cicero, Quintus 
had requested something politius perfectiusque to replace Cicero’s earlier rhetorical 
treatise, De Inventione, a work which had “slipped out” of Cicero’s notes into publication 
(ex commentariolis nostris… exciderunt).  According to this picture, the De Orat. fills 
two needs.  In the first place it responds to a request by Quintus; in the second place it is 
something refined, something meant for circulation in a way De Inventione had not been.  
When combined, these two points express Cicero’s belief that a dedication to someone 
(here Quintus) marks a text as worthy of circulation.  That is, a private dedication and 
exchange implicitly qualifies a text for broader circulation.  And a private dedication, in 
its turn, expects an existing relationship.  So then a private personal relationship allows 
for a public exhibition.385  As Cicero responds to it, Quintus’ request functionally 
substitutes for a request from the general reading audience. 
                                                
384 On the dynamics of this relationship, the specific features of the text to which Cicero hopes Archias will 
respond, and the epideictic character of the speech, see Dugan (2005) Ch.1. 
385 In this case the private relationship is further buttressed by the ongoing disagreement about oratory that 
Cicero uses as a frame for the dialogue (1.5). 
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 At the same time, Quintus’ request succeeds because, like Antonius will in the 
narrative of the dialogue, Quintus phrases his question in the right terms.  The De 
Inventione, that text of Cicero’s youth unworthy for publication, had failed by following 
the traditional form of a Greek rhetorical treatise (techne): it was an ars.  Quintus’ correct 
appraisal of this earlier shortcoming is central to Cicero’s approval of his brother’s 
request.  Quintus, like Antonius, expects something more than an ars.  As a result, in 
return for his request is a dialogue that believes elegance to be “established on the artes 
of the most sophisticated men.”386  The shift is a subtle, but extremely important one.  
Artes are a foundation for eloquence only when they belong to the eruditissimi homines.  
As May and Wisse observe, “the well-known triad, theory, natural ability, and practice 
stands in the background” of Cicero’s statement, but he has blended the triad into a 
synthesized unity.387  Quintus, by asking for something beyond the ars of De Inventione, 
has his request met in the form of the combination of ars with wisdom. 
 It is notable that Cicero’s dialogue comes in response to a request alone, and 
never entails upon Quintus that he write something in return.  It is a request-text 
exchange more akin to the request-discussion exchange observed within the dialogues 
than to, for example, the exchange between Catullus and Nepos, or even Atticus and 
Cicero.  Quintus is, in fact, a different kind of dedicatee, and is not even the sole 
dedicatee.  In the proem to book 3, Cicero gives a second dedication, an in memoriam to 
Crassus: “Even if it is in no way equal to his talent, yet for my devotion, I dedicate this to 
                                                
386 De Orat. 1.5: eruditissimorum hominum artibus eloquentiam contineri statuam. 




him, a pledge of gratia well-deserved and owed.”388  This kind of pledge resembles the 
memorials discussed in chapter 3, but, as so often for Cicero, memoria here is linked to 
gratia.  It is the faculty by which gratia becomes intergenerational.  This kind of 
dedication, like the one to Quintus, still differs from the reciprocal dedications of 
Catullus.  This first dialogue, with its twofold semi-dedications is only hinting at its own 
physicality.  When it functions as an item of exchange, it is unconcerned with receiving 
or having received an item.  It instead responds to the impetuses of conversation and 
memorialization. 
 This style of exchange reappears in the dedications of several later dialogues, but 
it also begins to alternate with a text-text type of exchange.389  So, Tusc. Disp. and the 
Orator both find Cicero writing when asked, as in De Orat.390  In Brutus, Fin., the 
Topica, and, to a certain extent Cato and the Acad., on the other hand, the dialogues show 
a greater textual self-awareness as they move to a more specific gift-exchange type of 
dedication.391  These are two methods of exchange that seem to stand in contrast to one 
another, at least potentially.  The text-for-text gift-exchange model threatens to come 
very close to the commodity ideas that the request model strictly abjures with its 
                                                
388 De Orat. 3.14: ei, si nequaquam parem illius ingenio, at pro nostro tamen studio meritam gratiam 
debitamque referamus. 
389 All of the post-exile rhetorica and philosophica of Cicero contain dedications except for Leg., which 
was never published, and Rep., of which the first several paragraphs are missing. The rest of the texts a). 
exhibit one of the two models of exchange presented here, b). mention a dedicatee only in passing, or c). 
have a presumptive dedicatee as the main interlocutor.  For examples of b)., note that Cicero mentions 
Atticus by name in Laelius 2 and Brutus by name in DND 1.1, but never fully explains his reasons for 
writing. As both of these figures receive dedications elsewhere, though, the reasons can be extrapolated. 
For c)., cf. Fin.ato and Div., where Hirtius and Quintus respectively are the only figures besides Cicero 
mentioned. Though they are presented as interlocutors, the dialogues fashion themselves as some sort of 
extension of a prior relationship. 
390 Cf. also Leg. 1.10, where Cicero the character responds to the request of Atticus for him to write a 
history. This request, if the historical Atticus ever actually made it, was never fulfilled. 
391 Though in general I exclude the treatises, as they do not demonstrate many of the formal characteristics 
of dialogues, I include them here as comparanda because they do, like the dialogues, contain dedications. 
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disapproval of ars.  In practice, however, Cicero’s use of both styles succeeds in 
rehabilitating the text-text model.  Because the dedicatees of text-text exchange also 
appear as dedicatees in request-text exchanges, Cicero never has to balance one of his 
texts with one of his dedicatee’s text in a specific one-for-one relationship.   
In the previous chapter we observed that memoria can often pluralize a 
relationship, so that, for instance, Cicero can access Furius either through their mutual 
acquaintance Cotta or simply through his own memory.  So memory makes a network out 
of a direct line.  The two different types of exchange suggest that gratia works in the 
same way.  The text-text exchange runs the risk of establishing an insulated, 
commodified, and potentially terminal dyadic relationship.  But the repeated dedications 
to the same people, coupled with a model of request-text exchange and dual dedications 
in single works, multiplies the cords that bind Cicero to his dedicatees and generates a 
forward-looking network of relationships.  Cicero can respond to the gift of a text with 
appropriate gratia and still avoid the populist model of commercial exchange he finds so 
destabilizing to the republic. 
 In Tusc. Disp. and the Orator, where Cicero responds to requests, it is Brutus to 
whom he responds.392  The Orator begins with Cicero debating with himself whether or 
not he has the capability to compose the treatise in response to Brutus’ request.393  
Naturally he capitulates in the end, and when he does so, he gives two reasons.  In the 
first place, Brutus is persistent.  As Cicero says, he writes quoniam me saepius rogas, 
using a present tense verb which suggests that the requests continue up until the time of 
                                                
392 On the historical relationship between Cicero and Brutus, see Welch (1998) and Douglas (1966) xvii-
xxii. 
393 Orator 1: Utrum difficilius aut maius esset negare tibi saepius idem roganti an efficere id quod rogares 
diu multumque, Brute, dubitavi. 
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the Orator’s composition (1).  And secondly, Cicero says, he would rather be seen to lack 
prudentia than benevolentia.  The specific terms of Brutus’ request, repeated as it is, are 
never explicitly revealed, but they do inspire in Cicero a demonstration of benevolentia, 
one of the communal virtues. 
 In Tusc. Disp., Cicero again writes at Brutus’ behest.  The request is again not 
specific, and this time is not even overtly textual.  Cicero simply says that he returns to 
philosophical study with Brutus’ encouragement (te hortante).394  But as with the Orator 
the request is only half of Cicero’s motivation.  He also composes Tusc. Disp. “since the 
system and learning of all artes is joined together with the pursuit of wisdom, i.e., 
philosophy.”395  Such a statement is a sort of manifesto for Cicero the philosopher; it 
generally summarizes his method for his rhetorica and philosophica; it might equally be 
found in a speech of Crassus in De Orat.  As much as they demonstrate the synthesized 
interchange of the interlocutors, Cicero’s dialogues attempt to forge a unity between the 
notions of ars and sapientia.396  What makes the re-expression of this motif the more 
relevant here is its pairing with the request of Brutus.  A response to Brutus’ request, both 
here and in the Orator, also happens to be a demonstration of virtue.  This coincidence 
gives the impression that the response to Brutus’ request actually is the demonstration of 
virtue.  This impression is, in turn, possible because Cicero’s Brutus has apparently asked 
in the right way: the right response to the right question is virtuous.  The coupling of 
Brutus’ requests with impetuses to virtue (benevolentia, ars cum sapientia) establishes 
correct executions of the request-text exchange model squarely on the side of virtue. 
                                                
394 Tusc. Disp. 1.1: rettuli me, Brute, te hortante maxime ad ea studia. 
395 Ibid: cum omnium artium … ratio et disciplina studio sapientiae, quae philosophia dicitur, contineretur 
….  
396 Cf. the balancing of honestum with utile in Off. 
 
 214 
The key to the request-text exchange is a prior personal relationship.  It is this 
kind of relationship that equips the asker to know how to ask in the right terms.  For 
Brutus and Cicero this relationship not only predates the writing of Tusc. Disp. and the 
Orator, it actually makes a textual appearance, albeit in a different form, in Brutus.  
Brutus, as the first of Cicero’s dialogues of the forties, in some ways sets the stage for the 
dialogues to follow.  The political scene had, of course, shifted considerably since the 
Leg., and especially since the last dialogue with a dedication, De Orat.  By 46, Caesar’s 
power was approaching its zenith, and the traditional republic its nadir.  According to his 
own claims in the dialogue, Cicero wrote Brutus in such a context as a tribute to 
Hortensius, a figure whose death in part symbolized the dying of the republic.  But 
Brutus is hardly a defeatist text.397  On the contrary, it inaugurates a period of prolific 
writing in Cicero’s life – a period that takes a philosophical turn at the death of Tullia – in 
which writing substitutes for oratory as his medium for civic involvement and influence.  
Brutus does look to the past in much of its content, but its form does not accept the 
republic’s decline and uses its own physicality, and in turn its exchangeability, to look 
forward to the republic’s rehabilitation. 
Brutus has no formal preface with a formal dedication, which means that any self-
awareness in the dialogue must be metatextual.  And indeed, after a short laudatio for 
Hortensius, Brutus begins to show both an awareness of other texts and an awareness of 
itself as a text (11-20).  As the dramatic action of the dialogue gets underway, featuring 
Cicero, Atticus, and Brutus, Cicero the interlocutor welcomes his guests with a request 
for news.  Atticus in response immediately insists on a rule that will guide much of the 
                                                
397 I do not deny the sense of gloom that Narducci, Dugan, et al. have perceived in the dialogue, but the 
dialogue, as I will argue, though perhaps anticipating defeat, does not accept it. 
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remainder of the dialogue: no talk of politics.  He is worried that such talk will only 
distress Cicero, when in fact he and Brutus have come to cheer him.  Cicero in return 
assures Atticus that any words from him and Brutus can only bring cheer.  As proof of his 
claim Cicero tells Atticus that it was the litterae sent to him by both Brutus and Atticus 
that had recalled him to writing after a period of literary inactivity.398  He goes on to 
describe these litterae as a delectatio and a source of salus, comparing them to the 
Roman victory at Nola in the second Punic war as sources of hope after a series of grave 
defeats (12-13).  Cicero could not be more fulsome in his praise for these letters because, 
as his argument implicitly goes, they made him write again and in writing was his 
salvation.  Here at the beginning of his second wave of dialogue-writing, such an 
emphasis on the written word is striking. 
But while writing alone could accomplish Cicero’s “salvation” in several ways, 
including the encouragement contained within writing or the therapeutic or cognitive 
value of the act of writing, Cicero puts his emphasis on the physicality of that which is 
written.  It is actually Brutus who takes the first step in this direction, when he asks 
Cicero to be more specific about the litterae of Atticus (14).  Cicero clarifies by assuring 
Brutus he is speaking of the Liber Annalis, which he now names a liber.  The Liber 
Annalis, as its name implies, was an annalistic history written by Atticus and dedicated to 
Cicero, which must have been published only shortly before Brutus.  That Brutus 
suspects this to be the text to which Cicero refers shows that he, too, has read it.  Brutus’ 
letter, meanwhile, seems to have been his treatise De Virtute, which Atticus in his turn 
                                                
398 Brut. 11: Vos vero, inquam, Attice, et praesentem me cura levatis et absenti magna solacia dedistis. nam 
vestris primum litteris recreatus me ad pristina studia revocavi. Rep. had been the last thing circulated by 
Cicero (cf. 19), though it is likely that the writing of Leg. intervened. 
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admits to having read (11).399  It too is dedicated to Cicero.  So then, the texts that have 
inspired Cicero to return to writing do so not only through their content, but through their 
function as gifts to him.  And, as was the case with De Orat. but not with De Inventione, 
the existence of a dedication marks the texts as worthy to be read by a broader audience.  
To put it another way, even though both texts are dedicated to Cicero, Brutus and Atticus 
are linked to one another because of their mutual reading of each other’s letters.  More 
than this, the dialogue itself pluralizes Cicero’s relationships, so that he is not simply part 
of two dyadic relationships, but part of a network. 
Cicero calls attention to the gifted-ness of his friends’ letters so that he may call 
attention to his own responsibilities as writer and giver.400  He intends to respond to both 
gifts and uses the dialogue to bear witness to his plans.  Cicero first deals with Atticus, 
and the Liber Annalis, when he promises to repay Atticus for his gift.  The passage (15-
16) is too long to quote in full, but the central ideas are a). that Cicero owes a debt, and 
b). that he cannot repay it.401  Though Cicero’s language and Atticus’ response are 
peppered with the language of gratia, Brutus picks up on the debt language and threatens 
to enforce payment as Atticus’ procurator.  All three interlocutors then begin to talk in 
terms of debt, payment, pledge, and demand (17-18).  Finally Atticus, in exchange for 
Brutus’ intervention on his behalf, offers to serve as Brutus’ procurator in recovering the 
                                                
399 Hendrickson (Loeb, 1939) 6, first proposes the De Virtute as the letter in question, and is followed by 
Douglas (1966) xi. De Virtute apparently expressed the Stoic doctrine that virtue alone is sufficient for a 
happy life. 
400 Narducci (1997) suggests that the discussion of gifts and debts in Brutus 18 plays off of the Atticus’ 
reputation as a meticulous accountant and banker. 
401 Among the phrases that point to payment are: teque remunerandum si non pari, at grato tamen 
munere… eadem mensura reddere iubet qua acceperis… nec enim ex novis, ut agricolae solent, fructibus 
est unde tibi reddam quod accepi… quod ita diligenter colemus, ut impendiis etiam augere possimus 
largitatem tui muneris. Throughout the passage farming provides a fitting analog to the idea of repayment, 
with Cicero’s mind the field, himself the farmer, and his ideas the crop. This analogy recalls the description 
in Fin. where Cicero recommends the imitation of the fields, which give back more than they receive. 
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debt that Cicero owes to him (Brutus).  The letters of Atticus and Brutus have by this 
point become entirely conceptualized as objects, and the language, introduced by Cicero 
himself, is fully that of commodity.  But before Cicero has a chance to respond or even to 
promise a specific object in return, Atticus moves the conversation towards the topic at 
hand, the history of rhetoric. 
In fact, Cicero the interlocutor does not need to respond because Cicero the author 
is doing so in the very act of writing.  This exchange in sections 11-18 replaces the 
preface with a formal dedication seen elsewhere.  As Hendrickson has argued, Brutus 
itself is the text with which Cicero repays Brutus.402  Or, more specifically it is a text 
with which Brutus is repaid.  After all, Cicero will go on to dedicate not only Tusc. Disp. 
and the Orator to Brutus, but Fin. as well.403  What Cicero frames as a commodity-
exchange in the opening of Brutus turns out to be a much more complex relationship.  He 
gives many texts to repay the one, even making specific reference to De Virtute at Fin. 
1.8 and Tusc. Disp. 5.1.  And at the same time, the gifts of Tusc. Disp. and the Orator are 
framed as coming in response to requests, so that Brutus and Cicero’s relationship is 
never discharged by a text-for-text exchange.  It is rather cemented through many types 
of action and reaction. 
Likewise, Cicero does not dedicate Brutus to Brutus alone.  Though Hendrickson 
wants to see Atticus repaid by some later work of Cicero, there is little reason given by 
the text itself to suppose that he is any less a recipient of the text than Brutus.404  The title 
                                                
402 Hendrickson (1939) 405n4. 
403 As in Brutus, Cicero cites De Virtute as his inspiration for the writing of Fin.: quamquam a te ipso id 
quidem facio provocatus gratissimo mihi libro, quem ad me de virtute misisti (1.8). 
404 Hendrickson (1939) never allows Atticus as a dedicatee. Douglas (1966) ad 16 suggests it as one 
possible option. The name of the dialogue naturally suggests that Brutus  
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of course does take its name from Brutus, and the character Brutus dominates the 
dialogue’s conclusion; both factors point to him as chief dedicatee.  But the very fact that 
the early part of the dialogue is so concerned with textual exchange coupled with the fact 
that Cicero never names one specific dedicatee suggests that Brutus, even were he first 
recipient, was not the text’s only recipient.  What Cicero does say explicitly is that he is 
inspired to return to writing by the letters of both Atticus and Brutus, and that he “owes” 
each of them.  This first foray of Cicero’s back into writing, by acknowledging his 
indebtedness to both of his friends, implies that the dialogue seeks to satisfy both of them 
in some way.  When he identifies Brutus and Atticus as readers of each other’s litterae he 
suggests a certain relationship between the two, mediated by himself.  The dual 
dedication of the single dialogue then reinforces an affinity between the two.  Like the 
dedication of several dialogues to Brutus, this dedication of one dialogue to two people 
undermines the commodity-exchange ideas hinted at in the conversation of 11-18.  
Brutus cannot be an item in a one-for-one exchange because it is only one-half of a 
dedicated item itself.   
In addition, Atticus, like Brutus, is the dedicatee of other Ciceronian texts.405  
These repeated dedications to Atticus and Brutus should come as no surprise to the reader 
of Brutus.  Before the misleading discussion of debt and payment takes the stage, the true 
                                                
405 Atticus is the dedicatee of Laelius and Cato. Cf. Cato 1: Sed mihi, cum de senectute vellem aliquid 
scribere, tu occurrebas dignus eo munere, quo uterque nostrum communiter uteretur. Mihi quidem ita 
iucunda huius libri confecto fuit, ut non modo omnis absterserit senectutis molestias, sed effecerit mollem 
etiam et iucundam senectutem. Cicero notes two benefits to the writing of Cato in this dedication. In the 
first place it is a munus for Atticus. In the second place, the process of writing alleviates Cicero’s care. 
Thus they are able to enjoy the text communiter. Cicero paints a picture of growing circles of influence for 
the text. Originally it consoled him personally; by dedicating it to Atticus he shared the consolation with a 
friend; and finally, the very ascription of a dedication marked the text as worthy of circulation, expanding 
the circle even more broadly. It is further proof that, no matter how introspective or personal his writings 
claim to be, Cicero’s dialogues are always looking outward.   
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role of the litterae of Atticus and Brutus is contained in their inspiration to Cicero to 
return to his studia.  His true motivation in dedicating texts to his friends has far less to 
do with repayment than in responding in gratitude to this inspiration.  Since his studia 
occupy all of his works, it is not out of place for him to dedicate any (or many) of them to 
Brutus or Atticus.   
So the situation outlined by the three interlocutors of Brutus as they talk, in which 
texts are commodities to be used to pay and repay, does not correspond to Cicero’s 
methods at all.  His text exchanges are not dyadic; they do not take into consideration 
only other texts; and they do not terminate through the giving of one text.  Instead they 
involve several parties; they respond to inspiration and request; and they carry over from 
one text to another. 
Before looking briefly at the other dialogues dedicated to Atticus and Brutus, it is 
worth taking note of the dedicatee of Brutus who wasn’t: Caesar.  Like Atticus and 
Brutus, Caesar had recently dedicated a text to Cicero, De Analogia, whose subject was 
Latinitas.  Unlike Atticus and Brutus, Caesar’s text does not appear until section 253, as 
the end of the discussion draws near.  The discussion of Caesar violates the established 
rules that Cicero will only speak about the dead and that the conversation will steer clear 
of politics.  Nevertheless, Brutus shows an interest in hearing about Caesar.  But instead 
of complying with Brutus himself Cicero shifts the burden of discussing Caesar to 
Atticus (251).  Because of the dual role of Cicero as author and interlocutor there is a sort 
of sleight of hand at work in such a shift.  Cicero manages to use Atticus as a way of 
pretending to observe his relationship with Caesar from the outside.  In the course of 
Atticus’ description of Caesar the orator he comes to Caesar’s Latinity, and hence De 
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Analogia.  He then repeats Caesar’s dedication to Cicero verbatim. The dedication cannot 
help but recall the litterae of 11.  But whereas those texts had taken virtue and traditional 
Roman history as their subjects, Caesar’s treatise concerned itself with providing rules to 
govern correct Latin usage as a way of democratizing the language.406  Among other 
things De Analogia, by prescribing fixed rules for Latin, was Caesar’s effort to 
marginalize the traditional language usage of the aristocracy and to erase social divisions 
engendered by language.  In this way the ideology closely resembled that of commodity-
exchange, which theoretically grants equal access to everyone wishing to participate in 
exchange.  Needless to say, it did not inspire Cicero to return to his studia; it was the very 
type of thing that had kept him from them.407  And in fact it keeps him from his studies 
even here, where Atticus takes over the discussion and the digression on Caesar interrupts 
the progress of the dialogue. 
Because of the differences between De Analogia and the litterae of Brutus and 
Atticus, Cicero responds in a whole new way.  In the first place he does not dedicate a 
text to him, much less this text.  He thereby excludes Caesar from this network.  Still, he 
cannot very well ignore Caesar’s dedication.  So, after exploring the sincerity of Caesar’s 
dedication (just quoted by Atticus), Cicero instructs Atticus to continue on with his 
discussion of Caesar in very particular words: Sed perge, Pomponi, de Caesare et redde 
quae restant (“But go on about Caesar, Atticus, and repay what is left to repay.”).408  The 
payment language of 15-18 is revisited here, but this time without qualification.  On the 
                                                
406 For more on Caesar’s goals and the disagreement between Cicero and Caesar on Latinitas, see Dugan 
(2005) 177-89. 
407 Cf. Brut. 262: sanos quidem homines a scribendo deterruit. The topic here is the writing of history, but 
the sentiment sounds almost gnomic given Cicero’s foregoing period of literary inactivity. 
408 Brut. 258. 
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one hand, Atticus must simply finish up the discussion of Caesar.  But at the same time, 
by reintroducing this commodity language, Cicero is having Atticus repay the debt he has 
incurred to Caesar through the dedication.409  Cicero is playing by the type of rules 
Caesar laid down in De Analogia, acknowledging a debt by including Caesar in this 
discussion.  At the same time Cicero shifts this type of activity from his own character to 
Atticus, and he removes it far in the dialogue from his dedicatory preface.  In fact Cicero 
uses a contrast in dedication styles to show that the commodity method of Caesar is 
greatly inferior to the many-tiered methods of exchange he himself prefers.  Caesar 
becomes a sort of anti-dedicatee, whose presence late in the dialogue serves most of all to 
mark his absence at its beginning. 
So far, then we have seen three and a half dedicatees, and one individual 
specifically excluded.  In all cases Cicero claims to be at least partially motivated by 
either a text or a request to which he is responding.  It also seems to be the case, based 
largely on Cicero’s own statements in the preface and epilogue of Brutus, that Atticus 
and Brutus offered distinct advantages as dedicatees.  Atticus, as author of Liber Annalis, 
was a backwards-looking figure.  A dedication to Atticus in a Ciceronian dialogue links 
that very dialogue to the project of annalistic historiography.  It grounds the dialogue in 
tradition, so that the dialogue can establish a connection to the past.  A dedication to 
Atticus in Brutus makes sense in these terms, since the dialogue’s own project is largely 
historical.  Likewise, Atticus is the dedicatee of Cato, which not only deals with Atticus 
                                                
409 Atticus functions here again as a procurator, but he is the agent on behalf of the debtor here (Cicero) 
and not the creditor (Brutus), as before.  He is therefore not an additional member in the group, but a 
representative of one member, Cicero, in a two-way exchange. There is certainly no reference to Caesar 
having read Atticus. 
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and Cicero’s own inexorable slide into the past, but invokes the most ancient of all the 
figures in the dialogues, Cato, as chief interlocutor.410 
Brutus serves the complementary role as dedicatee.  Whereas Atticus gives Cicero 
access to the past, Brutus is Cicero’s link to the future.  Cicero says as much at the 
conclusion of Brutus (332).  The dual dedication of Brutus works all the better when 
these temporal roles of Atticus and Brutus are taken into consideration.  The dialogue is 
both backward- and forward-looking, a union of past and present symbolized both in 
Atticus and Brutus’ mutual readings of each other’s texts and in the intermediary figure 
of Cicero himself.  Though none of the other texts dedicated to Brutus focus as explicitly 
on his future promise as does his eponymous dialogue, Brutus’ role as forward-looking 
dedicatee is reinforced by the fact that most of the dialogues dedicated to him occur in the 
recent present, and never do any of them extend into the past beyond the 70s.411  So for 
the works of Cicero’s second period of writing Brutus and Atticus function in much the 
same way as do Quintus and Crassus in De Orat..  They look both to the past and future, 
and do it all in the context of a close personal relationship with Cicero, which is the 
foundation for the public reorientation of a private text. 
The only two complications to this repeatedly established network come in 
Cicero’s Topica and the Academica.  These texts stand out both because of the identities 
of their dedicatees and because of references to them in Cicero’s correspondence.  The 
Acad. has already been discussed in the previous chapter in relation to Varro as 
                                                
410 Laelius, the other dialogue dedicated to Atticus, focuses little on the actual dedication. Cicero really 
only addresses Atticus once, in passing. That one mention, however, does ask Atticus to use his memoria to 
recall what he had heard in his youth about the scene of the dialogue. And of course the scene itself is set in 
the past, a further hint at the past-orientation of Atticus the dedicatee. 
411 Fin. 5 is set in 79, Nat. Deor. seems to have been set in the mid-70s (cf. Dyck [2003] 7), and the rest 
during the late 50s and 40s. 
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interlocutor, but, as so often, Varro does double duty in the dialogue as dedicatee.  Like 
Brutus, the Acad. has no formal preface with a formal dedication.  Instead, as in Brutus, 
the action of the dialogue begins when Cicero starts to ask Varro of politics only to have 
Atticus insist he not (1.2-3).  The conversation turns to Varro’s own activities, and it is 
here that Varro makes first reference to his own text (De Lingua Latina).  He tells Atticus 
and Cicero that he is hard at work on polishing his treatise, dedicated to Cicero and – as  
Cicero himself claims – promised long ago.  That is where the dedication ends; and it is 
from Varro to Cicero, not the other way around.  The implication that Cicero is 
dedicating the text at hand to Varro (a fact unknowable at the time of the fictional 
conversation) is plausible, considering the similar situation in Brutus.  But in addition to 
this probability, Cicero confirms his dedication in his letters to Atticus.   
The thirteenth book of Cicero’s epistulae ad Atticum, as we have seen, closely 
chronicles the requests of Varro for inclusion in Cicero’s new literary projects and 
Cicero’s own responses.412  Of greatest interest is Att. 13.12 where Varro has again 
requested inclusion in a project of Cicero’s.413  As in Acad., Cicero makes reference to 
Varro’s own promise of a work dedicated to him (Cicero) and his slowness in 
accomplishing it.  Cicero even quotes the same line of Hesiod that he had quoted in 
Brutus 15 to say he would have been more than happy to repay Varro had his dedication 
ever actually been made.  But faced with a delayed dedication and this renewed request, 
Cicero determines to acquiesce anyway.  His method of acquiescence seems to belie his 
sincerity in some of his other dedications, especially Fin..  Rather than writing a new 
work with Varro in mind Cicero purposes to “transfer” (transferamus) one of his already 
                                                
412 The first request comes in Att. 4.16, but it is book 13 which moves towards the specifics of dedication. 
413 On Varro’s request, see also Att. 13.13-19. 
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completed, but not yet published works to Varro.  Two texts fit the bill (Fin. and Acad.), 
but as Atticus had already urged Cicero to dedicate Fin. to Brutus, the Acad. is all that 
remains. 
Cicero’s tone in this letter differs somewhat from the one he uses in his 
dedications.  The dedication of Fin. to Brutus, colored as a response to Brutus’ De 
Virtute, proves to be only an arbitrarily selected work with no personal relation to its 
dedicatee.  And even after Cicero decides to dedicate the Acad. to Varro he has second 
thoughts, and considers transferring it all (transeamus) to Brutus (13.25).  Still, Cicero’s 
methods seem to be similarly motivated here as in the dialogues.  Texts are not 
considered to be one-to-one items for exchange.  Brutus potentially functions as a 
multiple dedicatee.  And Cicero’s response to Varro, though first seen to be in reaction to 
Varro’s own dedication, actually precedes the completion of De Lingua Latina, and 
responds to a request instead of a text.   
That Brutus and Varro can be interchanged in some places does not mean that 
Cicero’s dedications are insincere, but that they can fully function in a few contexts, so 
long as appropriate methods of exchange are maintained.  Cicero even tells Atticus that 
he is seeking a dialogue to house a dedication to Dolabella, though by this time he is out 
of completed ones (13.13).  All who are willing to play by Cicero’s rules of exchange are 
potential dedicatees.  That people ask to be included suggests that they understand that 
Ciceronian exchange is working to construct a community, and that the dialogues 
themselves are the tools for conferring social favor.  Their desire to be a part of such a 
community marks them as worthy to be members of it because it demonstrates their 
genuine belief in the viability of such a community.  Varro is so aware of the potential 
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importance of being included in the Ciceronian community that his request is regularly 
coupled in the letters with references to his jealousy.414  The dedication of Acad. satisfies 
this jealousy not only for Varro, but also for anyone else in favor of this system.  The 
inclusion of a new dedicatee only broadens Cicero’s circle slightly, but it hints at the 
circle’s potential for expanding to include anyone who is likeminded. 
The final dedication of note comes in Cicero’s Topica, which is dedicated to 
Cicero’s friend and correspondent, the jurist C. Trebatius Testa.  The relationship 
between the two dates back at least to the mid-fifties, as Cicero’s correspondence shows 
(Fam. 7.6-18).  In this period the relationship is characterized almost entirely by social 
navigation.  Cicero speaks regularly of letters of recommendation that he has written on 
behalf of Trebatius, including one that has helped him to acquire a position with Caesar 
in Gaul.  In turn Cicero regularly encourages Trebatius to maintain the relationship with 
Caesar, and repeatedly asks for updates on that front.  The Topica does not come until a 
decade later, but here too relative social positioning plays an important role.  Cicero 
actually has three motives for writing the Topica for Trebatius.  In the first case, 
Trebatius had been asking for Cicero’s translation insistently (4).  In the second place, 
Trebatius had written much for Cicero and his friends (4).  These writings may have been 
some sort of text dedicated to Cicero, but in all likelihood Cicero is making reference to 
legal opinions Trebatius the jurisconsult had given him.  Finally, Trebatius has apparently 
been involved in the oversight of some of Cicero’s personal affairs, affairs which Cicero 
did not want to suffer (5).  For all of these motives, and a general affection for his friend 
                                                




occasioned by the sight of his hometown (Fam. 7.19), Cicero dedicates the Topica to 
Trebatius.   
Like Brutus, the Topica is heavy on debt language.  Unlike Brutus, the Topica is 
not a dialogue, and it is largely targeted to an audience interested in a specific branch of 
rhetorical education.  And, as Cicero says in a letter to Trebatius, it requires the 
supplement of a teacher in order to be fully understood (Fam. 7.19).  In addition, it is 
conceived of as a translation of Aristotle’s original.  So then the Topica as a whole 
participates in a multiply-motivated exchange, as demonstrated throughout the other 
Ciceronian texts, but it is not dialogue.  Since it is not dialogue, it does not perform the 
same community-generating functions; its goal is to satisfy a very specific request, not to 
provide the communal example the dialogues provide.  Accordingly the dedication, 
though Ciceronian, does not go to the same lengths to include Trebatius in the 
community of Quintus, Brutus, Atticus, Cicero, and Varro.  This is not a text whose 
dedication could be arbitrarily assigned.  Though it functions as favor and not as 
commodity, the Topica meets a specific, non-communal need. 
The same seems to hold true for Cicero’s textual relationship with Lucceius 
witnessed in Fam. 5.12.  As Dugan has argued extensively, this letter, in which Cicero 
asks Lucceius to write an embellished history of Cicero’s consulship, closely resembles 
Cicero’s speech Pro Archia.415  According to Dugan, the letter, like the speech, is 
epideictic, a showpiece that not only makes a request, but offers examples of the style 
Cicero hopes Lucceius will use if he accedes to the request.  Specifically, Cicero uses 
ornatus in his letter to inspire the same in Lucceius.  But the letter to Lucceius, like the 
                                                
415 Dugan (2005) 47-54. 
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speech for Archias, failed in achieving its aim.  The goal of these texts, in general terms, 
had been “to project the rhetoric of display into the political domain.  They therefore 
mark an intermediate step between texts of private reflection and ones of direct political 
engagement.”416  It is only when this strategy fails that Cicero turns to a new genre to try 
to bridge the private-political gap, the dialogue.  The letter to Lucceius thus represents a 
different strategy of dedication.  It is still a strategy that depends upon gratia to be sure, 
but one which requires an external response instead of inscribing a response internally.   
 
Conclusions 
 The dedications of the dialogues have a unique power relative to other textual 
dedications because the dialogues themselves give both instruction and example of how 
their dedications should be interpreted.  The dedications model an idea of exchange that 
bristles back from a commercialized ideal of text-for-text.  Central to the subversion of 
this commercial ideal is the involvement of several figures in one dedication.  Atticus and 
Brutus especially embody this explosion of dyadic exchanges.  Not only are they two 
distinct figures brought into relation, but they are representatives of two different eras 
which can become associated through their persons.  At the same time, Cicero’s 
dedications respond to multiple motivations; they are “answers” both to other texts and to 
requests, often with one text balancing many texts or many requests or a combination of 
the two.  In this way they work more to establish a network of texts and requests than to 
achieve commercial balance.  Such a network mirrors the human one Cicero wants to 
establish.  Finally, a dedication paradoxically makes a text public.  It is a mark signifying 
                                                
416 Ibid. 70. 
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the completeness of a text, which certifies it to circulate, and so give communal 
awareness to a private relationship. 
 The requests that inspire the dedications of texts also closely resemble the 
requests that flavor the interactions of the dialogues’ interlocutors.  In these exchanges, as 
in those embodied by the dedications, only the right kind of request can succeed.  This 
request is one that does not seek only an ars, but something more, an ars synthesized 
with wisdom and virtue.  An interlocutor such as Crassus will respond only to such a 
request, or in such a way that he can correct the errors in the request. 
 This particularity on the part of the requested is no surprise; it fits right in with the 
theories of gratia and exchange that the dialogues support.  According to these theories, 
gratia is a communal virtue which is the exclusive property of the good.  The boni alone 
practice true gratia because gratia itself is the demonstration of virtue in response to the 
virtue of another.  This type of response initially engenders personal relationships, but 
easily translates into the public sphere.  This is one reason why Epicureans are so often 
contrasted with those who demonstrate the communal virtues.  Epicureans try to 
commodify their private dealings, a course of action that renders them unfit for public 
service.  The fact that they shun public service in the first place only supports their 
ignorance of the community-generating principles and responsibilities of true gratia.  
True gratia, once inspired, carries over from generation to generation, and supplies the 







 In the opening lines of the preface to De Divinatione 2, Cicero describes his 
motivation in composing of the complures libros of his post-exilic years.  Most of all, he 
says, he wished to prevent any interruption in his service to the state.  Though he does not 
say so explicitly, he clearly refers to an interruption occasioned by his exile and Caesar’s 
ascension.417  Elsewhere Cicero describes this period of his life as enforced otium, an 
otium threatened by the absence of the dignitas which Cicero identifies with the otium of 
L. Crassus in the opening words of De Oratore.  As he claims in Div. 2, Cicero achieved 
a level of usefulness to the state (and so maintained a certain amount of dignitas) by 
writing his theoretical books, books which he says communicate the optimarum artium 
vias to the Roman reading public. 
 What Cicero does not explicitly explain is why the great majority of those works 
assume the form of the dialogue.  In this dissertation I have sought to explore the formal 
capabilities of the dialogue which would make it attractive to a Cicero seeking to 
maintain dignitas and to render significant service to a state faced with a rapid shift of 
political and social structure.  In general I have argued that the dialogue form itself 
represents an antidote to the decommunalizing and populizing nature of Caesarian 
hegemony.  Other scholars, especially Narducci, Fantham, Dugan, and Connolly, have 
observed Cicero executing a similar pro-community political strategy in the dialogues, 
but they have tended to identify this strategy with Cicero’s rhetorical works and theory.  
Building on this effective and convincing mode of analysis, I have sought to expand the 
                                                




parameters of Cicero’s strategy by exploring the qualities unique to the dialogue form 
that allow it participate in this same project. 
 The communal character of the dialogue is clear on the surface in the interactions 
of the interlocutors, but there are three qualities which I have argued best encapsulate the 
project of community-building/repair: imitatio, memoria, and gratia.  Each of these 
qualities depends on community for its expression and serves to generate community 
where it does not exist.  Dialogues are, like dramas, inherently imitative insofar as they 
represent the actions and speech of their characters.  Dialogues are, in Cicero’s case, 
memorial because their action occurs in close temporal proximity to the death of one of 
the interlocutors.  Cicero often assumes the role of a mourner at a funeral.  They are also 
memorial because they conjure figures from the past into the present, for a new 
generation to contemplate and consider.  And dialogues are the loci for the expression of 
gratia, because, like other texts they may be treated as objects of exchange or as 
responses to requests, but also because they exhibit the humanitas and social ethics of the 
interlocutors. 
 Cicero treats each of these qualities in the theory of his dialogues, he represents 
each of them through the drama of the interlocutors, and he himself practices them as the 
author of texts.  For Cicero, imitation is the method by which an individual may access 
the virtue and community present in nature.  As an imitator of Plato, Cicero himself seeks 
to access the natural through the use of dialectic, and to create a continuity between 
himself and the great ethical theorist of Athens.   
Memoria is, in Cicero’s thinking, a communal process.  The rememberers 
remember best when they do so in cooperation, and it is best to remember the 
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remembered in the context of their communities.  Memory erases temporal boundaries 
and allows for a sort of transtemporal space in which figures from different generations 
may intersect (a space approximated by otium in the dialogues).  The players in the 
dialogues all come to inhabit this transtemporal space through the interweaving of the 
dialogues, and Cicero includes himself amongst their community.  Cicero envisions this 
community of the boni reiterating the ethics and political processes intergenerationally, in 
such a way that, in Arendt’s terms, the act of foundation is reproduced from one 
generation to the next, forming an organic connection between the seat of authority, the 
boni, and traditional Roman ethics (mos maiorum). 
The connection between gratia and community is well-established.  Cicero, 
however, seeks in his dialogues to distinguish between two types of gratia that lead to 
two types of society.  The first and wrong kind of gratia treats favors and gifts as 
quantifiable and commoditized objects of exchange.  To cast aspersions on this kind of 
gratia Cicero regularly associates it with the Epicureans.  The preferred type of gratia is 
the response of a virtuous individual to the expression of virtue by another.  Cicero 
himself seeks to avoid the commoditization of his knowledge into the form of a treatise, 
or ars.  The dialogue form is an acceptable alternative that privileges virtuous communal 
interaction over quantification.  At the same time, Cicero practices gratia in his 
dedication and exchange of the dialogues themselves.  Cicero repeatedly resists the 
temptation to treat the dialogues as tools for the advancement of his own social position.  
For, after all, as he says in the opening words of Div. 2, it is his goal in the dialogues “to 
benefit as many as possible” (prodesse quam plurimis). 
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In the end the dialogue form exhibits these communal characteristics better than 
any medium available to the Cicero of the 50s and 40s.  As power continued to be 
concentrated in the hands of Caesar, and as traditional ideas of politics and social ethics 
began to shift, Cicero turned to the dialogue both to demonstrate and to enact the ways in 
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